Libmonster ID: KZ-2899
Author(s) of the publication: L. M. VOLODARSKY

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" emphasizes:: "The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War fully revealed the advantages of socialism, its enormous economic, socio-political and spiritual possibilities. It was the victory of the Soviet state created by the great Lenin, the most advanced social system, the socialist economic system."1 . This assessment of the military and labor feats of the Soviet people is confirmed by the entire course of events of those terrible years.

The party's wise political, economic, and military strategy naturally led to the defeat of the largest group of imperialist aggressors in history. The victory in the Great Patriotic War was a vivid and irrefutable evidence of the indisputable fact that there are no forces in the world that can stop the development of a new, progressive social system.

The victory of the Soviet people over fascism, which became an important stage in world history, had a profound political impact on the entire life of mankind in the subsequent period. It provided the necessary prerequisites for the struggle of peoples for their national and social liberation, and was a factor in strengthening the position of democratic, peace-loving forces around the world. A fundamentally significant consequence of the Victory was the emergence and further successful development of the world socialist system. The powerful wave of the national liberation movement that arose after the defeat of the German and Japanese militarists led to the creation of dozens of new states on the ruins of former colonial empires.

Speaking at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU with veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: "Everything we have has two points of reference. The first began with the October Revolution, the second-after Victory Day. They can say: the war has long been the property of history and whether it is worth returning to the events of those years again and again and remembering what is connected with them. Of course, it's worth it. Moreover, it is essential for us and for all of humanity. " 2

Victory in the war was prepared by the entire preceding course of socialist construction in the USSR. During the first five-year plans, the working people of our country, while denying themselves many things, spent enormous amounts of money on the development of industry, agriculture, and transport. By building the foundation of a socialist economy under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people thereby created the prerequisites for an active defense, following Lenin's instructions not to-


1 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

2 Ibid., 6. V. 1985.

page 14


in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, it is always necessary to be in mobilization readiness.

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, new industries were created, 9 thousand large industrial enterprises were put into operation; the production of means of production increased by 13 times compared to 1913, and consumer goods - by 4.6 times. The output of mechanical engineering and metalworking in 1940 exceeded the level of 1913 by 30 times. In comparison with the eve of the first five - year plan, the volume of gross social product increased in 1940 by 4.5 times, and the national income-by more than 5 times. During this period, investment in the national economy increased almost 7-fold .3 High-quality metallurgy and precision engineering were developed, which became the basis for organizing mass production of aircraft, tanks, guns, mortars, and other types of weapons during the war, which were superior in their characteristics to the enemy's military equipment. On the basis of the country's industrialization, transport was reorganized. Socialist agriculture has become stronger. The implementation of the cultural Revolution ensured the training of qualified cadres dedicated to the cause of socialism for various branches of the national economy, and the raising of the ideological level of the entire people.

The growth of the economic power of the USSR in the pre-war years was largely ensured by the rapid development of natural resources. By the end of the second five - year plan, the USSR ranked first in Europe in terms of explored reserves of the most important natural resources, and in many of them-first in the world4 .

The high rates of expanded socialist reproduction in the pre-war period, the increase in the raw material base, and the improvement in the distribution of productive forces created a solid foundation for further strengthening the country's economic and defense power at a time when the war was already on its threshold. The outcome of the first five-year plans was the transformation of the Soviet Union into a powerful industrial power that achieved complete economic independence from the capitalist countries.

The attack of Nazi Germany dramatically changed the tasks facing the Soviet economy - the country turned into a single combat camp. The whole country became the rear of the Active Army - all its economic potential, all its population, all the strength of the socialist system. The conditions of the rear were often as difficult as those of the front. Little different from the front were Moscow in the October days of 1941 or Leningrad, whose workers withstood the blockade, built the "Road of Life" in an incredibly difficult situation, and laid an oil pipeline along the bottom of Lake Ladoga.

Using all the advantages of the socialist planned system, the party and the Soviet State ensured the transition of the national economy to the war economy as soon as possible. Planning of the national economy in wartime conditions became crucial. Within a week of its beginning, the first wartime plan was adopted - the "Mobilization National Economic Plan" for the third quarter of 1941, and in August-the "Military Economic Plan" for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. 5 The practice of planning is well established


3 Volodarsky " P., Semin S. Labor feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. - Kommunist, 1965, n 6. p. 21; Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let [National Economy of the USSR for 60 years]. Yub. stat. sb. m. 1977, p. 13.

4 Kravchenko G. S. economy of the USSR during the great Patriotic war. M. 1970, p. 35.

Voznesenskiy N. Voennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voiny [Military economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War]. Moscow, 1948, p. 38.

page 15


operational plans - quarterly and monthly, which were approved by the State Defense Committee (GKO).

All this required a deep and comprehensive analysis of the state of affairs in the national economy, careful identification of all material resources. During the war years, the nomenclature of the most important types of products, for which balance sheets and distribution plans were drawn up and approved centrally, significantly increased. In this regard, urgent censuses of materials and equipment were of great importance. Their implementation (including the development of results) was carried out by state statistics bodies in extremely short terms - from 7 to 15 days, rarely - up to a month. During the war, 105 such censuses were conducted.

In accordance with the plans, the mobilization of all the resources of the country for the needs of the front was ensured. The share of direct military expenditures reached 55% of national income. More than 2/3 of industrial products and 1/4 of agricultural products6 were used for military needs . The country acted as Lenin had pointed out at the time:"When it came to war, everything must be subordinated to the interests of the war, and the whole internal life of the country must be subordinated to the war." 7 All branches of the national economy worked together for Victory. The mobilization of labor resources was ensured, effective ways were found to distribute them and redistribute them across industries and regions of the country in conditions when a significant part of the active labor force was drafted into the army.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War was won by unprecedented mass military and labor heroism. The defeat of the enemy was the result of the unity of the front and rear. The 1,418 fiery days of battle on the warfields were also for home front workers a battle with the enemy - for metal and bread, fuel and raw materials, for the creation of powerful weapons. The work of the rear was based on a solid foundation of the economic system of socialism. Lenin's conclusion that economic organization is crucial in modern warfare was fully confirmed by the entire course of the Great Patriotic War. The Party was firmly and consistently guided by Lenin's instruction that " for the conduct of war, a strong organized rear is really necessary. The best army, the most devoted people to the cause of the revolution, will be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, provided with food, and trained. " 8

The events of the first months of the war, like the whole war, are unique in their scale. This applies equally to the work of the rear. Of particular importance in the first months of the war was the mass relocation of thousands of kilometers from front-line and front-line areas to the eastern regions of the country of a huge amount of valuables, equipment and millions of people, ensuring in the shortest possible time at a new place of production that is urgently needed by the front.

