Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Yemen, Islamists

D. A. NECHITAILO

Candidate of Political Sciences

Yemen has always been and remains a strategically important destination for the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, where it is relatively easy for it to send fighters to participate in combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Africa and East Asia. The fact that bin Laden's family is descended from the Yemeni city of Hadramut, and that he took his fourth wife from there, also plays a certain role.

The leader of the world jihad movement calls Yemen "one of the best countries in the Arab-Muslim world where Islam is strictly followed." Many of bin Laden's bodyguards are also of Yemeni origin. So, the Yemeni Nasir Ah. N. al-Bahri (Abu Jandal) led his guard for a long time.

Most of this country is dominated by tribal customs. A number of Yemeni tribes are at war with each other, and there are frequent clashes with the central authorities. The population has a huge amount of weapons in their hands.

Paramilitary formations of local clans are a serious force. Islamists are actively recruiting young people who are forced by the very conditions of life to study military affairs from childhood, thanks to which radical Islamist groups receive already well-trained fighters.

The tribal structure of the local society makes it difficult for the official authorities to fight Al-Qaeda. Having enlisted the support of the leader of a particular clan, Islamists get the opportunity not only to hide from the persecution of special services, but also to transport weapons and people to different countries and in different directions. It is not uncommon for attempts by the authorities to take control of tribal areas lead to strong opposition from the latter. A vivid example of this is the operation to kill one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, Abu Ali Harisi in 2002 (formerly bin Laden's bodyguard) in Marib. The leaders regarded this special operation as an attempt to limit their autonomy.

Yemen's proximity to African countries increases its importance for global Islamism.

The special role of this country in the region cannot be ignored by the United States, whose interest in the African continent is constantly growing. The United States aims to control up to 25% of oil supplies from Africa by 2015. One of the restraining factors of American influence here may be radical Islamism. Therefore, the United States is trying to prevent the so-called "white spots" (African states with weak central power) from becoming a breeding ground for extremists and a springboard for attacking oil and gas infrastructure. A concrete manifestation of this policy was the support of the US Air Force from the air to the Ethiopian army, which in 2006 conducted military operations against the "Union of Islamic Courts" in Somalia.

It is known that in the near future it is planned to build a bridge that would connect Yemen and Djibouti. The $ 10 billion to $ 20 billion project is headed by Tariq, bin Laden's brother. The construction of the unique structure has already been approved by the leaders of the two countries. This bridge will also facilitate the transfer of Mujahideen from Yemen to African countries.

Activists of Yemeni radical Islamist groups, as a rule, have Iraqi combat experience. At the same time, it should be noted that many Yemeni citizens who go to fight in Iraq are not members of such groups 1 and are guided only by the desire to help their brothers in faith in the fight against the Americans and their allies. In order not to attract the attention of the security services, they usually return to their homeland via third countries2.

According to the Russian Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17% of the foreign mujahideen of the Iraqi jihad are Yemenis. Approximately 20 suicide attacks of Yemeni origin are known. Sheikh al - Zindani, a prominent Yemeni political figure, constantly encourages young people to participate in jihad in Iraq.3 When he was the head of Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi sent 17 terrorists to Yemen to organize sabotage against top officials of the state, as well as against American citizens.4
Yemeni Mujahideen play an important role in international Islamist structures. At one time, the Arabs who came to participate in the fight against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were divided into two camps: "Yemeni" and "Egyptian"5. The first group included the most religious Islamists who went to a foreign country at the instigation of their imams. In between fights-

The article was prepared with the assistance of the Russian State Science Foundation (RGNF), project N 09-03-00711a/R.

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together, they spent their time in constant training. After completing their time in the Afghan resistance, they either returned to their homeland or married local girls and stayed in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In al-Qaeda circles, they were called "dravesh"("lovers of the easy life") .6
FROM COMMUNISM TO ISLAMISM

Some analysts attribute the rise of radical Islamism in Yemen to its " Soviet past." The Soviet Union did have an indirect influence on this process, but the rise of radicalism cannot be attributed to this alone. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established a network of training camps in South Yemen for military training of activists of the Saudi Communist Party, the Bahrain Liberation Front, as well as the national liberation movements of Palestine, Somalia, Oman, Yemen and several other countries. Cuban specialists trained members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman7.Party schools were set up in Makalla and Aden for the "ideological training" of PLO activists. Special service agents were trained by instructors from the GDR.

