The paper deals with a social group of the Kabardino-Balkarian society - the so-called "praying youth", which emerged during the post-Soviet religious revival. The paper shows some distinctive features of this group - their social base, their world outlook, and their behavioral patterns and markers. A special attention is paid to the analysis of the reasons of emergence of the religious conflict that divided the society into those professing a "popular" form of Islam and those "praying", with their fundamentalist agenda. The field materials illustrate how the "popular" and/or "traditional" culture vanishes within the subculture of the "praying youth".

Keywords: Islamic revival, the prayers, traditional Islam, fundamentalism, extremism, Kabardino-Balkaria, ritual, conflict.

A striking phenomenon in the public life of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the late 80s and early 90s of the XX century was the religious revival, which was particularly pronounced in relation to Islam. This phenomenon, which has become a stable scientific term today, is understood as the process of mass construction of mosques and registration of religious communities, the formation of a system of religious education and enlightenment, and in general - a sharp increase in public interest in religion.

By the end of the Soviet era, in Kabardino-Balkaria, as in other regions of the country, religion as a whole was pushed to the sidelines of social life. The overwhelming majority of the republic's population was characterized by religious indifferentism.

Takova A. The" praying " Muslim youth as a subculture of Kabardino-Balkar society / / Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad]. 2016. N2. pp. 255-280.

Takova, Aleksandra (2016) '"Praying Youth' as a Subculture of the Kabardino-Balkar Society", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(2): 255-280.

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In the sphere of ritual practice, a peculiar "folk" form of Islam was established, which was characterized by the presence of a large number of elements that were not Islamic in origin. The rites of the funeral and memorial cycle were especially rich in such elements, and the religious nature of the population of Kabardino-Balkaria was largely reduced to the performance of these rites. The following phenomena most clearly contradicted the Islamic prescriptions: feeding the mourners during the first three mourning days in the house of the deceased, compiling lists of mourners and the amount of money they brought to the family of the deceased, then distributing memorial packages (sadekye) on the 52nd day and on the anniversary in accordance with these lists, organizing lavish memorial feasts on the u,u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, u, 40, 52 days, as well as six months and a year after the day of death, buying new things and distributing them to relatives and neighbors of the deceased as a deur (atonement for the sins of the deceased), installing expensive monuments, often with photos of the deceased, etc.D. In addition, there was a kind of competition in the republic in the performance of these rites - according to the pomp of the memorial table, the value of memorial packages, the size and cost of monuments, etc., which drove families with modest incomes into debts that were often paid for years. Popularly, the local mullahs who supported this ruinous practice in this form were given the nickname "khyedefish" ("skinning corpse") .1
In 1986, on the eve of the religious revival, one of the leaders of the Muslim clergy of the North Caucasus, M. Gekkiev, gave a rather succinct description of the peculiarities of religious practice established in the republic by this time, noting, in particular, that " the funeral rituals performed by Kabardians and Balkars are nothing but inventions of local effendi and mullahs"2. This was not surprising, since by the end of the Soviet era, there were virtually no cultists in the republic who had a special religious education. According to the fair remark of the researcher A. Kh. Mukozhev:

1. Mukozhev A. H. Islam in Kabardino-Balkaria before and after October 2005. 2008. N7. P. 213.

2. Department of the Documentation Center for the latest history of the KBR Archival Service. F. 1. Op. 28. d. 77. L. 15.

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By this time, only a few people were able to read and write Arabic and, especially, interpret the Koran, and the mullahs who were preparing privately received minimal knowledge of funeral and wake services, marriage registration, and performing namaz, and the suras necessary for worship were memorized by them and often interpreted arbitrarily. Often, worshippers used prayer texts written in Russian graphics.3
As a result, all the necessary conditions were created under which each of the servants of the cult, to the extent of their creativity, brought something different to religious practice. Because of this, the forms of religious observance in Kabardino-Balkaria were not unified and sometimes significantly differed in different regions of the republic, or even in neighboring villages.

An important aspect of the religious revival of the late 80's-early 90's of the XX century was the emergence of a new social group - religious youth, which was sharply different from the society as a whole, whose representatives were characterized by situational religiosity, that is, its manifestation only on certain occasions-funerals, weddings, a number of major holidays. Due to the fact that the representatives of this group had a number of bright external and behavioral markers, including strict performance of the daily five-fold prayer, they often began to be called "praying".

The particular sensitivity of young people to religious revival was largely due to the fact that the socialization of this group coincided with the crisis and subsequent collapse of the Soviet ideological system. There is no doubt that the natural psychological craving of young people for everything new also played a role. In this case, the Islamic religion, including its external manifestations (silver jewelry, rosaries, books in Arabic, slight unshaven hair, etc.), was perceived as a new "fashionable" trend with elements of "eastern exoticism"in the early 90s of the XX century. Knowledge of the Arabic language, the subtleties of Islamic religious practice, observance of Eid (fasting), strict adherence to food bans, etc. became signs of a "good" tone, a kind of trend.

3.Mukozhev A. H. Islam v Kabardino-Balkariya v gody sovetskoi vlasti [Islam in Kabardino-Balkaria during the years of Soviet power]. 2007. N1. P. 174.