All the work of moving the productive forces to the rear was under the unflagging attention of the Party and the Government. The relocation was directly managed by the Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. A lot of work on monitoring the movement of trains with equipment was carried out by special representatives of the Council. Evacuation commissions were established in the People's commissariats, republics and regions that were under threat of occupation.


6 Sorokin G. M. The Great Economic victory of the USSR in the war with fascist Germany. - Voprosy ekonomiki, 1975, N 5, p. 11; Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 12. Moscow, 1982, p. 148.

7 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 41, p. 117.

8 Ibid., vol. 35, p. 408.

page 16


The evacuation became a real battle for the preservation of the country's national wealth, material values, so that in the shortest possible time they could meet the needs of the front, contribute to the victory over the enemy. Truly, it was a great movement that the history of previous wars had never known. This work was incredibly complex and difficult. Its scale is clearly illustrated by the following data :in total, from July to December 1941, 2,593 industrial enterprises were evacuated from the threatened areas, including 1,523 large ones; among them, 1,360, mainly military, were evacuated already in the first three months of the war9. 550 large enterprises were exported from Ukraine, 109 from Belarus, 62 from Estonia, 498 from Moscow and the Moscow Region, 92 from Leningrad, and 212.10 from other regions . Of the total number of large enterprises evacuated, 667 were sent to the Urals, 322 to Western and Eastern Siberia, 308 to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and 226 to the Volga region. In the second half of 1941, more than 10 million people were transported to the rear areas. In 1941-1942, 2.4 million head of cattle, 5.1 million sheep and goats, 200,000 pigs, 800,000 horses, and a lot of agricultural machinery, grain, and other foodstuffs were moved from the western regions .11

The evacuation was carried out in the shortest possible time. Thus, the evacuation of the Novo-Kramatorsk plant, which had unique equipment, was carried out from September 12 to October 21, 1941. 1,276 metal-cutting and woodworking machines, 1,752 motors and electric motors were exported 12 . 320 thousand tons of machine tools, structures, metal and other cargo were sent to the rear from the Zaporozhye group of plants in 45 days. Gomselmash, the largest plant in Belarus, was dismantled in three days. More than 1 thousand wagons with equipment and materials were transferred from this enterprise to the Urals 13 .

Enterprises that arrived at the evacuation sites were immediately restored and put into operation. Zaporizhia plant named after him. Engels began to produce products 20 days after arriving at the site. One of the Moscow factories of the People's Commissariat of Armaments was loaded into 12 echelons in mid-October 1941, it was on the road for 11 days, and in early December it entered service at a new location and began to produce products 1.5 times more than before the evacuation. Kharkiv plant No. 183, evacuated to the Urals, started producing T-34 tanks 45 days later; Leningrad Kirov and Kharkiv Motor Plants, merged with Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, started producing KV tanks a month later. Two factories that produced shells for aircraft guns were transferred to the Urals from the central regions. A month later, they issued the first batch of products. Evacuated aircraft factories after 1-1.5 months already produced combat aircraft 14 . On average, it took 1.5 - 2 months for relocated enterprises to establish production. In general, it was a grandiose operation, equal in importance to the greatest battles of the Second World War15 .

A huge role in the relocation of capacities and population was played by the presence of production areas, energy, raw materials and construction facilities, transport, and communication systems in the eastern regions, which were prepared by the entire course of the previous development of the industry.-


9 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 41; Sovetskiy Soyuz v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voiny 1941-1945. Moscow, 1978, p. 101.

10 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 4, Moscow, 1975, map 8.

11 Kosygin A. N. V edinom stroyu zashchitnikov Otchizny [In the unified system of defenders of the Motherland]. Moscow, 1980, p. 18, 19.

12 Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 114.

13 The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 100; The Great Patriotic War. 1941 -1945. Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1985, p. 801.

14 Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 19-20; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 117.

15 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

page 17


It was the result of a systematic improvement in the allocation of productive forces during the pre-war five-year plans.

All branches of the military economy worked as a single well-coordinated mechanism. Yet the leading position belonged to socialist industry. Having overcome the decline in production in December 1941, the country's industry began to increase production in March 1942, primarily in the defense industries. A huge role in this was played by the eastern regions, where the output of defense products by this time reached the pre-war level of production of the entire country and continued to grow at a rapid pace .16 The enterprises that remained in their former places did not reduce production either. The labor feat of the population of Moscow, Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad, other hero cities and all front - line cities, where the border between the front and the rear was practically erased, is enormous. In besieged Leningrad, with the beginning of the blockade, all types of military products had to be produced on non-replenishable reserves of raw materials and fuel. Nevertheless, industrial production continued to grow in the city until December 1941. Leningrad remained one of the country's arsenals. Its factories were operating under constant fire. Walls collapsed, machines were removed from the rubble, and often, while another room was being prepared, people worked on them in the open air .17

The organizational measures taken by the party and the Government aimed at restructuring the management of the national economy in the new environment were crucial in creating a well-coordinated war economy. A high degree of centralization and constant coordination of the work of all branches, directed by the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and its local representatives, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, ensured the unity of action of all levels of production in order to solve emergency wartime tasks. All this made it possible to overcome the disproportions that existed at the beginning of the war between the needs of the military economy in metal, electricity, fuel and their production. Thus, a solid foundation was laid for sustainable growth in the production of military products.

By the middle of 1942, the restructuring of the national economy in a military way was completed. Military factories and heavy industry enterprises were operating at full capacity, and new enterprises were being built. The second stage of development of the Soviet military economy - the stage of growth of a well-coordinated military economy-has begun. A radical change in the work of industry, which began in the second half of 1942, was fixed in 1943: the volume of gross output increased by 17%, while during the three peaceful years of the third five-year plan, the average annual increase was 13%; the production of defense industries increased more than 2 times compared to the pre-war level 18. Despite the fact that it is objectively much more difficult to carry out expanded reproduction during the war period than in peacetime, the military economy of the USSR ensured its high rates.

