S. G. LUZYANIN, Doctor of Historical Sciences Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences
APEC Key words: 2012, basic principles of the Forum, APEC priorities and objectives. APEC's energy and transport dimension. positions and role of leading countries participating in the Forum
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, which ended on September 9, 2012, on the island of Russian (Vladivostok) confirmed the basic principles and priorities of the Forum - development of regional integration, economic liberalization, reduction of trade and customs tariffs, etc. They were a red thread running through most of the speeches of state leaders.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, linking the traditional Bogor principles of APEC with the ongoing processes of adaptation to the WTO regime in Russia, noted the importance of dialogue between major integration structures. He highlighted the Eurasian integration vector, the convergence of APEC economies through the Common Economic Space (CES) and the Customs Union (CU) of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus with the European Union as key.
The Russian leader thus managed to shift the Forum's attention from the US Pacific Integration plan on strengthening the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Honolulu, 2011) to the advantages of this (Eurasian) integration route, using trade and transport routes, the common customs space of the three countries (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus), as well as the opportunities of the Trans-Siberian Railway, BAM and Northern Sea Route. sea route.
A BIT OF HISTORY
In 1965, Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima proposed the creation of a Pacific Free Trade Zone with the participation of industrialized and growing countries in the region.
In August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed as part of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines (currently it includes 10 States). ASEAN became the first integration group. In those years, ASEAN was mainly engaged in political tasks-isolating the liberal-minded part of Southeast Asian countries from the extremism of China during the "cultural revolution".
Kojima's ideas were brought to life in 1989, when, at the initiative of Australian Prime Minister B. Hawke, the first APEC ministerial meeting was organized in Canberra (Australia), represented by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the United States, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea Korea and Japan.
Economically, it united Asian states that either made a technological breakthrough (Japan, Singapore) or were at the stage of rapid industrial growth (South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand).
It was based on an ideological "attachment" to the United States. The original idea of regional integration was not really considered. The matter was limited to the program of development of mutual trade. Most of the participants were members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its requirements and standards were clear and close to them.
At the Seoul Meeting (1991), trade cooperation was already formalized, and the participating countries pledged not to create obstacles to the " movement of goods, services and capital."
In the 1990s, following the inclusion of the growing PRC in the project, the balance of power within APEC also began to change. There are two informal poles - Chinese and American-Japanese. All documents were considered through the prism of this confrontation. This led to the fact that most of the planned decisions, including integration ones, were not taken, because they necessarily met objections from representatives of one or another"pole".
In 1994, at the first APEC summit in history, the program for the formation of a free trade and investment zone by 2010-2020 was considered. Due to the 1997 - 1998 Asian financial crisis, as well as the special position of Japan, the United States and a number of other members who fear a sharp increase in China's influence, the program remained on paper.
In parallel to APEC, the region developed old (ASEAN) and new integration projects. The latter include ASEAN+1 (China), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea), the Japan - China - South Korea Triangle, the East Asia Summit (EAC) consisting of ten ASEAN countries, as well as the United States, Japan, Australia, India, China, New Zealand, South Korea Korea and Russia.
In 23 years, the number of members has grown to 21 states and territories. The figures are impressive: the share of APEC members in global GDP is 56%, in world trade -53%, foreign direct investment-43%, etc.
However, these figures do not reflect the main weakness of the project - the growing contradictions between individual countries and the actual failure of the project as a regional association.
A free trade zone for APEC developed countries was not created - the United States and Japan are not inclined to liberalize on the principles of organization (voluntary and non-reciprocal). Washington and Tokyo are particularly strongly opposed to the principle of non-reciprocity, when developed countries grant special tariff concessions to other, less developed countries unilaterally, without requiring reciprocity.
Such a large area as the Asia-Pacific region (APR), with a set of disparate economies (the United States and Papua New Guinea), cannot be integrated into a single zone. Hence the emergence of local trends for integration within certain sub-regions.
At the Honolulu Summit (USA, 2011), a new version appeared - the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project. The Americans proposed signing a free trade agreement between 8 economies (Australia, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and the United States). Japan is ready to join the agreement. According to initial estimates, the volume of trade under the TPP will be about $650 billion. The implementation of the project will mean a split in the Organization and the separation of the US-Japanese segment.
The TPP is planned without China and against China. The APEC project today resembles a "large communal apartment", where residents are unlikely to be able to make a "shared kitchen", and some residents would like to separate altogether.