Formally, all military training bases belonged to the Socialist Party of Yemen, which was funded by the USSR until 1987. Over the past 20 years, Soviet, East German and Cuban instructors have trained thousands of communist-oriented organizations to conduct sabotage and propaganda work, as well as to create party cells. All these "educational institutions" were steeped in anti-American propaganda. However, not all students of such courses and schools have dedicated their lives to serving the ideals of communism. Thus, the main ideologist of the world jihad movement, al-Zawahiri, also participated in Marxist groups during his student years, until he finally took the path of radical Islamism.

The leadership of North Yemen (the Yemeni Arab Republic, YAR) in the 1980s encouraged the sending of Yemeni Mujahideen to Afghanistan.8 On the contrary, the" socialist " People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRI) opposed the participation of its citizens in the fighting on the side of the "soldiers of Allah".

According to the British magazine "Jane's Intelligence Review", more than 3 thousand Yemeni Mujahideen took part in combat operations against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Unlike Egypt, which persecuted "jihad veterans" who returned from Afghanistan, the authorities of North Yemen, and then the United Republic of Yemen, provided shelter to"Arab Afghans". This was largely due to the growing popularity of the Islamist opposition Islah party, which was based on the Hashid clan confederation led by Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani.9 A veteran of the Afghan jihad, he was part of bin Laden's inner circle. In 1993, al-Zindani became a prominent figure in the Yemeni political arena and even joined the Government after the country's unification.10 In the mid-1990s, this State became a haven for many "Arab Afghans". In Yemen, the Islamists planned operations to kill Egyptian Prime Minister A. Sidki in November 1993 and President H. Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopia in June 1995.

During the Yemeni civil war in June 1994, "Arab Afghans" took the side of North Yemen, led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, where they were promised positions in government agencies and the army. They dealt harshly with Marxist groups in Southern Yemen. Sheikh Tariq al-Fadli, head of the Yemeni radical organization Islamic Jihad, noted that bin Laden was directly involved in financing operations to overthrow the government of South Yemen.11 After the end of the "Afghan jihad" against the Soviet troops, he began to fight against the communist south of the country, sending weapons and "Arab Afghans" there.

In the 1990s, bin Laden established military training camps in the northern city of Saad, where Mujahideen from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, and Yemen were trained. Large sums of money were allocated to Islamist educational institutions in Tanza. "Terrorist No. 1" maintained strong ties with Sheikh Tariq al-Fadli and Al-Zindani, both of whom he knew from Afghanistan.12 By the way, Tariq al-Fadli participated in the activities of Ali Abdullah Saleh's ruling party after the unification of the country.

However, not all Islamist radicals received dividends for supporting A. A. Saleh, who fought against South Yemen. Thus, the Yemeni authorities refused to comply with the demands of foreign Mujahideen to provide them with the opportunity to take leadership positions in the Yemeni army, as well as to grant freedom of action in the southern provinces. As a result, armed clashes broke out between government forces and "Arab Afghans". In July 1994, the Islamists were defeated; some of them were arrested, others were expelled from the country.

Two years later, the radicals formed the "Islamic Army of Aden-Abidan" under the leadership of "Arab Afghan" Zain al-Abidan al-Mihdar. Activists of the new structure established military training camps in South Yemen.13 According to the plans of the Islamists, this country was supposed to become a stronghold for destabilizing neighboring Saudi Arabia and attacking American and British interests in the region. The Aden-Abidan Army used to kidnap foreign citizens both for ransom and to exchange them for their imprisoned associates. The Islamists of this group conducted several joint operations with Al-Qaeda. The most famous of them is the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 off the coast of Aden.