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The social base of the "worshippers" mostly consisted of representatives of students and high school students of city schools, especially in Nalchik. It was among the urban population in the 1990s and early 2000s that numerous religious institutions opened in the wake of the religious upsurge were operating. So, in Nalchik, there were representative offices of the Salvation Charity organization (Saudi Arabia), the al-Igasa International Organization (Saudi Arabia), the al-Nadwa World Assembly of Islamic Youth, the Islamic charity organization Islamik Relief, the branch of the International Islamic Organization Daguat (Saudi Arabia), the educational and Educational Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences.Minaret Computer and Linguistic Center, etc. The initiative to open these institutions belonged mainly to Arabs and Adyghe repatriates. Thus, in 1992, on the initiative of repatriated Adygs, with the financial support of the Salvation organization, the Sharia Institute was opened in Nalchik - the first higher Islamic educational institution of the KBR, which was renamed the Institute of the Arabic Language in 1994.4 The founders of the Institute also became its first teachers. These are Muhammad Khair Khuazh (who also translated the Koran into Kabardian with Zaur Naloev, one of the leaders of the Kabardian national movement, and another repatriate, Fuad Duguzh), Shawki Balag, Abdul Wahhab Kankosh 5, and others. In 1996, this institute was closed. Since 1997, the Islamic Institute under the jurisdiction of the Duma has been operating in the republic, which was transformed in 2007 into the North Caucasus Islamic University. Imam Abu Hanifa.

In rural areas, the activities of these institutions were significantly more restrained. During the entire 90 - ies of the XX century. in one way or another 54 primary religious education centers were registered at various times 6,

4. Babich I. L., Yarlykapov A. A. Kabardino-Balkaria: development trends and problems of the modern Islamic movement. 2003. N4. P. 197.

5. Babich I. L. Interaction of internal and external factors in the process of creating a state mechanism for countering Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus // International Community and globalization of security threats: collection of scientific reports in two parts. Part 2. International community and national states in search of answers to new security threats / Ed. by V. V. Grokhotov, B. N. Kovalev, E. A. Makarova. Veliky Novgorod: NovGu im. Yaroslav the Wise, 2008. P. 164.

6. Mukozhev A. H. Islam in Kabardino-Balkaria before and after October 2005, p. 210.

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mostly a kind of Sunday school for the study of Arabic and the basics of the Koran in secular educational institutions. However, they did not work for long and by the end of the 90s of the XX century. they were no longer active. Only in the city of Baksan (the second most populous settlement of the KBR) from 1991 to 2002, the A. Dymov madrasah functioned quite successfully. The lower activity of Islamic educational organizations in rural areas was primarily due to the greater commitment of rural residents to traditional ideas, a certain reverence for the older generation - carriers of "popular" Islam. However, given that a significant part of rural youth had constant close ties with cities (studied at universities, schools, had relatives, etc.), the impact on them of the above institutions was hardly weaker than on urban youth.

The greatest authority and popularity among religious educational institutions was enjoyed by the Islamic Center 7, which began its work in 1993. This institution positioned itself as a cultural and educational religious organization created to promote the revival of Islam in the CBD. The Council of Jamaats and Shura functioned at the Islamic Center. The Center was funded by foreign charitable foundations located in Nalchik and Moscow8. Among them, in particular, was the SAR Foundation. 9
Since 2004, the Ministry of Education and Science of the KBR has banned providing premises in educational institutions to representatives of faiths for working with the population. In view of this, most of the primary religious education centers in the republic were closed. The closure of religious educational institutions was not a spontaneous action. It was associated with the implementation of a broad campaign in the first half of the 2000s aimed at preventing the spread of the virus.

7. Registered by the Ministry of Justice of the KBR on July 7, 1995 / / Politics and law in the sphere of ethnic and state relations of Kabardino-Balkaria / Edited by M. N. Guboglo, Kh. Kh. Sokhrokov. Moscow-Nalchik Publ., 2001, vol. 2, p. 238.

8. Babich I. L., Yarlykapov A. A. Kabardino-Balkaria: development trends and problems of the modern Islamic movement. p. 196.

9. Berezhnoy S. V. Kabardino-Balkar Republic as an example of the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism in the North Caucasus. 2006. N2. P. 173.

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islamic radicalism. In addition to the elimination of religious education centers, this campaign was carried out through a whole range of measures, including the mass closure of mosques not controlled by the DUM under the pretext of the expiration of the lease term for the premises used for them, the compilation of infamous "Wahhabi" lists (lists of persons allegedly belonging to the radical extremist underground), etc. that the official channels of introducing young people to the Islamic religion were almost completely eliminated and became latent. Only by the end of the 2000s did the network of religious educational institutions gradually begin to revive. Today, Kabardino-Balkaria has the only Nur madrasah in the republic (operating since 2009, licensed since 2011). In addition, there are 25 Sunday schools attached to rural mosques in the republic, where parishioners (usually elderly people) learn to read the Koran, and less often-to write English.They learn Arabic and learn the minimum necessary ritual rules. Sunday schools do not provide a systematic Islamic education, but contribute to improving the level of religious knowledge of parishioners.10 The only higher Islamic educational institution in the KBR is the North Caucasus Islamic University named after V. I. Abramovich. Imam Abu Hanifa.