Russia has officially been a member of the organization since 1998. At the time of accession, Russia's share in the Asia-Pacific economic and investment potential was less than 1%, and there were no prospects for its growth. Arguments about the presence of a large unrealized (in the Asian direction) resource-raw material and military-technical potential prevailed.
Now the question of who needs whom more is not formally worth it. Russia's accession to the WTO will accelerate legal and tariff compatibility with leading trading partners. The "Arab revolutions" and the aggravation of the Iranian issue increase the demand for Russian hydrocarbons that are geographically close and safe in terms of transportation. Russia can expect to receive large investments, technologies and the latest industrial equipment.
APEC SECURITY MEASUREMENTS
Despite its open and non-institutionalized nature
Of course, politics permeates all of his work. It is tacitly present everywhere - in energy, trade, investment, transport, and the environment. It hovers where big money is swirling, the interests of large, small and medium-sized players collide, when the future of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and the future of the entire world are discussed.
Based on the specifics of the project, it is impossible to talk about its military-political orientation or block nature. But the modern era has expanded the scope of the very concept of international security and the list of challenges and threats. No summit meeting can ignore the new non-traditional risks - terrorism, transnational crime, threats to energy, environmental and food security, and the increase in natural and man-made disasters. After the events of September 11, 2001 in New York, the Chinese (Shanghai, 2001) and Mexican (Los Cabos, 2002) forums adopted statements on combating international terrorism.
Today, the APEC structure has a "Special Counter - Terrorism Task Force" (CTTF), whose official tasks include " coordinating the counter-terrorism efforts of APEC economies, developing contacts with relevant multilateral organizations, combating the financing of terrorism, ensuring the security of transport, telecommunications, energy, etc."
It is difficult to fully accurately and objectively assess the effectiveness of this group. According to a number of foreign experts, its activities are secondary and are more related to defending the narrow-profile interests of individual TNCs and financial groups that have their business in East Asia. Most likely, this estimate is close to reality. Long reports on CTTF activities contain a lot of general phrases, declarations, and appeals, but there is a clear lack of evidence about the effectiveness of the structure. As you know, the activities of special services are always " a secret behind seven seals." This expression may also apply to this group.
The specifics of the group's work are activities in the international financial and economic sphere. Issues of a military-strategic nature, for obvious reasons, do not appear on its agenda. As for non-traditional challenges, the Forum tries to respond to them mainly in the following three areas:: 1) response to emergencies (natural, man-made and environmental disasters); 2) APEC activities in the field of energy security; 3) steps to minimize challenges related to food security. By the way, Russia has every right to put its own noticeable "flag" on the first two, since it has a unique experience and considerable opportunities.
It is clear that the list of painful issues of the Forum is not limited to three areas. The APEC documents set out a common goal of "ensuring personal security of a person". Formally, everything is correct. Who would object to the obvious? However, there are discrepancies. Many project members have different views on the solution to this problem both in their own country and within the Forum. The parties present their arguments, including civilizational, political-legal and humanitarian ones. The American approach considers personal security primarily from the standpoint of respecting "human rights", which annoys China and a number of other Forum countries. The Americans and their allies also like to talk about the "humanitarian component" of these rights, which in the light of the "Arab Spring" causes many countries to have a strong defensive reflex.
Thriving "Asian dragons" emphasize the quality of life of the individual and its social security. It is clear that this methodology is not only coldly perceived by poor members, but also sometimes stimulates the growth of their envy of well-fed "brothers", a sense of" injustice " of life.
Therefore, it was difficult and difficult to actually reach a consensus on the issue of "personal security" within the project. Although there are formal declarations in this regard. They include anti-terrorist words and terms inspired by September 11, 2001, as well as natural and man-made disasters in 2008-2011, including the Fukushima nuclear power plant. So far, these formulations suit and even, to some extent, bring everyone together.
Russia's" share " in the security scales in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and in the APEC project in particular, is objectively high. The status of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the presence of a military-strategic component located in the Siberian and Far Eastern expanses, the established Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, including the 2010 joint initiative on creating an open Asia-Pacific security and stability system, etc. put Russia in a leading position in the formation of various agendas security issues. Moreover, the Russian authority remains both in the " classical "(nonproliferation, deterrence of military threats, etc.) and" applied " security sphere - prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, food and energy security, environmental challenges, etc.