Even the enemies recognized the power of the Soviet rear. "It seems a miracle to us that new masses of Bolshevik technology are emerging from the vast Soviet steppes, as if some great wizard were sculpting them in any quantity from Ural clay, "wrote the newspaper Schwarze Kor in 1943,19


16 Volodarsky L., Semin S. Uk. soch., p. 23; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 21.

17 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. Vol. 12, p. 50; Khavin V. Na Vostoka. - Soviet Union, 1985, N 2, p. 29.

18 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 46; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 21.

19 Cit. by: Khavin V. Uk. soch., p. 29.

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A special place in the development of the military economy is occupied by 1944. Military production this year reached the highest level during the war.

GROWTH OF THE MILITARY ECONOMY OF THE USSR (in % to 1942)20

 

1943

1944

Average annual growth rate for 1943-1944., %

National income

113

135

16,2

Fixed production assets (excluding livestock) in the national economy

112

124

11,3

All industrial products

117

135

16,2

Mechanical engineering products

120

133

15,3

Production of the most important types of industrial products:

 

 

 

electricity supply

111

135

16,2

coal

123

161

26,9

cast iron

117

152

23,3

steel

105

135

16,2

rolled ferrous metals

106

135

16,2

Out of the total volume of industrial output - products of People's commissariats:

 

 

 

aviation industry

125

134

15,8

tank industry

127

161

26,9

armaments

105

108

3,9

ammunition

121

142

19,2

Gross agricultural output

96

142

19,2

Cargo turnover of all types of transport

115

132

14,9

Capital investments

109

151

22,9

Average annual number of workers and employees

106

129

13,6

Retail turnover of state and cooperative trade

94

109

4,4

The total volume of industrial output in 1944 exceeded the pre-war level by 3%, and military output-by 3.1 times. Compared to 1943, the volume of industrial output increased by 15%, including: ferrous metallurgy - by 25%, non-ferrous-by 35%, fuel industry - by 21%, chemical industry-by 29%, electricity production-by 21%. In 1944, 39 billion kWh of electricity, 121.5 million tons of coal, 7.3 million tons of pig iron, 10.9 million tons of steel, and 7.3 million tons of rolled ferrous metals were produced. Compared to 1942, the production of electricity, steel, and rolled products increased by more than 7 times, pig iron-by 1.5 times, and coal mining - by 1.6 times. 21

Annual oil production in 1943-1944 was 18 million tons, compared to 22 million tons in 1942. The reduction was explained by the fact that the oil fields of the North Caucasus were largely destroyed, and in the Baku area many wells had to be mothballed (because during the fighting on the Volga and the North Caucasus, the export of petroleum products was extremely difficult), their restoration took time. Nevertheless, as a result of the continuous improvement of oil refining, gasoline production in 1943 increased compared to the previous year.


20 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V., Moscow, 1978, p. 258; Vestnik statistiki, 1985, No. 3, p. 39.

21 Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 12, p. 161, 166; Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Vol. 4. Moscow, 1962, p. 581; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 22.

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since 1942, by 10%, diesel fuel - by 2.3, motor fuel - by 1.7 times. Thus, the supply of fuel to the front continued to increase 22 .

The growth of military production was mainly due to the huge work to expand existing enterprises and build new ones in the shortest possible time. So, at the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, the fifth and sixth blast furnaces were built in 6 months, and before the war it took 2 - 3 years. The main production assets of industry grew at a high rate: if in 1942 they were only 75% of the level of 1940, then in 1943 - 84%, in 1944-92% and in 1945-95% 23 .

For the development of the military economy, significant shifts in the allocation of productive forces and the restructuring of the structure of industrial production were important. The military-economic potential was built up on the basis of a comprehensive expansion of the fuel and energy, metallurgical and machine-building base. The most important construction projects of those years were the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant, Aktobe Ferroalloy Plants, Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine, South Ural Machine-building Plant, Bogoslovskaya, Kuznetsk, Karaganda, Kuibyshev, Sumgait thermal power plants. The commissioning of aluminum plants in the Sverdlovsk and Kemerovo regions has provided an increase in the production of aluminum, which is urgently needed by the aviation industry. Already in 1943, despite the loss of the largest Volkhov and Dnieper aluminum plants, the pre-war level of aluminum production was surpassed .24 By 1945, the capacity of all power plants had almost reached the pre-war level of 25 .

The accelerated development of heavy industry ensured the stability of all branches of the national economy, the growth of the production of weapons and military equipment. The leading role was played by mechanical engineering. In 1944, the volume of machine-building output increased 1.6 times compared to 1940 .26

The main arsenal of the front was the eastern regions of the country. The gross output of their industry in the first half of 1945 was 2 times that of the defense industry, and 5.6 times that of the first half of 1941.27 A special place in achieving these results belongs to the workers of the Urals, which has become the main base for supplying the country with metal and other industrial products. Its factories in 1942-1943 produced 25% of the country's industrial output, and in 1945 it produced more than 50% of the all-Union output of cast iron, steel and rolled products. Thanks to the commissioning of existing large evacuated and newly built factories, the capacity of mechanical engineering and metalworking has increased several times. The share of this branch in the large-scale industry of the Urals increased from 43% in 1940 to 70% in 1943. Ural enterprises produced Uz products of mechanical engineering and metalworking. The Urals provided 60% of medium and 100% of heavy tanks. Every second shell fired at the enemy was made of Ural steel 28 .


22 Great Patriotic War. Brief History, Moscow, 1984, p. 251.

23 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, p. 245; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 221; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 22.

24 Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 22; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 239.

25 Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR [National Economy of the USSR], 1922-1982. Yub. stat. sb. Moscow, 1982, p. 201.

26 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

27 Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 23.