Since the Islamic revival in the republic, as already noted above, revealed an almost complete lack of personnel capable of adequately meeting the growing spiritual needs of the society, the leadership of the organization created in 1991. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria (DUM KBR) has started to solve this problem by sending promising young people to study in foreign spiritual educational institutions. According to R. A. Silantiev's just remark

The main criteria for choosing educational institutions were payment for the road by the host party, free tuition, housing, food, and preferably a scholarship. Of course, the training centers that offered such preferential conditions were not so well known,

10. Akkieva S. I., Sampiev I. M. State and problems of Muslim education in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic // Theory and practice of social development. 2015. N22 [www.teoria-praktica.ru, accessed on 1.03.2016].

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like Cairo's Al-Azhar University, however, they seemed suitable for religious educational programs and Arabic language teaching 11.

According to N. M. Yemelyanova, "in 1994/95, about a hundred students from Kabardino-Balkaria studied in Saudi Arabia (Muhammad bin Saud University), Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey." 12 Since the second half of the 1990s, the number of students from Kabardino-Balkaria who received a foreign religious education has noticeably decreased, on the one hand, due to the fact that the republic opened its own institution of higher religious education in 1997 - the already mentioned Islamic University, and on the other hand, due to a sharp decline in the volume of foreign religious education funds allocated by foreign foundations and charitable organizations for Russian citizens to receive religious education. Therefore, by the beginning of the 2000s, the practice of receiving religious education abroad in the republic was reduced to nothing.

However, the knowledge gained by young people abroad often went against the religious beliefs mentioned above that existed in the republic. This aspect was superimposed on the nuance that a significant part of the educated youth identified themselves as persons called to fulfill a certain missionary purpose. Concerned about the erosion of religion in society, its marginalization, and the loss of its position as a regulator of social and family life, educated young people have energetically set about correcting the existing state of affairs. In view of this, they actively began to spread an interpretation of Islam on the territory of the republic that was more consistent with its classical fundamental canons, but in many respects different from its "folk" form, which was professed by the majority of the population. This became the basis for the emergence of a religious conflict in the republic.

It should be noted that the active work carried out by the DUM of the KBR in the 90s of the XX century on the creation of a professional personnel base for cult ministers did not give the expected result in the end. Due to the fact that the majority of representatives of the educated mo-

11. Silant'ev R. A. Religious factor in foreign policy conflicts in the Caucasus / Religion and conflict / Edited by A. Malashenko and S. Filatov; Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007, pp. 144-145.

12. Emelyanova N. M. Secret and explicit in North Caucasian Islam / / Daryal. 2001. N4 [http://www.darial-onlain/2002_4/emel.shtml, accessed from 21.11.2009].

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лодежи оказались носителями нетрадиционных для субрегиона, по сути фундаменталистских, религиозных идей, с конца 90-х гг. XX в. началась кампания по "выдавливанию" их с должностей имамов приходских мечетей, которые они заняли во второй половине 90-х гг. Апогеем данного процесса стало принятие в 2004 г. на IV съезде мусульман КБР постановления, согласно которому раис-имамов и имамов населенных пунктов стали назначать по решению ДУМ, по согласованию с главами местных администраций (с начала 1990-х гг. имамов выбирала община верующих конкретного населенного пункта). Ввиду того что вопрос о кадровом обеспечении мечетей, таким образом, всецело перешел в компетенцию руководства ДУМ, исключалась возможность активной работы носителями нетрадиционных для республики религиозных идей. В результате имел место следующий процесс: вместо молодых образованных имамов к руководству приходами вновь пришли представители старшего поколения, не обладавшие специальным религиозным образованием. В итоге, по данным самого ДУМ в 2003 г., специальным образованием обладали лишь 10% из 138 официально зарегистрированных служителей мусульманского культа КБР13.

It should be noted that the leadership of the Duma was generally aware of the validity of criticism of the" praying " state of religious rituals in the republic. In the early 2000s, it carried out a great deal of work to bring the rites of the funeral and burial cycle into line with the canonical religious prescriptions. In 2004, on the eve of the IV Congress of Muslims of the KBR, the Duma adopted a resolution "On streamlining the funeral rites of Muslims". The resolution was later issued as a separate booklet.14 In particular, it reflects most of the issues that were the subject of disputes between "praying people" and traditionalists in the early and mid-90s. Many profligate rites and rituals that have become part of the tradition have been sharply criticized. In particular, drawing up lists of people of condolence for the purpose of distributing bags (p. 1.16), feeding relatives of the deceased people of condolence during three mourning days (p. 1.17)was prohibited,

13. Kabardino-Balkarskaya pravda. 7.02.2003.

14. Resolution of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic "On the regulation of funeral rites of Muslims". Nalchik: DUM KBR, 2011. p. 20.

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conducting memorial events dedicated to the 3rd, 7th, 40th, 52nd days, six months and a year from the date of death (item 1.18), buying new things and then distributing them under the guise of clothes of the deceased (item 1.21) 15 and a number of others. It can be assumed that if this decree had appeared several years earlier, the religious conflict in the CBD would have tended to fade. However, in 2004, in the midst of a campaign to close mosques and religious educational institutions and replace young imams with older generations, the adoption of this resolution did not help to reconcile the warring parties. In addition, the issue of the resolution was not accompanied by strict implementation on the ground. The traditions of "everyday" Islam that had been developing for decades turned out to be quite stable, and the lack of principles of a significant number of religious servants also played a role. As a result, after the adoption of this resolution, the funeral rites in the republic continued to remain non-unified.

