Dorotea PETERS. Politische und gesellschaftliche Vorstellungen in der Aufstandsbewegung unter Pugacev (1773 - 1775). Osteuropa- lnstitut...Wiesbaden. 1973. 364 S.
D. PETERS. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PUGACHEV (1773-1775)
The book by a West German historian is a notable phenomenon in the study of the Peasant War of 1773-1775 in the West, where the "Pugachev theme" is not very popular among researchers. It is also of particular interest to .historians of our country, since the ideology of the Pugachovites in Soviet historical science has not yet been studied sufficiently-
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The social and political views of the opponents of the Pugachev uprising, which were reflected in their reaction to it (Peters discusses these views in the second part of his monograph), were almost completely ignored by Soviet scientists. The choice of the Peters topic can be considered very successful: on the basis of published sources alone (the author did not use archival materials), a specialist can make many important observations. The book contains a large number of different conclusions, it is impossible to say about all of them in the review (we will focus on the most significant ones).
A positive aspect of D. Peters ' study of the Pugachev ideology is that she pays attention not only to the program statements of the rebels, but also to their actions, which were based on "unformulated or unclear ideas" (p.10). The author's attempt to find out the peculiarities of the ideology of various social categories of the population that participated in the uprising is also worthy of approval. Separate sections of the first part of the book are devoted to the socio-political views of the Yaitsk Cossacks, "non-Russian participants" in the uprising, Ural workers, peasants and other insurgents, and at the beginning of each such essay data on the situation of these groups of participants in the movement are given.
However, the possibility of creating a valuable study was hindered both by Peters ' general methodological guidelines and her biased attitude towards the socio-political ideas of peasants and representatives of other social categories of the Russian population in the second half of the XVIII century. Peters proceeds from the idealistic premise that "the rebels' ideas about the purpose of the movement and the social order they sought" reflect the essence of the movement (p. 10). This, in fact, explains the author's interest in the ideology of the Pugachevites. Peters ' denial of the existence of classes in eighteenth-century Russia on the grounds that at that time there were no social groups organized to protect their common interests is completely illegitimate (p. 13). At the same time, Peters contradicts himself and recognizes the Pugachev movement as a form of class struggle (p.170).
The book belittles the role of the peasants in Pugachev's uprising. According to the author, this was not a peasant war, since it was supposedly only at the last stage of the uprising that the peasants "became the defining element of the movement" (p. 105). In fact, even at the time of the siege of Orenburg, economic, imputed and landed peasants made up the majority of the insurgents. It is curious that at one point in his book Peters, contradicting himself, recognizes the Pugachev uprising as a peasant war (p. 170).
Peters also belittles the level of consciousness of the peasants. She argues that the naive monarchism of the peasants of the Volga and Kama regions led to the complete lack of independence of their actions. In her opinion, only "in exceptional cases" did the peasants of this vast region deal with the landlords on their own (p. 113). In reality, the very idea of destroying the landlords belongs to the peasants. Initially, Pugachev, as is known, wanted to take away the "villages and villages" from the nobles, and transfer them to a salary. However, taking into account the demands of the peasants, he decided on a more radical solution to the issue. It was the aspirations of the peasants that most determined the Pugachev program. This once again shows that the Pugachev uprising is a peasant war. The July manifesto of the supposed tsar was only a kind of" legal cover " for the peasants who hated their masters. The peasants of the non-Russian peoples of the Middle Volga region, on the other hand, went beyond the appeals of the July manifesto in one matter: they, as Peters rightly points out, dealt with Christian priests on their own initiative (p.88). It is very significant that the peasants were ready to support any impostor who defended their interests, without caring about his rights to the throne. This is also largely recognized by Peters, who pointed out that "the peasants are ready to follow anyone who, with a semblance of right, has come forward as an initiator of the struggle against their superiors" (p. 117).
Peters ' claim that the peasants did not oppose the entire serf system, but sought only to destroy bad masters, is completely wrong (p.119). At the same time, it refers to the fact that in some cases the rebels spared their landlords, but it obscures the extremely important fact that the pardoned landlords did not remain the owners of the peasants. In addition, Peters comes to the conclusion that in the appeal of Pugachev Colonel I. N. Gryaznov to zhi-
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According to the Chelyabinsk decree of January 8, 1774 (which, in her opinion, was more in line with the peasants ' ideas than the July manifesto), there is only a moral condemnation of the domestic servants for excessive exploitation of serfs, and that this condemnation itself contains recognition of their rights to the peasants (p.110). This conclusion is made on the basis of several lines of Gryaznov's address taken out of context. Peters ignores the fact that this appeal clearly supports Pugachev's anti-serfdom program, his intention to remove the peasants from the possession of the nobles. The moral condemnation of the nobility is used by Gryaznov only to justify this program, which, of course, is naive and contradictory. The rebels did not rely on any theory, their ideology was part of an unsystematic consciousness. However, based on life practice, they were still able to put forward quite definite anti-serf slogans.