28 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, pp. 239-240, 264; Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyni 1939-1945, vol. 12, p. 161.

page 20


The Party and the Government paid special attention to the accelerated growth of military output. Already in 1942, the USSR surpassed Nazi Germany in the production of combat aircraft by 1.9, tanks and self-propelled guns-by 3.9, guns of all types and calibers-by 3.1, rifles and carbines-by 3 times. More ammunition was also released. In 1943-1944, the production of weapons increased significantly. Production of tanks and self-propelled guns in 1944 increased by 18% compared to 1942, combat aircraft-by 1.5 times. In 1944, every day our industry produced as many tanks, self-propelled guns and combat aircraft as were needed at that time to complete approximately one tank brigade and a self-propelled gun regiment, and three aviation regiments .29

In total, during the war, the industry of the USSR gave the front 102.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 112.1 thousand combat aircraft, 482.2 thousand guns of all types and calibers. During the war years, the Soviet Armed Forces received more than 10 million tons of ammunition, over 16 million tons of fuel, 40 million tons of food and fodder, and a large number of other materiels30 . The Soviet rear managed to achieve not only a significant increase in the production of weapons, but also an increase in their quality characteristics. During the war years, 25 new aircraft models (including modifications) and 23 types of aircraft engines entered mass production. The share of new models reached: in small arms-42%, artillery-83%, armored-more than 80%, aviation-67% 31 .

The country's military economy worked with high efficiency and productivity. By smelting about 3 times less steel and extracting almost 5 times less coal than nazi Germany (taking into account imports from occupied countries, annexed territories, and imports), the USSR created almost 2 times more weapons and military equipment during the war. As a result of continuous improvement of production from May 1942 to May 1945, labor productivity in the defense industries increased 2.2 times .32 The growth of labor productivity was ensured both by increasing output per unit of working time - by rationalizing production, and by increasing working time - by reducing its losses and increasing overtime. As a result, during the two years of the war economy, the number of hours worked per worker per month on average increased by 22%, and hourly output - by 7%. In 1944 alone, workers and engineers in industry, construction, and transport made 347,000 innovation proposals, and in 1945 - 387,000 .33

Along with the increase in labor productivity, the costs of producing the most important types of weapons have significantly decreased. In 1944, the cost of all types of military products decreased by an average of 2 times compared to 1940. The economic effect of reducing the cost of military products in 1941-1944 amounted to an amount equal to almost half of all state budget expenditures for military needs in 1942. Only by saving materials and money did the tank industry give the front more than 25,000 tanks (in terms of T - 34s) over the last three years of the war, i.e. more than the average annual production during wartime .34 It is also characteristic that, based on 1 million tons of steel produced, the military economy of the USSR


29 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. Vol. 12, p. 168, 200.

30 Ibid., p. 170.

31 Ibid., pp. 160, 169.

32 Ibid., p. 159. 168, 200; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 24.

33 Voznesensky N. Uk. op., p. 114; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. op., p. 334.

34 Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 24; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 338.

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it ensured the production of several times more tanks, aircraft, guns and other important types of military equipment than Germany, England, and the United States35 . Thus, the Soviet economic system during the years of military trials demonstrated a clear advantage, practically proving its high efficiency, the ability to make rational use of all types of resources, and the full mobilization of all elements of socialist expanded reproduction to achieve a specific task in extreme conditions. "The effectiveness of the military economy of the USSR was ensured by the unshakable authority of the state plan, discipline and strict responsibility for the assigned task, initiative, ingenuity, bold thought and selfless work of workers, collective farmers, engineers, designers and scientists, organizational abilities of production commanders," M. S. Gorbachev noted at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union. the people in the Great Patriotic War.

The war required heroic efforts from agricultural workers, who were called upon to provide the front and rear with sufficient food, and industry with raw materials. This was a task of the most important economic and political importance. It was solved in the most difficult conditions. Before the war, 47% of all cultivated areas were located on the territory temporarily captured by the enemy, and more than 50% of all agricultural and livestock products were produced. Since the beginning of the war, the number of able-bodied people in the village has sharply decreased. Hundreds of thousands of collective farmers were mobilized into the Active Army. Rural workers began to work in factories, factories and mines. Horses, most of the cars, and powerful diesel tractors were taken to the Red Army. The lack of fuel was becoming more acute. But even under these conditions, the socialist system of agriculture survived .37

The need to supply the army and the population with food has set the task of developing agricultural production in the rear areas - in the Center, the Volga region, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East. The acreage in these areas increased in 1942 against 1940 by almost 5 million hectares and by 2.8 million hectares against 1941. The total area sown on collective farms increased from 62.6 million hectares in 1940 to 66.3 million hectares in 1942, including the area under grain increased from 51.6 million to 53.9 million hectares. Sugar beet and oilseed crops were expanded in Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The growth of industrial crops in 1942 compared to 1940 in the regions of the Far East was 37%, Siberia-27%38 .

In the collective farms of the eastern regions, the area under potatoes and vegetables in 1942 increased by 37% compared to 1940, including in Siberia-by 44%, in the Urals-by 37%, in the Far East-by 30%, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan - by 32%. An important role was played by the increase in the share of winter crops in the total area of grain crops: in 1942 it increased by 18% compared to 1940, including in Siberia-by 64%, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia - by 44%. The growth of the area under winter crops has made it possible to significantly compensate for the lack of labor, draft and equipment 39 .


35 Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 359.

36 Pravda, 9. V. 1985.

37 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 12, p. 162; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 151; Volodarsky L., Semin S. Uk. soch., p. 26.

38 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 94, 95; The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 273.

39 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., pp. 95, 96.

page 22


During the war, subsidiary agriculture and gardening were widely developed. They played an important role in increasing the country's food resources, supplying workers and employees with agricultural products, primarily potatoes and vegetables. In 1942, more than 7.6 million workers and employees were engaged in gardening; they cultivated about 500 thousand hectares of land. The acreage of subsidiary farms attached to industrial and transport enterprises was significantly expanded , from 1.4 million hectares in 1940 to 3.1 million hectares in 194340 .