The process of formation of a social group of "worshippers" in Kabardino-Balkar society, as well as its acquisition of sufficiently clear group boundaries, took more or less organized forms as a result of the separation of the leadership core from the educated youth. The main leaders of the "worshippers" were the heads of the previously mentioned Islamic Center of the KBR-M. Mukozhev and A. Astemirov. According to researcher R. Kurbanov

Both of them studied at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, both had a broad vision of the prospects for the development of Islamic conscription in the republic, applied the most effective methods of spreading the appeal and persuading the conscripts, were actively engaged in translations from Arabic, and maintained a fairly high-quality electronic resource on the web www.islaminkbr.ru 16.

"Worshippers" in the republic in the 1990s and 2000s also became synonymous with other terms - "young Muslims", "young Muslims", "new Muslims", " practicing Muslims-

15. Resolution of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic "On the regulation of funeral rites of Muslims". Nalchik: DUM KBR, 2011, pp. 10-14.

16. Kurbanov R. Globalizatsiya soznaniya moslem Kavkaza: vzvok i jihad [Globalization of consciousness of Muslims of the Caucasus: appeal and jihad]. 2006. N6. P. 75.

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mane", in the scientific community - "Salafists", and in the late 90s of the XX century, largely due to the efforts of the media-a kind of cliche"Wahhabis". According to L. Syukiyainen, the term "Wahhabi" in the Russian public environment has become virtually synonymous with the concept of "Islamic extremism" 17. Representatives of this social group called themselves simply Muslims. However, to demonstrate their difference from the "popular" form of Islam, they often added the definitions of "praying Muslims"," new Muslims"," young Muslims", and"practicing Muslims". They did not use the term "Salafi" as a self-determination term. The general point was the possession of the individuals ranked among them with pronounced fundamentalist attitudes, that is, a hypertrophied desire for purity of cult practice, against the background of obvious reductionism, manifested primarily in a rather critical attitude to the religious history and traditions of their own peoples. This reductionism contributed to the fact that the contradictions between the "praying" youth and the bearers of "popular" Islam deeply divided both the Muslim clergy and society as a whole. At the same time, both opposing groups publicly called for the consolidation of Muslims, while simultaneously excluding their opponents from this process, accusing them of apostasy.18 Due to a whole complex of reasons, the contradictions between the "worshippers" and the bearers of "popular" Islam turned into a confrontation that initially boiled down to theological disputes and questions of ritual practice, and later developed into a fundamental question about religious leadership in the republic.

An example illustrating a typical manifestation of the contradictions between traditionalists and "worshippers" is the question of places in the mosque. Thus, there was a tradition in the republic, according to which the places of honor in the mosque were occupied exclusively by representatives of the older generation. Moreover, if an elderly person came to the mosque, and these places were already occupied, then the youngest parishioner was obliged to give up his place. In this regard, mosques of the republic are constantly visited

17. Shukiyainen L. Legal, political and ideological aspects of the so-called "Wahhabism" in Russia. 27.06.2001.

18. Malashenko A.V. Islamic Landmarks of the North Caucasus, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2001, p. 105.

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there was noise, idle conversations, chaotic movements of people, which objectively distracted from prayer. This tradition was sharply criticized by the "worshippers". In particular, I. L. Babich noted that "the institution of honoring the elders was not approved by young Muslims", who believed that the best places should be occupied by those "who came to the mosque earlier" 19. A real case that occurred in one of the mosques of the Baksan district of the KBR in 2002 had a wide resonance. skip to the places of honor in the mosque a group of old people who came later than the youth. A heated argument ensued, culminating in public reproaches to the elderly for their lack of religious education. The imam of the mosque intervened in the dispute, supporting the old people. The conflict ended with the expulsion of young believers from the mosque, carried out by the decision of the imam with the support of representatives of the older generation.20
An important turning point in the religious conflict in the CBD was the complete breakup of the "worshippers" and doomsayers. As an alternative management network structure, the "worshippers" formed the Jama'at of the KBR in the early 2000s. For a long time it was headed by the undisputed leader of the praying youth M. Mukozhev. An important difference between the Jama'at of the KBR and similar structures that emerged in other sub-regions of the North Caucasus, where religious conflicts also took place, was its relative unity and fairly clear organizational structure. According to A. A. Yarlykapov, "a single jamaat was never established in any other subject of the North Caucasus" 21.

By the mid-2000s, the more or less ideologically monolithic Jamaat of the KBR, under the influence of a complex of factors discussed below, began to disintegrate. There are clear trends towards radicalization of a significant part of it. The result of this process was the emergence of an extremist wing (the Yarmouk Jamaat, etc.).

For obvious reasons, the extremist wing of the "worshippers" has been studied more or less thoroughly. In relation to this

19. Babich I. L. Interaction of internal and external factors in the process of creating a state mechanism for countering Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus. p. 158.