Today, Russian experts and politicians are actively discussing the permissible limits for attracting foreign capital and labor to the regions of Siberia and the Far East. Information from the Russian media added fuel to the fire.
Media reports that the summit will allegedly officially announce the Russian proposal to lease hundreds of thousands of hectares of Primorsky Krai and other Far Eastern regions to individual APEC countries for agricultural lease. Some scientists and politicians regard this as a fact of impending " national betrayal and humiliation of Russia." Others do not see anything criminal in this, noting that Russia can only benefit from the development of ownerless, abandoned lands - additional taxes to the treasury, an incentive for the development of the agro-industrial complex on its own.
Such information undoubtedly needs to be confirmed, but the story raised automatically touches on a deeper layer - the problem of national food security, which takes on real outlines both in connection with the plans to make a Russian contribution to solving the APEC food security problem and in connection with the Russian Federation's accession to the WTO.
It is obvious that the Soviet agricultural model, which existed before 1991, could not solve the tasks assigned to it. Only the capital and small closed cities had the necessary set of products. The current structure also does not fully meet all the criteria for national food security. Some products are imported.
On the other hand, the demand for all types of food is growing rapidly in the East Asian region. In most of our neighbors, the growth in the cost of food products outstrips the growth in the cost of petroleum products, and suitable land for further agricultural development is rapidly declining and depleted. In Russia, however, there is enough untilled and abandoned land for a separate large agricultural state. Theoretically, for Russia, the food challenge can simultaneously become both an incentive and an option for profitable external cooperation, and in a certain scenario - a long-term and profitable business. But today our country, having all kinds of resources for agricultural production, does not use them very effectively. We are still discussing whether or not to lease our land to foreigners. It seems that it is still too early to raise the Russian flag on the APEC food tower.
APEC'S ENERGY DIMENSION
Energy is a key component of the APEC structure. The Asia-Pacific region and the West Coast of the United States account for 35% of global oil consumption and 23% of natural and liquefied natural gas (LNG) consumption. China is a major consumer and producer of hydrocarbons at the same time. The volume of oil production there is 195-198 million tons per year, and the consumption in the region is 400 million tons. The Celestial Empire produces about 90 billion cubic meters of natural gas. m, and consumes 80-85. Japan consumes 240 million tons of oil and 90-95 billion cubic meters of gas. South Korea is a similar recipient of oil (110-115 million tons) and gas (40 billion cubic meters).
For Russia, whose exports currently consist of 64% of energy resources, the new Asian energy "corridors" are, on the one hand, just a salvation. In the sense that as traditional European markets are shrinking and experiencing financial difficulties, Russia is losing out on energy sales every year. And the transfer of a part of hydrocarbon exports to the East, to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, is a good compensation.
On the other hand, the problem is that the East Asian direction appeared (de facto) only in 2010 with the launch of the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline. More precisely, its first stage, Taishet-Skovorodino, with a branch line to China and an annual capacity of 30 million tons, of which 15-17 goes to China, and the remaining 13-15 million tons are delivered by rail (Transsib) to the port of Kozmino (Primorye), where they are reloaded on tankers bound for the Asia-Pacific countries.
The main infrastructure for a full-fledged Russian hydrocarbon business with the Asia-Pacific countries is just beginning to be created. At the same time, the Russian political and business elites somehow retain some illusions that our oil and gas are "waiting, waiting" in Asia, because, as some experts explain, the overall economic recovery of the East Asian region, especially China, automatically ensures long-term demand for Russian hydrocarbons.
However, by definition, there can be nothing automatic in such an unpredictable business as the hydrocarbon one, when oil prices jump and gas contracts change. The hydrocarbon market in the East Asian region has long been divided between large foreign companies-sellers and buyers of oil and gas. There are tens and hundreds of billions of dollars in this market, and no one is going to give them to Russia.
5-7 large companies have long divided the region. These are China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAZ), Korea National Petroleum Corporation (KNOC), Japan National Petroleum Corporation (JNOC), Mitsui Oil Company (MOES), Indonesian Oil Company (IPEC), etc.
A coherent system of investment, production, processing, and import/export of hydrocarbons has been created without the participation of Russian companies. And how to "Gazprom", "Rosneft" and other Russian preten-
It is a very difficult question for students to integrate into this market, to find their "niche". The fact that Rosneft and Transneft have committed to China to supply 300 million tons of Siberian oil worth $25 billion over 20 years. at $45 per barrel (the price is calculated on market conditions using quotes in the port of Kozmino), it does not mean that they have made their way to the Chinese oil market.