In order to ensure the timely implementation of all agricultural work in early 1942, the minimum workday introduced on the eve of the war was increased approximately 1.5 times, and a mandatory minimum workday for teenagers was established. As a result, the total output of working days on collective farms per able-bodied person rose from 254 in 1940 to 352 in 1942.41

Measures were taken to maximize the mobilization of the able-bodied population not engaged in public work in the city and village. In April 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted a resolution "On the order of mobilization for agricultural work in collective farms, state farms and MTS of the able-bodied population of cities and rural areas". In the same year, more than 4 million people were already involved in weeding and harvesting crops .42

Due to the sharp decline in the number of able-bodied men in agriculture, women became the main force in collective farms, state farms and MTS. They headed collective farms, led brigades and links, and ran livestock farms. The proportion of women among MTS tractor drivers increased from 4% at the beginning of 1940 to 40% in 1942, among combine operators - from 6 to 43%, among MTS drivers - from 5 to 36%, and among tractor crew foremen - from 1 to 10%. In mechanization courses and schools, the proportion of women increased from 8.5% in 1940 to 51% in 1941-1942 .43 Since 1943, areas liberated from the enemy have been making an increasing contribution to State resources of agricultural products. In 1944, the volume of gross agricultural output in the whole country exceeded the level of 1942 by more than 1.4 times. This was made possible by the implementation of urgent measures for the rehabilitation and development of agriculture .44

The organization of uninterrupted operation of transport was vital for the victory over the enemy. He played a decisive role in the successful relocation of the productive forces to the east, and with honor coped with the equally difficult and complex task of transferring troops and cargo to the front, providing for the needs of the military economy. Transport communications, being one of the most important material factors of the war, from the first days of the fascist aggression became the object of fierce raids by enemy aircraft. The temporary occupation of a part of Soviet territory led to a reduction in the length of the railway network. In the first year and a half of the war, the locomotive and carriage fleet of railways, the number of self-propelled and non-self-propelled river and sea vessels significantly decreased. This required the restructuring of the entire transport network of the country, especially rail transport.


40 Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., pp. 163, 166.

41 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 93; The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 268.

42 The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 268.

43 Ibid.; Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., pp. 92-93.

44 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

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During the first 6 months of the war, the total volume of military transportation amounted to about 2.4 million cars. Only for the period up to August 1, 1941, 2.5 million people were transported by rail to the front. In July - December, military cargo transportation on all railways accounted for about 20%. At the same time, the transfer of cargo and people to the east was carried out on a huge scale. From June 1941 to January 1942, evacuation shipments in excess of 1 million wagons were accounted for. The loading of railways in the eastern regions increased dramatically: in 1940, they accounted for 13.9% of the total Soviet load, while in 1942, they accounted for about one-third .45

The war required much faster movement of cargo. Railway transport had a special military schedule, introduced on the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee from June 24, 1941. This made it possible to ensure more stable operation of railways and maximize the use of their capacity. Since May 25, 1942, a new schedule was introduced, which took into account the features of various roads, junctions and stations, and increased the rhythm of train traffic. An important role in improving the operation of transport belonged to the Transport Committee under the GKO, organized in February 1942,46 The measures taken made it possible to significantly improve the operation of transport: compared to the first quarter of 1942, the freight turnover of railways increased by 36% in the second quarter, and by 41% in the third quarter .47

In 1943, transport operations continued to improve steadily. For a more complete and precise provision of transportation, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 15, 1943, all railways were transferred to martial law, and from May 9, martial law was introduced on river and sea transport .48 This strengthened labor discipline, improved the organization of labor, and made all parts of the country's transport system work more clearly and consistently. Due to this, on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, up to 6 thousand wagons arrived in the areas of concentration of Soviet troops on some days: the total volume of military traffic to the Kursk salient area reached about 540 thousand wagons. In 1943, the front-line railways supplied the troops during their offensive operations without any special interruptions, worked more smoothly, and fully met the needs of the front .49

The restoration of the road network was important for improving the operation of transport. During the war, about 120 thousand km of main railway lines, 2.8 thousand large and medium-sized bridges, and many other 50 objects were revived . Along with the restoration on a large scale, new transport construction was also carried out, and second tracks were built. Transport construction was subordinated to the military-strategic interests and needs of the development of defense production.

The first major object commissioned in wartime conditions (1941) was the Sorokskaya (Belomorsk) - Obozerskaya line with a length of 351 kilometers. Thanks to its construction, the Northern Road turned out to be connected by the shortest route with Kirovskaya, which made it possible to provide everything necessary for conducting military operations in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front and to get out of the city.-


45 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, pp. 440, 450; Sovetskiy Soyuz v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, pp. 95, 96; Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 119.

46 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

47 Calculated from: Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 157.

48 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, p. 415; Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoy voiny 1941-1945, vol. 3, Moscow, 1962, chronika.

49 Orlov B. P. Razvitie transporta SSSR. 1917-1962 gg. M. 1963, p. 291.

50 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, pp. 435-436.

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who from the Kola Peninsula imported cargo arriving in the USSR via the Murmansk port 51 .

Crucial importance for the development of the Pechora coal basin (its role was especially important due to the temporary loss of the Donbass) and the Ukhta oil field, for improving fuel supply to the north-western and northern regions of the country, was the construction of the Pechora Road, which began construction before the war. The 1,100 km section of this road (Konosha - Kotlas - Kozhva) was commissioned in 1942. At the same time, the new 340 km long Kizlyar - Trusovo road was put into operation, which provided additional access from the Caucasus and the Volga region to the central regions of the country. The Stalingrad-Baskunchak line (1942), which connected the besieged city to the rear, played an exceptional role in servicing the Stalingrad Front.

Reconstruction work and the construction of new railway lines were so extensive that by the end of the war, the operational length of the country's railways was 112.9 thousand km (in 1940 - 106.1 thousand km)52 . The war was a severe test of the viability of Soviet transport. Its employees, put in the most difficult conditions, came out of all the trials with honor. The transport system withstood the enormous stress of the first period of the war and provided a steady increase in traffic.

The war put builders in special conditions. In an unprecedented short time, it was necessary to build objects of the military economy, including premises for evacuated factories, and restore the national economy destroyed by the war. The creative work of the builders took on a new meaning: it was necessary to build in order to win. The builders largely had to ensure the transformation of the eastern regions into the main military - industrial base of the country. The rate of expanded reproduction of the military economy depended on the builders. The role of builders during the war years is vividly described in the telegram of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin to the heads of the trust "Magnitostroy" and Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works in connection with the commissioning of blast furnace No. 5: "With your successful work, you have proved in practice the strength of the Soviet home front and its ability not only to meet the needs of the glorious Red Army with all types of weapons and ammunition, but also to create new production facilities in an exceptionally short time. This is the key to our victory over the German-Fascist invaders. " 53

The maximum material, financial, and labor expenditures were directed to military-industrial construction and heavy industry, which accounted for 93% of the total capital investment in industry .54 Most of them were sent to the eastern regions of the country in the first years of the war. Thus, in 1942 and 1943, capital investments in the national economy of the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, the Far East, Central Asia and Kazakhstan accounted for more than 60% of the total volume of capital investments in the country's economy.