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At bin Laden's initiative, a "sea bridge" was created during his stay in Sudan (from 1991 to 1996) to transfer weapons and jihadist fighters from Yemen in support of H. Turabi is an Islamist leader in Sudan. In turn, activists of various radical Islamist groups were transported from African countries to the states of the Persian Gulf via this transport corridor.14
Mujahideen from various countries were sheltered, treated, and trained in poorly controlled areas of Yemen. Operating through Yemeni diasporas in the port cities of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Islamist radicals provided cover for terrorist attacks. In 2006, the Mujahideen of the Union of Islamic Courts also found refuge in Yemen after the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops.

THE "YEMENI TRAIL" IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Yemeni Islamists also took part in military operations in the North Caucasus. Many of them have previously received military training at the training bases of the "Islamic Army of Aden". They were transported in small groups through Saudi Arabia to Transcaucasia, and from there to the North Caucasus.

In the Yemeni cities of Sana'a, Makal, Ibba, as well as in the provinces of Lahej and Mahra, with the support of representatives of Al-Islah, recruitment centers for mercenaries for participation in military operations on the territory of Russia began to operate in August 1999. Each recruit was promised a reward of $ 100 per day15. Muhammad H. Al-Ahdal, one of 20 members of al-Qaeda's top leadership and the mastermind behind the bombing of the USS Cole, took part in combat operations in Chechnya.

16total, there were about 200 Yemeni fighters in the North Caucasus.

Recruits were sent in groups of several people by regular planes to Jordan, then got to Georgia, where they were met by Chechen emissaries and taken by buses to mountainous areas.

The training of the recruited volunteers was organized on the basis of militant camps in Yemen with the involvement of instructors who had experience in combat operations in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. So, according to radical websites, 26-year-old Abu Ubayda al-Yemeni fought in Bosnia, where he was known as Abu Ayman al-Yemeni. Then he returned to Yemen and studied at one of the Islamic educational institutions. He arrived in Chechnya in August 1999. He fought in the detachment of Abu Jafar, known in the North Caucasus as Abu Jafar al-Yemeni. The latter was born and raised in the Saudi city of Al-Taif, and received a religious education. After the end of the first Chechen campaign, he headed a training center that trained several hundred terrorists. The most famous "graduates" were D. Saitakov and Agochiyaev, who organized the 1999 explosions of residential buildings in Moscow on Guryanov Street and Kashirskoye Highway, which killed more than 200 people. In July 2005, Mashraoui AH, a Yemeni emissary of al-Qaeda, was arrested in Baku. Izzy.

THE" SECOND YOUTH " OF ISLAMISTS IN YEMEN

By 2003, the Islamist infrastructure in Yemen was effectively destroyed. Through information channels, the authorities made it clear to the Islamists that they would not be persecuted if they refused to carry out sabotage on the territory of Yemen. 17 However, the Yemeni Islamists did not stop their destructive activities after they stopped using force. This state has become a haven for Islamists in foreign countries. And there are still quite a lot of people in various government structures of the country who sympathize with Al-Qaeda and the world jihad movement.

According to Ahmad A. al-Hasani, a former Yemeni ambassador to Syria who sought political asylum in the UK, Islamist radicals have many supporters in the army, security forces and government. There are many of them in the "Political Security Service of Yemen". The service operates a prison from which 23 Islamists escaped in early 2006; six of them were killed in clashes with police. In mid-September 2007, the President of Yemen appealed to the Waila tribe in the north of the country to return the escaped prisoners. 18 However, the request of the Head of State was not met. The radical leader is known to have been born in 1976 and traveled to Afghanistan in the 1990s, where he became bin Laden's charge d'affaires. After the start of military operations of the coalition forces against the Taliban, he left for Iran, where he was arrested. In November 2003, he and eight other Yemenis were extradited to their homeland.