The share of Russian hydrocarbons in Chinese oil imports today is 5.2%, and in gas imports-3.1%, and in general, the share of the Russian sector in the Asia - Pacific hydrocarbon market is about 1.5%.
The Chinese are even tougher in defending their interests in the purchase of Russian natural gas and electricity. Using the price advantages obtained by Beijing from Ashgabat for the purchase of Turkmen gas ($160-180 per thousand cubic meters). m), Chinese companies reject all attempts by Gazprom to discuss other options, for example, $260 - 280, or slightly lower. The Chinese say:"if you don't accept our terms, we will do without Russian gas." But if Russia makes concessions, the commercial sense of Siberian gas projects focused on China is lost.
By the way, Chinese negotiators are not bluffing. They really don't have urgent needs for Siberian gas today. Under the contract with Turkmenistan, China has already received 17 billion cubic meters at the agreed price in 2011, and 30 billion cubic meters in 2012. m and plans to receive another 10 billion rubles. from Uzbekistan and about 20 billion rubles from Kazakhstan also at dumping prices.
The situation is similar for purchases of Russian electricity. Currently, Russian companies are forced to supply it to China at a price of 1.3 rubles per 1 kW / h. Moreover, the population of the Russian Far East pays 2.5 rubles for electricity, and the general tariff in the Amur Region is, for example, about 5 rubles per 1 kW / h. Chinese local authorities say that they would like to buy Russian electricity at even lower prices.
The only thing holding back Chinese energy companies in this "price war" is the growing demand for electricity (as opposed to gas) in the domestic Chinese market. More than 19 Chinese provinces are experiencing an acute shortage of it. In 2010, China's electricity demand grew by 15%. The Chinese annually consume 4.3 trillion kWh of electricity, which is 5 times more than in Russia.
They would like to receive 35-40 billion kWh annually from the Russian Federation, and by 2020, according to experts, up to 60. But this is not yet possible. The volume of Russian electricity exports to China does not exceed 1 billion kWh. The reasons are different - the mentioned price inconsistencies, low capacity of Russian power lines, etc.
Special hopes in Beijing are pinned on the cooperation of Eurosibenergo (O. Deripaska) and China Yangtze Power Company, which intend to build a thermal power plant and two hydroelectric power plants (with a total capacity of 3 GW) in the Irkutsk region, Krasnoyarsk Territory and Transbaikalia, some of which will be exported to China. In this case, the Russian share will increase to 6-7 billion rubles. kW/h. However, even this will not solve the Chinese "electric" problems.
Apparently, in tough dialogues with Asian partners, Russia must learn to use its "energy sword" both in defense and in attack. Defense is the construction of your own tankers, terminals, oil and gas processing enterprises, etc. Attack is a struggle for your prices, routes, new markets, and sometimes a change of partners (buyers). When selling, of course, you can't avoid the press of monopolists, but it will be much easier to talk to them when you have your own processing, transportation and significant market shares behind you.
APEC TRANSPORT DIMENSIONS
Functionally, the transport sector in APEC is handled by the "Transportation Working Group", whose documents state that APEC pays special attention to the issues of liberalizing transport services, strengthening the safety of transport systems, improving efficiency, and improving the quality of transport services.-
compliance with internal transport regulations.
According to the logic of the transport issue, the Committee on Trade and Investment and its Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures are close to this group, which deals with the simplification of customs procedures "to ensure efficient cross-border movement of goods and services".
If we apply the official provisions of the draft to the Russian customs and transport reality, we get the feeling that much of it, to put it mildly, does not coincide with Russia's intentions in this area.
Over the past two or three years, in addition to the existing relevant ministry, dozens of departmental, administrative and expert centers, "coordination councils", logistics companies, etc.have been created in the Russian Federation to support the APEC transport agenda. During the preparations for the summit in Vladivostok, the government allocated a lot of money in the form of grants and other financial injections. A lot of different video bridges, roundtables, conferences, and situational analyses were held, where everyone - from the minister to the ordinary scientist-reflected on the problem of how to further develop the Russian transport system and make it attractive for the APEC economies.
It would seem quite obvious that Russia, as a large Eurasian country, simply because of its geographical location, should automatically become the main "transport corridor" between East and West. Shipping Asian cargo through a single territory, with a single system of laws and tariffs, by definition, makes the transit business of most APEC countries a win-win.