None of the warring states experienced such a high rate of capital construction as our country: in 1944, capital investments increased by more than 1/3, and in 1945-by almost V s. (in relation to the previous year)55 . Total for the war years in the rear areas-


51 Ibid., p. 427; Orlov B. P. Uk. soch., p. 261.

52 The Country of Soviets for 50 years. Sat. stat. m-lov. M. 1967, p. 170; Orlov B. P. Uk. soch., p. 262.

53 Cit. by: Kommunist, 1985, N 3, p. 75.

64 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, p. 236. Statistical Collection, Moscow, 1961, pp. 66-67.

55 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, p. 237; Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945, vol. 12, p. 166.

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3,500 large industrial enterprises were built in the occupied territories; 7,500 destroyed large enterprises were restored in the territory liberated from occupation .56 Despite the strain on all resources, from July 1, 1941 to January 1, 1946, residential buildings with a total area of 102.5 million square meters were built and restored .57

The growing needs of the front and rear constantly required hard work to find the most effective ways to use labor resources, organize training and retraining of personnel, distribute and redistribute them across the branches of the national economy and regions of the country. The party leadership, the planned nature of the economy, the high consciousness and patriotic enthusiasm of the united multinational family of Soviet people - all that makes up the solid foundation of the socialist state-made it possible to successfully solve this key task of the military economy.

Already in June 1941, a Committee on the Distribution of Labor (later the Committee on Accounting and Distribution of Labor) was established under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which carried out the mobilization and rational distribution of labor resources. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in June 1941, mandatory overtime work lasting from 1 to 3 hours per day was introduced and vacations were canceled. This made it possible to further load the production capacity of industrial enterprises by about 1/3 without increasing the number of workers and employees .58

In order to provide personnel for the branches of the national economy that worked for defense, in 1942, the working-age population was mobilized. During the first 10 months of 1942 alone, 733,000 people were sent to industry, construction, and transport: 565,000 from cities and 168,000 from rural areas; in addition, in 1942, 1,396,000 more people were mobilized for temporary and seasonal work in these sectors .59

The war led to significant changes in the gender and age composition of national economy workers. Soviet women actively participated in the construction of the socialist economy in the pre-war years, but now many male concerns have fallen on their shoulders. Only in the second half of 1941, 500 thousand housewives came to the production. The share of women in all branches of the national economy has sharply increased: if in 1940 it was 39% of the total number of workers and employees, then in 1942 it was 53%. The share of women among skilled workers increased at the end of 1942 compared to the beginning of 1941: among metal turners - from 16 to 33%, welders-from 17 to 31%, blacksmiths and stampers - from 11 to 50%, electricians of electrical substations - from 32 to 50%, steam engine drivers-from 6 to 33%, car drivers - from 3.5 to 19% 60 .

Soviet youth showed labor heroism. During the war years, the teenagers who came to the production replaced the adults who went to the front. In the second half of 1941, 360,000 8th - 10th grade students joined the work. The share of workers and employees under the age of 18 in industry increased 2.5 times in 1942 compared to 1939. In the third year of the war, young people in various industries-


56 Kapitalnoe stroitelstvo v SSSR [Capital Construction in the USSR], p. 17; Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945, vol. 6, Moscow, 1965, p. 65.

57 " Tikhonov N. A. Sovetskaya ekonomika: dostizheniya, problemy, perspektivy [Soviet Economy: achievements, problems, prospects]. Moscow, 1984, p. 240.

58 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR]. Chronicle of Events and Facts, 1917-1959, Moscow, 1961, p. 385.

59 Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 110.

60 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 4, p. 144; Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 111.

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The number of employees was between 40 and 60%. Students of the labor reserve system, who were just beginning to master the profession, produced various products in 1941, extracted oil, coal, ore, performed construction and other works for 615 million rubles, in 1942-for 1053 million rubles, and in total for 1941-1945 - for about 5 billion rubles 61 .

The most tense situation with the cadres of the war economy developed in 1942, when the number of workers and employees was only 59% of the level of 1940, but in the future it continuously increased: in relation to 1942, in 1943 - 105%, in 1944-129%, in 1945-148% (thus reaching 87% of the level of 1940).62 . Under these conditions, the distribution and reallocation of available and additionally attracted labor resources was of great importance. Despite a significant reduction in the total number of workers and employees, the share of industrial workers and employees increased from 35% to 39% in 1943 compared to 1940 .63

The reallocation of labor resources across the country's economic regions was also significant. If in 1943 the number of workers and employees in the North and North-West of the European part of the USSR, in the Center, in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia decreased in comparison with 1940, then in other regions it significantly increased: in the industry of the Urals-by 65%, in the Volga region-by 65%, in Western Siberia-by 71%, Kazakhstan and Central Asia - by 54%. This led to a sharp change in the share of industrial workers and employees in the eastern regions in relation to the total number of industrial workers and employees in the entire country. The share of the Urals, for example, increased from 8.5% in 1940 to 20.5% in 194364 .

The Committee on Labor Registration and Distribution played a major role in this work. From 1942 to July 1945, it and its local bodies sent more than 3 million urban and rural people to work permanently in industry, construction and transport, including more than 570,000 in the fuel and energy industries, 411,000 in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, and 487,000 in the military industry thousand people 65 .

It was necessary not only to organize a significant replenishment of the labor force, but also to provide the military economy with personnel of appropriate qualifications. This task was also successfully solved by the party and the Government. Suffice it to say that in 1941-1945, 11.3 million workers were trained directly in production, 9.3 million were trained in the advanced training system at enterprises and institutions, and 2.5 million were trained in the labor force system .66

The State took measures to ensure the training of specialists for the front and rear. On May 5, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) adopted a resolution on the plan for admission to universities in 1942 and measures to strengthen them: Since 1943, admission to universities and technical schools increased and in 1945 exceeded the pre-war level .67 The work of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions was subordinated to the requirements of wartime. Necessary changes were made to the content of training and the nomenclature of specialties. Training periods have been reduced, although RA-


61 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 4, p. 144; Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 112; The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 407.

62 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

63 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., pp. 109-110.