20. Author's field material. 2012, Baksan.

21. Yarlykapov A. A. Islamic communities of the North Caucasus: ideology and practice // Asia and Africa today. 2006. N1. P. 41.

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categories can be described as having certain quantitative characteristics. So, already in 1996, according to the Mufti of the KBR Sh. Pshikhachev, who referred, in turn, to the words of the self-proclaimed Emir of Kabardino-Balkaria A. Kazdokhov (one of the "worshippers" from the Baksan district), by the way, who did not enjoy much authority in this environment, there were about 600 extremist-minded Muslims in the republic "capable of creating certain problems"22. Representatives of law enforcement agencies in the early 2000s indicated that there were "more than 300 active adherents of Islam"in the republic23. In turn, sources from the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic noted that "382 supporters of the' new 'Islam are registered in law enforcement agencies." 24 Due to the lack of family lists, we can only assume that they include a lot of those who died during the fighting in Nalchik on October 13-14, 2005. These lists include individuals who belong to the radical wing, many of whom were already in an illegal position at the time of their compilation. They made up only a small fraction of the total number of"worshippers". Most of the representatives of this social group still remained within the legal framework.

The development of the religious conflict in the KBR, which by the mid-2000s had generally gone far beyond the purely religious framework, led to the events of October 13-14, 2005 in Nalchik - an attack by the extremist wing of the "worshippers" on the power structures of the capital of the republic.

To date, it is possible to identify the following main reasons for the bloody outcome of the republican religious conflict::

1) The formation of conflict potential took place in the absence of any real force in the republic capable of resolving it or at least mitigating it.

2) According to the fair remark of the researcher A. H. Borov:

The fundamental factor here should be recognized as the loss of spiritual, ideological and moral guidelines by a significant part of society. This was combined with deep economic decline, social polarization, and egregious forms of social exclusion.-

22. North Caucasus 2001. N6.

23. Ibid.

24. Kabardino-Balkarskaya pravda. 1.11.2001.

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justice. As a result, there was a dangerous decline in the authority and level of legitimation of state power in the public consciousness, mass alienation from the state and the erosion of the legal consciousness of citizens of the country25.

3) Interference in the religious conflict by law enforcement agencies contributed to its deepening. Unprecedented in its brutality, the actions of the security forces had a huge resonance. They contributed to the formation of a sense of permanent danger of persecution by the Ministry of Internal Affairs among young believers who were not related to extremists. The authorities, on the other hand, substituted illegal actions against a wide range of "worshippers"for legitimate measures aimed at suppressing the activities of real extremists, 26 which ultimately created the ground for preachers of "armed jihad" and contributed to the radicalization of a significant number of young believers. The excesses that took place, the lack of a differentiated approach in carrying out operational measures, and forceful pressure led to the loss of legitimacy by law enforcement agencies in the eyes of society. As a result, the number of sympathizers for radical young people who acted on religious grounds increased in the republic.27
4) The scientific community did not have the necessary human resources to work on such a delicate problem. As a result, the religious conflict in the republic turned out to be one of the most discussed, but at the same time poorly understood problems of post-Soviet Kabardino-Balkaria. An exception, perhaps, was an ethnographic expedition organized by the Institute for Humanitarian Studies of the KBR in cooperation with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, during which researchers identified "a dangerous trend associated with discrimination against young believers under the pretext of fighting" wah-

25. Borov A. H. Religious extremism in the North Caucasus: from analysis of events to understanding the phenomenon // Bulletin of KBSU. Ser. Humanities. 2006. Issue 11, p. 13.

26. Memorial Human Rights Center. Kabardino-Balkaria: On the road to disaster. Prerequisites for an armed performance in Nalchik on October 13-14, 2005 / Moscow, 2008, author-compiler A. Zhukov [http:/2008/10/09/09/0910081/htm, accessed 22.12.2009].

27. Apazheva E. Kh., Takova A. N. Osobennosti protsessa islamskogo vozrozhdeniya v Kabardino-Balkariya v kontsey XX - nachale XXI v. [Features of the Islamic revival process in Kabardino-Balkaria in the late XX-early XXI centuries]. 2014. N12. P. 243.

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28. Brief results of the expedition were published in 2003. At the same time, a correct prognostic assessment of the nature of the development of religious conflict in the republic was given. Expedition leader V. Kh. Kazharov noted:

There is no doubt that the continuation of the policy of discrimination against young parishioners, sharply reducing the level of religious tolerance in society, can become one of the factors that can significantly destabilize the ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus.;

5) The difficult socio-economic situation in the republic, mass unemployment, polarization of society, cronyism and corruption, and the lack of any clear life prospects for the majority of residents contributed to the formation of an extensive social base of discontented people in Kabardino-Balkaria who are capable of breaking the law in a certain situation. The socialization of young people that took place under these conditions created prerequisites for "the marginalization of a significant part of young people, deviating from their behavior, including religious and political extremism" 30.