However, not everything is so simple. In 2009, representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Russian expert structures recognized that Russia ranked 94th in the logistics development index, and 115th in the world out of 155 countries in terms of customs development. And everyone expected that a qualitative improvement would occur by the summit. The near future will show how justified were the optimistic statements of the ministers about reducing bureaucratic barriers when processing transit cargo (the "single window" service, etc.).
According to the APEC Business Advisory Council, preparing transport documents for the export or import of goods before the Forum in Vladivostok took 25 days (in Singapore-1 day), passing customs control of goods in the Russian Federation took 3-4 days and cost more than in any APEC country - $ 500 (in Singapore-1 day, $ 31).
According to the Hong Kong Logistics Research Center, based on the results of a study conducted in early 2012, 3 documents are required for cargo export registration in Canada or South Korea, and 8 in Russia. Only 3 documents are required for import registration in most APEC countries, and as many as 13 in Russia. The experts ' conclusion is disappointing : until recently, the Russian Federation was one of the last APEC countries to develop transport and customs services.
Official representatives of Russian Railways say that these data are somewhat controversial, that there is some bias in interpretation, etc. Of course, you can doubt the details, but it seems that the general conclusion is correct. The transport, logistics and customs systems in Russia need serious reform, and the APEC Forum may have provided some impetus for this.
We do not use the main and win-win Russian trump card-the advantage in the speed of overland cargo delivery along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in contrast to the slow circular sea routes. In the face of growing competition on international trade lines, when every day saved can bring millions of dollars in profit, it is simply unacceptable to lose such trump cards.
If the problems of governance can be solved, especially since there is a political will to do so, then it will be more difficult to cope with geopolitical challenges. One of the most acute problems that Russia may face is China's growing transport competition.
China is actively developing alternative projects for creating transport corridors bypassing the Russian Federation. Friendship is friendship (more precisely, a strategic partnership), but the money is separate. Moreover, in addition to business interests, China also has geostrategic motives.
China's creation of the transcontinental Asia-Europe railway through its territory south of the Trans-Siberian Railway is, in fact, a new "Silk Road". The first transport version of the modern Trans-Asian corridor was laid down by China in 1992, when it opened traffic on the route Lianyungang Port (Jiangsu Province) - Rotterdam (Netherlands) with a total length of 10,800 km.
The branch line connected the largest Chinese port in the Pacific Ocean and Europe, which not only economically, but also geopolitically brought China to the Old World. At the same time, China is developing a network of railways connecting the republic with the countries of Southeast Asia-the Greater Mekong project, which creates 6 branches connected to China.
It is obvious that China is turning into a transport superpower of the Asia-Pacific region. This fact can no longer be denied or ignored. Especially to the neighboring countries of the Asian giant. In this regard, it is important for Russia to develop regional transport cooperation
Siberia, the Far East, and Northeastern China.
We are talking, in particular, about the construction of the Blagoveshchensk - Heihe railway and automobile bridge across the Amur River (which has been talked about for 10 years) and the creation of large transport and logistics centers on the Russian and Chinese coasts.
This will make it possible to connect the Trans-Siberian Railway with the China-Changchun Railway, which historically, back in the period of the Russian Empire, was part of the Trans-Siberian Railway and was then called the China - Eastern Railway (CER). Such a connection will expand regional cooperation between the Chinese border provinces and Russia.
It is important to make a proper use of the fact that the development and modernization of the Russian Far Eastern Railway (Far Eastern Railway) has increased its capacity to major Russian seaports (Vanino, Nakhodka, etc.) and, at the same time, to three border railway points with the PRC and the DPRK - Khasan - Tumangan, Grodekovo-Suifenhe, Makhalino-Hunchun.
APEC COUNTRY DIMENSIONS
China. Today, many experts consider China's participation in APEC not only as a strengthening of the regional and global economic role of the republic, but also as an internal challenge for China itself. The deepening of external integration within the APEC framework automatically increases the liberal economic mood in the country, generating political pressure on the leadership both from the "right" (from private business and part of the intelligentsia) and from the "left" (from the camp of supporters of curtailing "bourgeois reforms"). At the same time, the deepening of integration processes in APEC reinforces the traditional geopolitical and trade-economic contradictions of China with the United States, Japan and their allies - partners in the project.