64 Ibid.

65 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

66 Ibid., pp. 208, 210; USSR in Numbers, Moscow, 1958, pp. 331-333; Kosygin A. N. Uk. soch., p. 32.

67 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

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During this period, the established volume of the studied material was mostly preserved. The main feature of this period was the combination of study with permanent work in production. While doing practical training in training workshops, students fulfilled defense orders. In 1941-1945, higher education institutions gave the country 302,000 specialists, and specialized secondary schools - 540,000 specialists .68 Thanks to these measures, all the most important branches of the military economy were mainly provided with qualified personnel. It is characteristic that the number of specialists with higher and secondary special education in 1942-1945 grew faster than the total number of workers and employees .69

Mass heroism, the contribution of home front workers to the national struggle against fascism, found its expression in new forms of labor organization based on socialist competition. From the first days of the war, the working people of towns and villages launched a competition under the slogan: "Work for yourself and for those who have gone to the front!". Stakhanov's methods of labor were actively used in the movement of two-hundred men, three-hundred men, thousand-year-olds, multi-year-olds, in Komsomol youth front-line brigades and in other collective and individual forms of national competition. When it was necessary to fulfill particularly important and urgent military orders, such forms of collective Stakhanov's work as front-line watches, front-line weeks and decades were widely used. People worked for 12-14 hours, and sometimes even more.

In May 1942, at the initiative of the workers of advanced enterprises of the aviation, tank, and metallurgical industries, in response to the May Day appeals of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), an All-Union socialist competition developed for the best fulfillment of front-line orders, mobilization of internal resources, savings in raw materials, and cost reduction. Enterprises of more than 20 People's commissariats participated in the competition. To increase the creative activity of workers, the Red Banners of the GKO, the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), the All-Union Trade Union and the People's Commissariats70 were established .

Participants in the socialist competition (and only in industry by the end of 1944 it covered 85% of the working population) honorably fulfilled their obligations, achieving over-fulfillment of plans for the production of the most important types of defense products. The whole country knew the names of the heroes of the labor front-the Stakhanovites and udarniks, whose ardent patriotism was succinctly expressed in the slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for victory!". At the end of 1943, the staff of Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk factories, tank factories in the Urals, and 13 advanced aviation factories called on the working class of the country to exceed state plans based on increasing labor productivity, and to send the released workers to the enterprises of the liberated areas that were being restored. At the initiative of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the All-Union Socialist Competition of Komsomol Youth brigades, a new organizational form of collective competition, began. At the same time, if in 1942 10 thousand such brigades worked at enterprises, then in 1943 - 36 thousand, and by August 1945 - 154 thousand. They united more than 1 million people. At the end of 1943, the output of these youth groups was 30-40% higher than the average labor productivity72 .

Socialist competition for high labor productivity was closely linked to a broad movement of innovators and inventors (in the armament industry, for example, in 1942).


68 Ibid.

69 Kravchenko G. S. Uk. soch., p. 227.

70 Volodarsky L., Semin S. Uk. soch., pp. 24-25.

71 History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Vol. 4, p. 593.

72 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR], vol. V, p. 217; Volodarsky L., Semin S. Uk. soch., p. 24.

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an average of 665 proposals were submitted per month). During the war years, constant attention was paid to rationalization and invention: months were held to collect rationalization and inventive proposals, competitions for the most effective invention and rational proposal, and public reviews. As a result, industry provided the front with more tanks, planes, artillery pieces, mortars, submachine guns, and ammunition every month .73

In wartime, the responsibility of senior personnel and specialists for solving economic issues has increased immeasurably. Increased central planning was combined with broad initiative, enterprise, and sometimes reasonable risk-taking in an environment where time was crucial. During the war years, a remarkable feature of our cadres, trained by the party, was particularly evident: relying on mass labor heroism, we can find optimal solutions.

This is one of the typical situations of the war years. In the autumn of 1941, fuel reserves in besieged Leningrad were at their limit. The situation was becoming disastrous. The weekly delivery of scanty doses of gasoline had to be made only for vehicles delivering bread. Even the fire trucks were out of fuel, their call teams leaving on foot. Electricity was not supplied to residential buildings - it was barely enough for the needs of military production. Kerosene was needed for lighting homes, but the first delivery of it at 0.5 liters per person took place only in February 1942. There was only one way out - to lay a pipeline along the bottom of Lake Ladoga. The idea is as obvious as it is difficult to implement. A group of specialist military engineers insisted on the immediate development of the project. It was a tempting business - the pipeline, protected from shelling and bombing, could operate at any time of the year. At the Izhora plant, where the most valuable equipment, including the pipe rolling mill, was removed in mid-September, within a few days workers reviewed the stacks and selected about 1 thousand tons of suitable pipes. Under German fire, they were taken to the construction site. In the spring of 1942, after the decision of the GKO, they started laying the pipeline. And soon the oil products that the city needed so much came here through pipes laid along the bottom of Lake Ladoga 74 .

Scientists have made a great contribution to ensuring the country's defense capability. The greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the participants of the scientific conference dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 states: "The role of Soviet science is significant in achieving Victory. Thanks to the efforts of scientists, designers, engineers, and the working class, our army was equipped with the most advanced weapons and military equipment. Scientists actively participated in ideological and political work at the front and in the rear, in exposing the misanthropic ideology of fascism " 75 .

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR had a powerful research and production base at the beginning of the war. The reconstruction of scientific work for the needs of the front and rear was carried out in difficult evacuation conditions. Since the first days of the war, significant changes have taken place in the organization and management of scientific research. A number of regional and specialized scientific commissions were created, which focused the efforts of scientists on solving individual military and economic problems. By the beginning of July 1941, the main directions of scientific activity in wartime conditions were already defined: search and const.-


73 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

74 Pravda, 31. VII. 1984.

75 Ibid., 10. IV. 1985.

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investing in defense assets and solving related scientific problems 76 .

A special commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences headed by its President V. L. Komarov, consisting of more than 600 specialists, carried out a huge work that ensured the use of the resources of the Urals, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan for the needs of the military economy. Geologists have identified new iron ore deposits in Kuzbass and the Urals, oil sources in Bashkiria, large deposits of bauxite in the east of the Ural Mountains, and a molybdenum ore deposit in Kazakhstan .77

The help of scientists in improving and mastering military production by the industry was important. Advanced technology was widely used - in-line methods, the use of stamping parts, heat treatment of parts with high-frequency currents, high-speed automatic welding of tank armored hulls, and much more. In some areas of production, scientists and engineers, in collaboration with craftsmen and workers, have not only provided a radical improvement, but also carried out a complete revolution in the technology and organization of industrial production. For example, a group of engineers at Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works applied a new method for manufacturing high - alloy steels, and a team of civil engineers and metallurgists developed a method for high - speed construction and installation of blast furnaces 78 .