6) The above-mentioned reasons resulted in the separation of the radical extremist wing from the "praying people", as well as the transition to the position of radicalism of the leaders of the "praying people" - M. Mukozhev and A. Astimirov. However, for a long time there was no clarity about M. Mukozhev's position, since in all his public speeches prior to October 2005, he spoke exclusively about the peaceful nature of the Jamaat. There was an opinion that he was not involved in the October attack. It was only in September 2006 that the Kavkaz-Center website published his message "Having joined the jihad, we have found real freedom", in which he justified the armed resistance-

28. Berezhnoy S. V. Kabardino-Balkar Republic as an example of the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism in the North Caucasus. 2006. N2. P. 176.

29. Kazharov V. Ethnographic expedition on the problems of Islam in the KBR / / Newspaper of the South. 5.06.2003.

30. Tetuev A. I. Vliyanie institutov grazhdanskogo obshchestva na etnopoliticheskie protsessy v regione (na materialakh Kabardino-Balkarskoy Respubliki) [Influence of civil society institutions on ethnopolitical processes in the region (based on the materials of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic)]. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference October 22, 2009. Makhachkala: Nauka DNTs, 2010. p. 438.

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On October 13, 2005, he noted that it was provoked by the actions of the security forces against members of the Muslim community, and also called on his supporters to continue the "October 13 line". He acknowledged his personal responsibility and that of the Jamaat leadership as a whole for the armed attack on 13 October and expressed the view that the attack was part of an "armed jihad" against the Russian authorities in the North Caucasus.31
The battles of October 13-14, 2005 became one of the most tragic events in the recent history of the republic. During them, 35 law enforcement officers, 12 civilians, 95 attackers were killed. A special tragedy of the situation was that many people close to each other - relatives and neighbors, classmates and classmates-came together in a bloody battle. The composition of the attackers, on the example of those killed during the battles of October 13-14, whose family names were published in the press, was generally multiethnic. Of the 90 people identified, 89 were residents of the republic. Of the 89 attackers, 78 were Kabardians, 6 were Balkarians, 2 were Russians, and 3 were Ossetians. The presence among the attackers of persons who are not related to the so-called ethnic Muslims (Russians and Ossetians) indicates another feature of the "worshippers" - the presence of a special segment - neophytes. This segment was studied in some detail by D. N. Prasolov32.

In the period after October 2005, questions were repeatedly raised about "how could this have happened?", " who is to blame for what happened?"and "what should I do to prevent possible relapses?". Conferences and round tables were held in the republic. Kabardino-Balkaria was visited by a number of prominent religious figures and eminent scientists specializing in Islamic topics. The authorities have developed special targeted programs aimed at preventing religious extremism. The common point in them was, on the one hand, an indication of the need to" distract " young people from extremist ideas, and, on the other, to the huge stabilizing potential contained in the bowels of traditional culture.

31. Memorial Human Rights Center. Kabardino-Balkaria: On the road to disaster. Prerequisites for an armed performance in Nalchik on October 13-14, 2005 / Author-compiler A. Zhukov. Moscow, 2008 [http:/2008/10/09/09/0910081/htm, accessed 22.12.2009].

32. Prasolov D. N. Islamic fundamentalism and the problem of changing religious identity. 2008. N7. pp. 230-256.

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As part of this process, after 2005, Kabardino-Balkaria began to carry out targeted work at the state level to "distract" young people from fundamentalist ideas by instilling in them an interest in the ethnic past. It began to be actively implemented through mass theatrical ethno-cultural events. Among them were the New Year according to the Adyghe calendar (Gyere shchlyre shchyzykhekl), games from the series "Adyghe World" (ritual horse breeding damygetedze), etc.

These spectacular events were accompanied by dancing, horse riding, drinking makhyme (the national low-alcohol drink), traditional fortune-telling on the shoulder of mutton, etc. A special feature of these events was the emphasis on the ancient pagan system and related rites and rituals, as well as the imitation of the worship of pagan deities. A phenomenon of the same order was the organization of a series of ethnographic evenings by representatives of initiative youth in order to introduce young men and women to traditional dance culture and etiquette - the so-called Jegu (game). Jegu has been held regularly in Nalchik since 2006, and in the central square of the city - Abkhazia Square, which suggests that the authorities are clearly interested in popularizing this type of event. Jogu was held once a week, lasting 3-4 hours. It was attended by about 200-300 people 33.

It cannot be said that these events were clearly anti-Islamic in nature. It is unlikely that they were perceived as such by the majority of residents of the republic, who lived in an acute shortage of leisure activities. However, among religiously minded people, they saw a dangerous tendency to impose archaic pagan ideas on the inhabitants of Kabardino-Balkaria, which run counter to the norms of the Islamic religion.

The organizer of the ethnographic shows was a prominent scholar-folklorist, an employee of the Kabardino-Balkar Institute for Humanitarian Studies A. A. Tsipinov, whose position, shared by part of the scientific intelligentsia of the republic, was distinguished by the perception of the Islamic religion as a kind of superstrate element introduced into the integral system of Adygeus

33. Kesheva Z. M. Ekologiya sovremennoy dancevoi kul'tury kabardintsev [Ecology of modern dance culture of Kabardins]. Issue VI. 2008. p. 364.