At the APEC summit in Honolulu (USA, 2011), the American president recalled Beijing's "traditional sins" - an undervalued yuan exchange rate and "unacceptably weak intellectual property protection. Obama, in particular, said that " in China, there is a group of producers of goods for export, which is satisfied with the existing system, and it is difficult for them to change anything politically. I understand it. But the US and other countries feel that we have had enough."
At the same time, the United States welcomed the Canadian initiative to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the basis of deepening the regional free trade system in the Asia-Pacific region.
The decisions of the APEC summit in Honolulu absolutely did not coincide with the priorities and features of the Chinese strategy. As you know, the following Forum priorities were identified there:: Strengthening regional integration through the creation of the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area and the elimination of new non-tariff barriers; supporting green growth in the trade of environmental goods, eliminating barriers to trade in natural resources.-
subsidies related to the use of fossil fuels, etc.
The Green Priorities block gives some official "authority" to the United States and its allies to launch criticism of China's environmental policy. By the way, the environment in China is really being subjected to powerful technological pressure and destruction.
Some Chinese experts believe that "the current US policy towards China has not yet reached the stage of containment" and that at least three obstacles stand in the way of implementing this policy: 1) the US presidential election (we are talking about estimates that were made before the November 2012 elections); 2) the budget deficit and national debt of the United States; 3) the existence of acute problems in the Arab East, with Iran, in Afghanistan, diverting attention and resources from the Asia-Pacific region.
In Honolulu, Chinese President Hu Jintao called on project participants to develop a concept of innovative development. This initiative demonstrates a number of regional priorities. First of all, the strengthening of China's maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific region and the leadership of the international financial center in Shanghai in the region. The need for the PRC to settle territorial (island) disputes with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, etc., preferably on Chinese terms, but in some cases a compromise is also possible. Maintaining close relations with ASEAN, including the development of the initiative launched on January 1, 2011. ASEAN - CHINA Free Trade Zones (FTZs).
It seems that China is making a special bet on this project, seeing it as the main counterweight to the American TPP. Many Chinese experts openly say that at present it is no longer possible to avoid competition between the China-ASEAN FTA and the TPP partnership model, which is being promoted in every possible way by the United States. Moreover, the Chinese believe that one of the goals of the United States is to create trade isolation for the PRC and eliminate China's national enterprises.
Data on the pace of development of the China - ASEAN FTA confirms the seriousness of China's intentions. In January-October 2011 alone, China's total direct investment in the non-financial sector of the ASEAN member states reached $2.36 billion. Singapore, Myanmar and Cambodia took the top three places in terms of attracted Chinese investment. Overall, Chinese enterprises have invested $12.426 billion in ASEAN countries over the past three years.
Under the current rules, Chinese enterprises can invest capital in any of the ten ASEAN member countries, and goods produced in this country will be able to enter the market of the other nine members of the Association on the basis of zero customs duty. Moreover, these goods can enter an even wider market on the basis of free trade agreements concluded between ASEAN and Japan, the Republic of Korea, etc.
Japan remains one of the world's economic leaders, and its authority in the world of global economy and high technologies, despite the well-known difficulties and man-made disasters, is not in doubt.
Controversies in Japan
The foreign policy strategy can be expressed in the short slogan of one of the nationalist groups - " Japan, become a full-fledged state!" It's all about disillusionment with an American ally, the desire to regain its former greatness, and the desire to gain not only economic, but also military, geopolitical power and independence.
The focus on a Japanese-American military-political alliance, regardless of emotions, remains the basis for the country's foreign policy, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. It helps in countering the rising China, saves costs, especially in the military part of the budget.
But, on the other hand, dependence on Washington, like a powerful political pressure, puts pressure on the country, not allowing it to become a "full-fledged state". And all attempts to somehow weaken and revise the allied obligations remain unsuccessful. In May 2012, President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda met in Washington. This was the first state visit of a Japanese prime minister to the United States in three years. The meeting confirmed the existence of two serious contradictions: 1) on the relocation of the US military base Futemma and 2) on Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. If the former is more about the bilateral format of relations, the latter is directly related to the economic life of the region, i.e., the object of direct attention of the APEC Forum. According to the Americans, Tokyo's accession to the TPP agreement would strengthen the US position in APEC to the detriment of China. However, to the surprise of American politicians, the Japanese public, individual politicians lobbying for the interests of agricultural businesses, and others opposed joining the American project. Japanese experts considered that the announced TPP project is not entirely beneficial to the country, that the United States simply wants to use Japan to implement its "return to Asia"doctrine.