Peters admits that the July manifesto proclaimed the abolition of serfdom. But it asserts that in practice the rebels, and" in one case " Pugachev himself, retreated from their anti-serf slogans (p. 119). This thesis does not receive a convincing justification. In the actions of the peasant who saved the young nobleman D. V. Mertago, as he promised to become his employee, as well as in the arguments of the former rebel Marusha that in the event of a victory of the uprising, its participants would change places with the "masters", from the point of view of Peters, the "goal of a simple turn of domination and submission" was reflected (page 119). The author attaches excessive importance to individual facts. In addition, the first of these facts does not reflect the desire to preserve serfdom: the worker is not a serf. The reasoning of a former Pugachev resident who became a rich man in Siberia is not significant in the light of the fact that the rebels simply destroyed the "masters". Finally , referring to an article by L. D. Ryslyaev 1, Peters states that " Pugachev gave a Penza resident the family of a peasant." On this basis, it is broadly concluded that the rebels "generally" took the unfreedom of "individual families or groups" for granted (p.120). However, L. D. Ryslyaev, on whom Peters relies, did not take into account the fact that the" decree " on granting the Penza merchant A. Ya.Koznov a peasant family is not a document of the Pugachev rate. This paper was drawn up on the initiative of Koznov himself, who did not dare to give it to Pugachov2 for signature .
The book rightly emphasizes the important role of the Yaitsk Cossacks in the Peasant War as initiators of the movement. The author pays a lot of attention to the consideration of bundle data in their environment. In connection with these data, a conclusion is drawn about two trends in the movement of the Yaitsky Cossacks: the well-to-do Cossacks of the military party, from the point of view of Peters, advocated the restoration of Cossack self - government and the punishment of elders, and also sought to become the "upper stratum" in all of Russia (pp. 48-50), while the "ordinary" Cossacks sought primarily to elimination of "social oppression of elders and ... property inequality" (p. 52). The first trend, according to the author, prevailed. In the actions of the Cossacks, who robbed the elders and forbade the peasants of the Orenburg region to work for the landlords, Peters sees a manifestation of the ideology of the Cossack lower classes (p. 60). One can, of course, speak of various tendencies in the movement of the Yaitsk Cossacks. But they were not as pronounced as the author believes. Naturally, it is impossible to draw a conclusion about the desire of poor Cossacks to eliminate property inequality. The actions of those who urged the peasants not to work for the landlords corresponded to the general direction of the struggle.
Peters rightly points out that "the ideological influence of the Yaitsk Cossacks on the insurgent movement was small," because Pugachev's manifestos reflected the "goals and ideas" of various groups of the population (p.59). However, it is quite wrongly inclined to regard the ideology and movement of the Yaitsk Cossacks in general as reactionary (Peters uses the word "reactionary" in quotation marks, apparently trying to rise above the idea of the existence of progressive and reactionary movements) on the grounds that,
1 L. D. Ryslyaev. On some peculiarities of the Peasant War in Russia in 1773-1775 "Scientific Notes" of the Pskov Pedagogical Institute, issue 23, Department of History, 1964.
2 See R. V. Ovchinnikov. From the experience of reconstruction of lost documents (on the example of decrees and manifestos of E. I. Pugachev). "Source studies of national history". 1975. Moscow, 1976, pp. 230-231.
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that they allegedly proceeded "not from a high principle of freedom, but from a fundamental hostility to the new", that is, to changes in their position (p. 51). This conclusion is made in the spirit of the author's subjectivist attitude. The most important fact that the Cossacks fought together with the peasants against serfdom is obscured.
Much attention is paid to the ideology of the Ural workers. At the same time, Peters, in fact, takes the assigned peasants and permanent workers in one bracket, asserting that they all sought to "eliminate factory work", to become independent peasants (pp. 104-105). But the author contradicts himself by showing that the trained serfs had no intention of destroying factories and taking up agriculture (p. 100, 103). The fact that "Pugachev did not find specific... Peters explains, first of all, that the leadership of the insurgents is ignorant of this category of the population (p.98). It seems that this point of view is not without reason.