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habze (a set of norms of customary law and moral and ethical prescriptions), which adapted to it, but did not change its foundations. This position has been repeatedly voiced by scientists in the framework of scientific publications and newspaper articles, in speeches at conferences. A number of statements of the scientist had a wide resonance: "religions come and go, the nation remains"," we are first of all Circassians, and then Muslims"," yes, the Circassians were Muslims, but they never did namaz, because they would never kneel before anyone", etc. 34

Conducting ethnographic shows and Jegu was ambiguously perceived by both the public and specialists. There were both enthusiastic and strongly disapproving reviews. The article of a certain Z. became a landmark. Dyshekova of October 25, 2007, which gave a sharply negative assessment of these ethnographic events. With indignation, the author wrote:

When the entire civilized world is striving for progress, why do these people persist in calling Kabardians to regress? Any people who once lived in paganism tries to hide this period of ignorance... our countrymen, however, not only do not hide or hesitate about this period of idolatry, but also try to make it a source of pride.35
A. A. Tsipinov received regular threats. The scientist was killed in December 2010 by members of the extremist underground, acting on religious grounds.

The events of October 2005 became for many residents of the republic a kind of watershed in their attitude to the social group of "worshippers". According to the fair instructions of I. L. Babich:

The majority of the population has formed the opinion that all young bearded Muslims are radicals, Wahhabis, dangerous people for society who want to overthrow the existing government, that most of them are connected with the criminal world of the North Caucasus, that mosques visited by young Muslims are a place extremely dangerous for children, teenagers and young people.-

34. Бакова З. Brief biography of A. Tsipinov [http://www.adigasite.com>archives / tag, accessed 5.11.2014].

35. Dyshekova Z. Who is leading us to paganism? // Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda. 25.10.2007.

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We believe that the various forms of Islamic education organized by young Muslims are not necessary for the population of the KBR, because the Islam they preach is wrong.36
In general, in the period after October 2005, the majority of the population of the republic began to perceive the interest of young people in Islam negatively, which indicates a sharp change in public sentiment, since the same thing in the early 90s of the XX century caused an approving reaction. Researcher A. Kh. Mukozhev noted on this occasion: "Now in ordinary street conversations, you can often hear: "Imagine, their son is doing namaz!", and in response: "What a horror!""37. Thus, the young believers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation and gradually developed into a rather closed subculture.

The validity of applying the term "subculture" to "worshippers" is determined by the fact that this social group has all the classical features that allow it to be classified as such from the point of view of sociology, namely:: 1) the presence of clearly defined norms, values, and more broadly, a system of perception of the world; 2) the conduct of a specific lifestyle; 3) the presence of a certain set of distinctive behavioral markers and external attributes; 4) the presence of a more or less explicit initiative center, in this case, the leadership core (up to a certain time).

Thus, this social group is distinguished by fairly clear group boundaries, which are obvious both for its members and for society as a whole. At the same time, the personality of the "praying person" is often the result of complete re - socialization-a total change in the worldview system, life rules, norms of behavior and lifestyle, discarding a significant number of elements of national culture and secular rules. In view of this, the problem of split families, in which conflicts between "praying" children and "secular" parents are permanent, is relevant for the republic. These conflicts often lead to discrimination against believers

36. Babich I. L. Interaction of internal and external factors in the process of creating a state mechanism for countering Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus. p. 168.

37. Mukozhev A. H. Intra-confessional conflict and problems of Islamic radicalism in modern Kabardino-Balkaria. 2009. N8. P. 318.

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at the household level, including the family level. The overwhelming majority of" worshippers " live in Nalchik.

The "worshippers", especially their female part, stand out from the rest of society with bright external markers. For women, the main thing is the hijab - a headscarf that hides the neck and hair. It should be noted that Kabardians and Balkarians have never worn a headscarf in the manner of a hijab during the entire period of their belonging to the Islamic religion. Any married Kabardian or Balkar woman wore a headscarf, but tied it in a different way. At the same time, the neck and, sometimes, partially the hair remained open. Other clothing of representatives of the "praying" social group is quite democratic - it is mainly long skirts, tight loose tunics, and often bright colors, shoes without heels. Often in their appearance, the hijab is organically combined with clothing that fully corresponds to the main fashionable secular trends. The appearance of girls in hijabs with soft manicures and make-up has also become a common occurrence. About five years ago, there was a tendency in the republic to introduce a strict dress code - exclusively black baggy clothing, gloves that hide a woman's hands, and even, sometimes, niqabs-headscarves in which only the eyes remained open. However, this trend has not taken root in the republic.

External markers of "praying" men are not so bright. Beardiness, which in the eyes of society has become the main sign of attributing a person with it to the category of "worshippers", in reality is not such. Nowadays, beardiness has mostly become an attribute that complements the image of people who are prone to shocking and various forms of manifest behavior. In recent years, beardiness has also come to symbolize a state of mourning, as well as a black headscarf for women. In this case, there is a resuscitation of an external marker that existed in the pre-revolutionary period. However, then it belonged exclusively to the elderly. Thus, a bright external marker that symbolizes the male person's belonging to the social group of "worshippers" does not exist today.

In the behavioral aspect, representatives of "worshippers" are characterized by such traits as emotional restraint, humility, and self-control.-

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modesty, accentuated politeness and responsiveness, which are already evident at the stage of superficial acquaintance.

The most important difference between representatives of this social group and others is the predominance of the religious component in the system of their self-identification over all others (national, state, etc.).