Japanese politicians are skeptical about the possibility of trade and economic integration of the 21st APEC state. By the way, all participants of the project perceive the decisions of the Bogor summit (Indonesia, 1994) on co-operation with other countries.-
creating a free trade zone in APEC by 2020, as some "rules of good taste", but no more.
Each summit host tried to go down in history with their own "chip", which, by and large, was in no way connected with the basic (Bogor) strategy of the Forum. APEC platforms gradually turned into some kind of PR companies and behind-the-scenes political battles. The degree of effectiveness of perception of the proposed" brands "and" new means " of liberalization depended on the capabilities of the host party. In this sense, I remember the last three summits in Singapore (2009), Japan (2010) and the United States (2011).
Thus, the Shanghai Summit (2001) put forward the "Shanghai Accord", the Mexican Summit (2002)- "transparency standards", the Sydney Declaration (2007) addressed climate change and energy security for the first time, the Yokohama Declaration (2010) extended the moratorium on protectionism in trade and investment until 2013, and finally the final document in Honolulu (2011) heralded the need for a green economy to grow.
The most noticeable variant of regional integration is in the Japan - China - South Korea triangle. The combined economic power of the three countries is impressive. If we take the volume of trilateral trade, it was more than $690 billion in 2011. The investment contribution of Japan and South Korea to the Chinese economy is$80 billion. and, accordingly, $50 billion. The three countries have already decided to start negotiations on the practical creation of a free trade zone.
Representatives of Japan, China and South Korea are working on the most promising areas of the APEC agenda. These are nuclear security, food problems, agricultural business, and energy. In November 2011, the 4th meeting of high-level officials of the three countries in the field of nuclear safety control was held in Tokyo. In April 2012, the first meeting of the three countries ' agriculture ministers was held in Jeju, South Korea, which resulted in the development of a mechanism for trilateral cooperation.
The viability of this project will directly depend on who will be in charge of it, and who will "order music". Today, Tokyo, fearing Chinese pressure, is trying to incorporate the top ten ASEAN countries, as well as New Zealand, Australia, etc. into the project. China has surpassed Japan in terms of trade with ASEAN since 2008.
Bilateral Japanese-Indian cooperation is becoming more active. In April 2012, the 6th Japan-India Dialogue and economic negotiations at the ministerial level were held. Observers wonder if Tokyo and New Delhi are friends with Beijing. The successful launch of an Indian strategic missile to 6.5 thousand km in the Pacific Ocean also did not add joy to the Chinese military and politicians.
It was bad news for Beijing that New Delhi, Tokyo and Washington wanted to start trilateral strategic consultations in 2012 and conduct joint naval exercises in the area of disputed islands in the South China Sea. In general, India's active integration into the Asia - Pacific region is a kind of political know-how of the United States. What this might lead to is a separate question. In any case, the APEC Forum will not do this.
The difficult Russian-Japanese format of relations affects the Forum in one way or another. Obviously, the territorial problem has been and will continue to be a key obstacle to the transition of the bilateral model to a new, higher economic and political quality.
The minimum program of Russia and Japan is well-known-the intensification of trade, economic, investment and energy cooperation. At last year's APEC summit in Honolulu (USA, 2011), Russia and Japan signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of economic modernization. According to the document, cooperation was envisaged in terms of improving the business climate, trade and investment, and deepening contacts at the level of business structures.
Vietnam. In the last 20 years, Vietnamese socialism has increasingly taken on a capitalist face. Market mechanisms under the control of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) have long been part of the economy and politics. The XI Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (2011) set the task of turning Vietnam into an "industrial power" by 2020 on the basis of "developing an innovative economy and high technologies". Vietnam is one of the ten most dynamically developing countries in the world (8-9% of annual GDP growth). There is a total fight against corruption-for 5 years, more than 4 thousand corrupt officials, former major party and state officials were brought to court. All this is reminiscent of the Chinese experience.
The success of the Vietnamese reforms, according to some Russian experts, is partly due to the influence of the Chinese version of socialism on Vietnamese society, and partly to their own creative approach to solving the problem of "how to be rich and healthy", while remaining true to the precepts of Ho Chi Minh.