Of the remaining Islamists at large, the most prominent person is 32 - year-old Qasim Ya.M. al-Raisi, also known by the "pseudonym" Abu Hurayr al-Sanaani. His brother, who fought in Afghanistan, was killed in Iraq in June 2007. The second brother, 27-year-old Ibrahim M. A. Al-Jabar Huwaidi, is being held at Guantanamo Bay. He is accused of plotting a terrorist attack against the American Ambassador to Yemen, E. Hull. In one of his statements, he claimed that he had attempted suicide several times due to severe torture in an American prison.

The Islamists who escaped from prison became the backbone of a new organization - Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQIM). It was joined by many young people sympathetic to the global jihad movement. Most of them have combat experience in Iraq 19.

Over the past two years, Islamists in Yemen have significantly strengthened their positions. In particular, they demonstrated their readiness and ability to carry out serious terrorist acts. Al-Qaeda in Yemen organized a terrorist attack near an ancient pagan temple located west of Sanaa, which killed 8 Spanish tourists. In January 2008, the organization claimed responsibility for the Hadramout massacre

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belgian tourists and their drivers. It is not by chance that foreign tourists have been targeted by terrorists, since the tourism sector accounts for the largest monetary revenues to the Yemeni budget.

Islamists posted an appeal on the Internet in which they call the agreements of the "old guard" of the Mujahideen with the government a "betrayal". One of the authors of the message, Abu H. Al-Sanaani, called for intensifying the fight against the country's leadership in order to secure the release of the Mujahideen from prison.20 "If they die,"he said," they should be considered martyrs."

After the authorities failed to respond, Ali M. Kasaila, the head of the Marib criminal police, was killed by Islamists. A few days later, Al-Qaeda issued a new appeal to the Yemeni government, which again demanded the release of Al-Qaeda activists from prison, as well as not to prevent the transfer of volunteers to Iraq, and to refuse to cooperate with the United States and its allies.21 The Islamists demanded that A. A. Saleh take vigorous measures for their release from the US prison at Guantanamo Bay.22 And the President was forced to take some steps to at least partially meet these demands. So, during an official visit to Washington, he raised the issue of the extradition of Sheikh Muhammad A. H. al-Muayyad, who was extradited from Germany to the United States on charges of supporting the Hamas movement. Islamists who are opposed to the ruling regime reasonably claim that in a situation where the international community is establishing ties with the entry of this movement into power, there is no reason to keep al-Muayyad in custody.23
NEW METHODS "UNDECLARED WAR"

Recently, Al-Qaeda in Yemen has increasingly used well-trained suicide bombers in its operations. Previously, radical Islamists relied on mining vehicles, which led to mass casualties and caused protests among the population. The first action of the "new type" took place in March 2009, when suicide bomber Abd al-Rahman M. A. Qasim blew himself up among South Korean tourists. The victims were 4 people, including 24 Yemeni guides.

Immediately after this terrorist attack, Islamists said that the act of killing tourists was directed against the government of the Republic of Korea in protest against its cooperation with Washington in the fight against terrorism. Korean tourists were also accused of ... undermining the morals of Muslims. The second terrorist attack involving a "live bomb" was carried out against a South Korean delegation that arrived in Yemen to investigate the incident. And the number of victims (except for the suicide bomber) It was not, however, AKI demonstrated its ability to deliver "pinpoint strikes" on various targets.

In such ways, Islamists demonstrate the seriousness of their statements and intentions, as well as their commitment to a certain strategy. This distinguishes them from the Iraqi radicals, who plunged the country into a series of indiscriminate terrorist attacks that claimed thousands of civilian lives.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen has clearly identified two main goals - "the apostate Saleh regime" and "the interests of the West."

At the same time, AKY pays serious attention to the information support of its shares. Islamists even publish a special magazine "Echo of Battles", which, in particular, publishes lists of intended goals. The first issue of this publication (January 2008) published materials on the expediency of local Mujahideen's participation in the fighting in Iraq. The well-known radical ideologist Abu Hammam al-Qahtani gave in his article two main reasons why it is necessary to start the fight against the "infidels" in the Arabian Peninsula. The first is purely religious, since the need to expel infidels from this region "is mentioned in the Koran and hadiths." The second one boils down to a number of military and economic considerations. Remaining in Yemen, he writes, the Mujahideen will be able to strike at ships carrying oil from the Arabian Peninsula. After all, oil is the basis for the West's economic prosperity, which it uses in the fight against Muslims in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The January 2008 issue of the first issue of Echo of Battles magazine, coincidentally or not, coincided with the attack of Al-Qaeda militants on a group of tourists in Hadramout. Two Belgians and two Yemeni drivers were killed.