Peters refers the townspeople to one of the" small groups of participants " in the Peasant War, who did not have "their own interests in the uprising" (p.127), and pays little attention to them. At the same time, she completely loses sight of the position of the lower urban population and writes only about rich merchants. Peters ' conclusion is largely correct that the townspeople "did not introduce a specific program into the movement" (p.134). However, the freedom of salt trade proclaimed by the Cossacks in Penza was primarily beneficial to merchants. - The townspeople were not, of course, a" group "of the population"without their own interests in the uprising." They tried to get rid of the poll tax, conscription (this is what they were promised). Undoubtedly, other groups of the population (soldiers, Volga and Don Cossacks, lower clergy) also had their own interests, although, from the point of view of Peters, these groups did not have such interests.
Much space in the book is devoted to the consideration of the socio-political views of the" non-Russian participants " of the uprising, especially the Bashkirs. The author, in fact, denies class differentiation among Bashkirs, wrongly claiming that "less influential Bashkirs were not economically dependent" on the "upper stratum" (p. 66). Peters believes that all Bashkirs sought to "become the only masters on their territory", equally opposed all Russians, trying to expel them from Bashkiria (p. 71). The actions of such people as Salavat Yulaev, in the author's opinion, were an exception and were explained, as she suggests, by strategic considerations (p. 74). Thus, Peters tries to gloss over social contradictions among Bashkirs and exaggerates national divisions in the insurgent movement. According to Peters, the Kazakhs did not take part in the uprising at all, but only acted as robbers (p. 79), which, as is well known, is incorrect.
More correctly, Peters assesses the struggle of the non-Russian population of the Middle Volga region and the Kama region. She comes to the conclusion that representatives of pagan nationalities in the past opposed their direct oppressors (churchmen, officials, and their own social elite), but did not show hostility to the Russians and did not seek to return to paganism (pp. 88-89), and the Tatars during the uprising had the same social division as the Russians (page 85).
Separate chapters of the first part of the monograph describe the role of Pugachev himself in the insurgent movement, his imposture, religious moments in the uprising, and its significance in Russian history. It seems that Peters ' opinion about the imaginative, concrete thinking of Pugachev and the entire "ordinary population" of Russia in the eighteenth century is fair (p. 152). The author correctly recreates the main features of the" good "tsar according to popular ideas: a combination of" majestic severity " with care and accessibility (p.153). However, it is impossible to agree with Peters that Pugachev's victories were crucial for the people to support him (p. 153, etc.). Peters herself repeatedly stressed that representatives of various social categories of the population became followers of Pugachev because he defended their interests.
Considering the question of religious aspects in the insurgent movement, Peters correctly concludes that the schismatics played a minor role in it. She rightly emphasizes that " in practice, the support for a split was exhausted... formalities" (p. 157-158). Peters also rightly acknowledges the almost complete absence of a "Christian cover for the social demands" of the Pugachevites (p.159). However, unlike Soviet historians, she sees this as a manifestation of immaturity.-
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the weakness of the insurgent ideology. It seems that the rebels ' religious justification of their program would have mattered in the Middle Ages, but not in the age of Enlightenment, when such justification became an anachronism.
Peters, in fact, denies the progressive significance of the Pugachev uprising in Russian history. At the same time, from her subjectivist point of view, the author admits the possibility of describing the Pugachev movement as progressive (she uses this word in quotation marks), "because the rebels turned against social injustice, oppression and the deterioration of their situation" (p.168).
In the second part of the book, Peters examines in detail various aspects of the government's policy in connection with the Peasant War (in particular, its propaganda activities), the behavior of the nobles during the uprising, and finds out how it was evaluated by Catherine II and the Russian nobles. The author concludes that neither Catherine II nor the Russian nobles understood the social nature of Pugachev's movement (pp. 179, 213, etc.). Indeed, Catherine tried to obscure the essence of the events that took place; as Peters correctly points out, she was characterized by evaluating negative phenomena from a moral perspective (p.199).
However, it was quite clear to some nobles, in particular A. T. Bolotov, during the Pugachev uprising that there was a grassroots movement against them. Peters argues that the Western European ambassadors and travelers, whose reports on Pugachev's movement she examines in a special appendix, had a fundamentally different understanding of the uprising than the Russian nobles (pp. 258, 261). However, no convincing evidence of this is provided.
The book revealed a lack of understanding of the class essence of absolutism. The author considers the nobility and absolutism as allies (p. 188), and emphasizes the non-independence of the nobility. This, according to Peters, was reflected, in particular, in the fact that during the Pugachev uprising, the nobles "did not defend themselves on their own initiative" (p.212). What the author misses is that provincial nobles, as a rule, did not have any opportunities for self-defense.
As we can see, in a book written by an author who belongs to the left wing of bourgeois historiography, but adheres to idealistic positions, only individual observations are valuable.
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