The days when the republic was economically and ideologically dependent only on the USSR are long gone. Today, its foreign policy is based on a focus on various forces, including the United States, its ASEAN neighbors, Japan, China, Russia, and others. Vietnam is trying to take an equidistant position from certain centers of influence through regional projects. However, it is not always successful-
especially when it comes to the complex Vietnam-China relationship. At the 2011 APEC Summit in Honolulu Vietnam supported the American project to create a Trans-Pacific partnership, which does not involve China's participation.
Of the entire inner circle of Vietnam, the Chinese neighbor is by far the biggest headache for the Vietnamese leadership. Experts note that if earlier the PRC declared its rights to the disputed islands in the South China Sea in the language of diplomacy in the framework of regular consultations, today the degree of dispute between Beijing and Hanoi over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago, on the shelf of which oil, gas and mineral deposits have been discovered, has noticeably increased.
In June 2011, Hanoi spoke of its desire to " stop anyone who tries to encroach on Vietnamese sovereignty." In response, China began to block the work of Vietnamese vessels conducting exploration of deposits in the South China Sea.
It came to the announcement of Beijing's plans to place an air base on the Nansha Islands (Spratly), respectively Hanoi-to use force to protect their sovereign rights. By the way, not only China and Vietnam claim the Spratly Islands, but also Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. This is how the "sea node" turned out. And neither Beijing nor Hanoi seems to know how to unleash it.
The visit of Nguyen Phu Trung, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, to China in October 2011 was of fundamental importance, and after a meeting with Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CPC, a joint statement was issued on the parties 'intention to" properly resolve all maritime issues". The statement cooled the hotheads in both China and Vietnam. It is impossible to say that the visit completely resolved the contradictions - they remained. But the anti-Chinese demonstrations of Vietnamese people in Hanoi stopped, and Vietnamese officials began to say again that after all, " China is a good comrade and a good brother."
Most Russian and foreign experts point out that the current island dispute is only a visible part of the iceberg of contradictions. The current conflict is based on China's resentment of Vietnam, including the events of February-March 1979. Then the PRC, as you know, decided to" teach a lesson " to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the fact that it had removed the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea (Cambodia) a year earlier. Vietnam was the closest ally of the USSR, which at that time had not the best relations with China. As a result, in February 1979, Chinese tanks crossed the border with Vietnam and moved on Hanoi.
Battle-hardened Vietnamese units stopped the 600,000-strong Chinese corps, destroying about 300 tanks. In 1991, peaceful relations were restored, but the fallout in both Beijing and Hanoi remained. And today it is no-no yes and is manifested in the memoirs of the Chinese and Vietnamese military, then in scientific and historical disputes.
It is surprising that the Vietnamese today do not particularly remember the longer (1964 - 1973) and more bloody war with the Americans, and if they do, then without much emotion and resentment. The economic and political relations of the former irreconcilable enemies are now developing in a complex way, quickly reaching the level of partnership. Moreover, official Hanoi has entered into delicate negotiations with Washington, which offers to create an international format for settling disputes between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea. It is obvious that such an "internationalization" of the conflict is beneficial, first of all, to the United States, which unexpectedly received in the person of "offended" Vietnam an additional means of deterring the strengthening of the PRC in Southeast Asia.
The Vietnam-Russia "corner" was and remains an important part of both the overall configuration of the APEC Forum and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, especially in terms of energy. Vietnam for Russia is a kind of "economic window" to ASEAN. The history of relations between Moscow and Hanoi has no conflict pages, on the contrary, the Vietnamese remember the Soviet Union's help to their country in difficult years.
The Vietnam-Russia joint venture Vietsovpetro retains its leading position in Vietnam's oil and gas sector. Vietgazprom, a joint operating company with Gazprom's participation, is operating steadily on the continental shelf of Vietnam.
Russia provided Vietnam with a loan for the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant, and the trade turnover in 2011 amounted to almost $3 billion. For comparison, China-Vietnam trade is estimated at $8 billion. Traditionally, Vietnam-Russia military-technical cooperation remains strong. At one time, the USSR not only fully provided the defense of Vietnam, but also leased the famous Cam Ranh naval base. Today, there are no Russian military sailors there.
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Thus, the Forum's " agenda "included the main issues of cooperation, including the Russian" road map " for foreign investment - creating a favorable investment climate, reducing customs and bureaucratic barriers. The Vladivostok stage is over. In 2013, the APEC summit will be held in Bali (Indonesia). The long journey of APEC member countries towards cooperation and liberalization continues.
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