In the latest issue of Echo of Battles (September 2009), the leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Naif Muhammad al-Qahtani, comments on the list of 85 Islamist terrorists published by the Saudi authorities, as well as the fact that American servicemen used torture of prisoners in Iraqi prisons. With this technique, Qakhtani seems to encourage readers to ask themselves: who, in fact, should be considered terrorists? After all, the Americans use essentially the same methods against radical Islamists as the Islamists - against Americans and other military personnel of Western countries.25
Ideologues and propagandists of radical Islamism skillfully use the facts of bullying that many AKY activists are subjected to in prisons in Yemen. In this way, Islamists try to show that, while remaining within the framework of traditional society, they are active fighters against the oppressors of their people. This strategy allows radicals to enlist the support of tribal leaders.

Another factor that al-Qaeda seeks to use to strengthen its position in the country is the ongoing civil war in Yemen. In the poor, economically backward southern parts of the country, there are frequent protests that are violently suppressed by the authorities. The latest mass clashes between local poor people and law enforcement forces, which took place in Abyan in the spring of 2009, did not go unnoticed by Islamists. Head of AKY Nasir al-Wahay-

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Shi strongly criticized the actions of government forces in the city, as well as in Lahij and Hadramout. He stated that "...Islam allows you to defend yourself... " and "... we at al-Qaeda support your actions against the government's aggression... " 26.

In his address, Wahaishi called on the people not to join any political parties, including the "Supreme Council for the Liberation of South Yemen", headed by former South Yemeni President Ali Salem al-Bida. Wahaishi made it clear that Islamists will not repeat the mistakes of 1994, when most of the Mujahideen who passed through Afghanistan helped the current head of the country, A. A. Saleh, in the fight against the "socialist" South, believing the president's promises to introduce Sharia law after the unification of the state. However, this promise was not fulfilled, and subsequently the ruling regime dealt harshly with the Islamists.

Unlike the Islamists of the 1990s, who were focused on negotiations with the ruling regime, the new radicals from Islam position themselves as irreconcilable fighters for the triumph of the universal caliphate.

The authorities 'successful tactics in the past to support moderate preachers of "pure Islam" have proved ineffective against the new echelon of Mujahideen, especially those who have gone through Iraq and Yemeni prisons. It came to the point that Al-Qaeda in Yemen appealed to President Saleh to abandon the democratic reforms, describing them as " blindly following the religion of America."

A legitimate question arises: are the Yemeni authorities in a position to fight international terrorism at all? In practice, they prefer not to engage in an open confrontation with Islamists. Thus, the dominance of clan interests over state interests is evident, despite the fact that Islamists rely on influential representatives of their tribe, who often hold senior positions in the country. We have already mentioned that Islamists have in the past helped the current ruling regime in the fight against South Yemen, which allowed some of them to occupy important positions in the security forces. The dissatisfaction of many Yemeni army officers trained by the Baathists in Iraq with President Saleh's cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism can also be seen as a deterrent to the spread of radical Islamism in Yemen.

To ensure better control over the security forces and the army, the country's leader is forced to appoint his close relatives to senior positions. So, his son Ahmed headed the Republican Guard, the brother of the country's leader Ali Saleh - commander of the Air Force, another brother Ali Muhsin-commander of the troops of North-west Yemen. Two of President Saleh's nephews hold senior positions in the country's security services. Relying on his relatives, the president found himself caught between the opposition-minded representatives of influential tribes deprived of power and the Islamists gaining strength.