This thesis is clearly illustrated by the peculiarities of holding a wedding for "worshippers". As you know, among Kabardians and Balkarians, a wedding (one of the most important events of the life cycle) is a crowded and wasteful event, accompanied by a cycle of ancient rituals, an abundance of national dances, the main part of which is taken by young people. If representatives of the "worshippers" marry, the wedding undergoes significant transformations. So, symbolic stealing of the bride and all rituals related to alcohol consumption, comic "beating" of the groom by unmarried friends, etc., become completely unacceptable, wedding dances are reduced to a minimum. In rare cases, there are male dances in the manner of circular East Caucasian dances. As noted by I. L. Babich, young Muslims of the KBR allow only those dances where only men participate, to the drum and jig. 38 "Praying" girls do not take part in dances at all. 39
In general, at the weddings of "worshippers", the national component is carried out schematically and simplified to a minimum. However, due to the fact that the" worshippers " still objectively belong to a certain genus, family, and therefore have by definition a large number of relatives, most often a compromise wedding option is arranged - a separate (halal) table is set for young people and their religious friends, and, if possible, a separate room is allocated. At the same time, a traditional wedding celebration is arranged for other guests.

The peculiarities of wedding ceremonies are just one of the examples that testify to the significant transformation of national elements of spiritual culture among the praying youth. They are no less significant when conducting rituals

38. Babich I. L. Interaction of internal and external factors in the process of creating a state mechanism for countering Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus. p. 158.

39. Author's field material. 2013, Nalchik.

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funerary and memorial cycle, secular holidays, and even the naming of children.

An objective analysis of these facts allows us to conclude that, in general, the attitudes of the "praying" youth differ significantly from the non-praying part of society, in which the emphasis is more on national elements. However, in contrast to the realities of the mid-1990s and early 2000s, when the "worshippers" took active steps to purify the rites of spiritual culture from elements that, in their view, contradicted the prescriptions of Islam, which often led to open conflicts, deepening existing contradictions, to date, this is not observed in the republic. In contrast to the negative precedents of the past, the practice of voluntary segregation of "praying" youth on both sides has been established, which, on the one hand, minimizes the possibility of conflicts, but, on the other, preserves the closeness and isolation of representatives of this social group.

In the case of employment, "worshippers" often experience certain difficulties. Thus, the range of places of work that are potentially possible for a "praying person" is significantly narrowed. There are no representatives of this social group among doctors, teachers, educators, bank employees, especially among employees of administrative and administrative bodies and law enforcement agencies, due to the fact that when applying for a job in these institutions, there are unwritten rules that exclude the possibility of employment in them for representatives of this social group. However, quite often they can be found among the employees of non-governmental institutions. There are many of them among consultants of retail outlets, service personnel of public catering establishments. Among men, a significant number of people are engaged in transport transportation, many employees of taxi companies, IT specialists, digital equipment adjusters, builders, repair and decoration specialists. A certain cluster of small businesses has also emerged in the republic, where the segment of "worshippers" is quite high - this is the market for auto parts and car care products, maintenance facilities, car washes, children's clothing stores and, of course, the entire existing market for Muslim clothing, perfumes and religious items. In general, the representatives of the" praying people " live quite comfortably, about-

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having a stable income. Many people, including women, own their own cars, and they own prestigious brands. Among the "worshippers", there is active intra-group mutual assistance in finding employment and starting a business (interest-free loans, assistance in paperwork, accounting, etc.). It should be noted that "worshippers", with rare exceptions, conduct an open business, carefully make the necessary deductions40. Among the "worshippers" there are no people who can be attributed to the financial elite of the republic, but at the same time there are no needy people among them, which does not confirm the existing stable opinion that the composition of this social group is mainly filled by the unemployed and destitute. The prospects for future employment are determined by faculties and universities where the share of "worshippers" is particularly high , such as economic, construction, engineering and technical faculties, as well as colleges that train specialists in applied, including working, specialties. Permanent control measures are applied to young students. All school students, students belonging to the social group of "worshippers", are on a special account. Regularly employees of law enforcement agencies carry out audit activities in relation to them according to a clearly defined scheme: 1) the lists of persons belonging to the "worshippers" are checked, often new surnames are added to them; 2) academic performance and attendance are analyzed; 3) the surnames of persons with whom the "worshipper" has friendly or just friendly relations, even if they do not belong to the category of "worshippers", are recorded; 4) teachers ' names are recorded. characteristics are collected for each of them, while the emphasis is placed on the nature of behavior, features of relationships with classmates and classmates, whether this person shows or not his religious views, whether he promotes them, etc. 41 In general, without exception, all "worshippers", school students, etc. are taken into account. universities are on the operational register in law enforcement agencies.

It is worth noting that the social group of "worshippers", which appeared in the republic in the early 90s of the XX century, has more than twenty years of history. And if the initial occurrence is

40. Author's field material. 2014, Nalchik.

41. Ibid., 2012, Nalchik.

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As a result of a kind of re-socialization, then later children were born in this environment, who, unlike their parents, were already introduced to the ideological attitudes and values of Islam at the stage of primary socialization. This allows us to speak about the sustainability of this social group and its potential tendency to expand.

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