The current strategy of Al-Qaeda in Yemen is limited to aggressive propaganda campaigns combined with demonstrative terrorist actions. Its main "targets" are Western tourist groups, army checkpoints, oil industry facilities, embassies of Western states and residential complexes for foreigners. It is in these ways that Islamists seek to weaken the position of official authorities.

* * *

Al-Qaeda in Yemen, realizing that it is currently impossible to fight on equal terms with the Saleh regime, which relies on Washington's support,is building its plans for the long term. While waiting for the state itself to come to a social and economic collapse, the radicals gain the support of tribal leaders, fill up their ranks with volunteers who are ready to move on to the decisive stage of the struggle at the right moment.

McGregor A. 1 Stand-Off in Yemen: The al-Zindani case // Terrorism Monitor. Washington. Vol. 3, Issue 9. March 7, 2006.

2 Yemen signs pacts with al-Qaida militants to swear off attacks, but they still love bin Laden // The Associated Press. July 10. 2007.

O'Neill B. 3 New generation of al-Qaeda on trial in Yemen // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 4, Issue 39. November 27, 2007.

4 Ibidem.

Bruce J. 5 Arab veterans of the Afghan war // Jane's Intelligence Review. Section: Middle East. Vol. 7, No. 4. April 1995, p. 175.

Al-Sulami P. 6 Watan Tanshuru al-Qissa al-Kamilah li-l-Muqatilah al-Ya'amaniyin fi Afghanistan. December 17, 2001, p. 24.

Novikov E. 7 The Soviet roots of Islamic militancy in Yemen // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 2. Issue 7. April 08, 2004.

Abd al-Majid N. 8 Mumarasat Harakat al-Afgan al-Arab wa Haritat al-Unf al-Syaisi / / IslamOnline. October 7, 2001.

Boyne S. 9 Islamic leader threatens revenge // Jane's Intelligence Review. Section: News and Analysis. Vol. 11, No. 6. June 1999, p. 5.

Ad-Din N. 10 Bin Ladin-the Taliban. Al-Afgan al-Arab wal-Umamiyya al-Usuliyya. Al-Kahira. Maktabat Madbuli. 2002, p. 38.

Al-Jarbani H. 11 Al-Yaman: Maktal Sita Ashkhas baynahum Jundiyan fi Ishtibak bi Maarib. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat. February 2005.

Macleod S. 12 The Paladin of Jihad. New York. No. 19. May 6, 1996, p. 52.

Bin Ladin U. 13 Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places - Expel the infidels from the Arab Peninsula // Azzam Publications. March 20, 2000.

Bodansky Y. 14 Bin Laden - The man who declared war on America. California: Prima. 1999, p. 374.

Tarnby M. 15 Yemen's committee for dialogue: Can jihadists return to society? // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 3, Issue 12. July 15, 2005.

Nechitailo D. 16 Mezhdunarodnyi islamizm na Severnom Kavkaze [International Islamism in the North Caucasus], Moscow, 2007, pp. 189-191.

McGregor A. 17 Op. cit.

Johnsen G. 18 Tracking Yemen's 23 escaped jihadi operatives - Part 1 // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 5, Issue 18. September 27, 2007.

Johnsen G. 19 Yemen Accuses Iran of Meddling in its Internal Affairs // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 4, Issue 2. February 20, 2007.

Johnsen G 20. Yemen Faces Second Generation of Islamist Militants // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 4, Issue 27. August 14, 2007.

Heffelfinger C., Guitta O. 21 Proposed Yemen-Djibouti bridge threatens AFRICOM security // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 5, Issue 19. October 11, 2007.

Johnsen G. 22 Is Al-Qaeda in Yemen Regrouping? // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 4, Issue 15. May 22, 2007.

Tarnby M. 23 Yemen's committee for dialogue: Can jihadists return to society? // Terrorism Monitor... Vol. 3, Issue 12. July 15, 2005.

24 Al-Qaeda Claims Killing South Korean Tourists in Revenge // News Yemen. March 27, 2009.

25 Sada al-Malachim ("Echo of Battles"). 2009, p. 42.

26 Ibid., p. 48.

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