Soviet physicists discovered economical ways to produce liquid oxygen, designed a number of devices for controlling ships, aircraft and artillery fire. Methods were found to combat magnetic sea mines, radar installations and devices were invented. Chemists have done a great job of refining gasoline. Many scientists were engaged in the search for substitutes for scarce raw materials and materials, created new devices for aircraft, artillery and ships, as well as means of protecting military equipment, developed and implemented new methods for the production of mortar pipes .79 A brilliant galaxy of Soviet aircraft designers, designers of aircraft engines, armored vehicles, artillery systems and small arms entered the annals of the country by creating the world's best models of military equipment-weapons of Victory.

Thanks to the efforts of medical scientists and doctors, everything was done to significantly reduce the mortality rate among the wounded. Soviet doctors ensured the return to service of 3/4 of the soldiers and officers treated in hospitals, more than 9/10 of 80 patients . Mass epidemics and infectious diseases were excluded at the front and in the rear.

Despite the enormous efforts expended by scientists to solve specific operational problems during the war years, the USSR Academy of Sciences developed long-term plans for the development of science, and continued research of a fundamental nature. This provided a serious foundation for fruitful research in the post-war period.

The working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the Soviet intelligentsia created a solid military economy during the war and provided the army, air force, and navy with first-class equipment and everything necessary to defeat the enemy.

A vivid manifestation of the patriotism of the Soviet people during the war years was the voluntary financial assistance of working people to the state, according to which the state is responsible.-


76 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

77 Ibid., p. 525; The Great Patriotic War. A brief history, p. 171.

78 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

79 Great Patriotic War. A brief history, pp. 171-172.

80 History of the Second World War 1939-1945, Vol. 12, p. 165.

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which allowed to send more than 2.5 thousand planes, several thousand tanks and many other military equipment to the front in addition 81 . Receipts of funds from the population to the defense fund, for the production of military equipment, loans and lotteries amounted to more than 118 billion rubles, which is equal to 1/5 of the state budget resources allocated for military needs .82 Workers and employees sought to help the front by contributing part of their earnings, and collective farmers-food to the defense fund, holding Sunday parties, collecting money and jewelry, gifts and warm clothes for soldiers, etc. Donors made an important contribution to the victory. Their movement during the war years reached 5.5 million people. They handed over more than 1,700 thousand liters of blood, thanks to which thousands of wounded 83 soldiers returned to the ranks .

The war brought a lot of grief to the Soviet people, caused huge damage to the national economy. No country in the entire history of mankind has experienced such losses and destruction as the Soviet Union suffered during the Second World War. The German-Fascist invaders completely or partially destroyed and burned 1710 cities and towns, more than 70 thousand villages and villages; burned and destroyed more than 6 million buildings and made homeless about 25 million people; destroyed about 32 thousand industrial enterprises, disabled metallurgical plants, which before the war smelted about 60% of steel mines that provided more than 60% of the country's coal production; destroyed 65 thousand km of railway tracks and 4,100 railway stations, 36 thousand postal and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges and other communication enterprises; destroyed and destroyed 40 thousand hospitals and other medical institutions, 84 thousand schools, technical schools, universities, research institutes 43 thousand libraries; destroyed and looted tens of thousands of collective and state farms; stole 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep and goats to Germany 84 .

The expenses of the Soviet state for the war with Germany, as well as with Japan, and the loss of income incurred by state and cooperative enterprises and organizations, collective farms, and the population as a result of the occupation amounted to at least 1,890 billion rubles (in 1941 prices). This amount should be added to the 679 billion rubles of damage inflicted on the people's as a result of the huge destruction and looting of State, cooperative and personal property in the occupied territory 85 . The losses suffered by the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War amounted to about 30% of its national wealth.

The work done by the Soviet people during the war to restore the economy of the liberated areas was a truly great feat. There is no example in the history of the world where any country has carried out such a large-scale restoration work in such a short time. They were conducted in parallel with major offensive operations on the fronts that required an increase in military production. Nevertheless, considerable funds were allocated for the restoration of the national economy. In 1944. they accounted for 40% of all capital investments in the national economy. The volume of capital investments directed in 1944 to restore the national economy was 1.4 times higher than the average annual volume of capital investments


81 The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 705.

82 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 12, pp. 51, 147.

83 Ibid., p. 51; The Great Patriotic War. 1941 - 1945. Encyclopedia, p. 24.

84 Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR [National Economy of the USSR], 1922-1982, p. 58.

85 Ibid.

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in all branches of the national economy of the country during the first five-year plan 86 .

The liberated areas, receiving aid from the eastern regions of the country, quickly restored the destroyed economy and became an organic part of the Soviet rear. The energy base was restored, machine-building plants, enterprises for the production of building materials, chemical, light and food industries were put into operation.

In 1943, restoration work began at power plants in the Donbass, Left-Bank Ukraine, Stalingrad, Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, Oryol, Bryansk and Smolensk regions. In 1944-1945, the Dnieper hydroelectric power Station, Nizhnesvirskaya hydroelectric power station, Dubrovskaya GRES and other large power plants were revived. In total, during 1943-1945, 37% of all power plants commissioned during the war were commissioned in the liberated areas. More than 30 restored large power plants have been put into operation 87 . Although during the war it was necessary to rebuild the mines of Donbass almost twice, coal production here from May 1943 to May 1944 increased 7 times. During 1942, production in the coal basin near Moscow was fully restored, and in 1943 the pre-war level of coal production was exceeded here. In 1943-1944, 13 blast furnaces with an annual capacity of 2.3 million tons of pig iron, 70 steelmaking furnaces, and 28 rolling mills were put back into operation in the liberated areas. Exceptionally large-scale work was carried out on the revival of the iron ore base 88 .

Of great importance for the war economy was the restoration of agriculture in the areas liberated from Nazi occupation. The Soviet state and the entire people rendered great assistance to the collective farms, MTS and state farms in reviving the destroyed agricultural production. In 1945, the former MTS network was fully operational in agriculture, and new machine and tractor stations were created.

The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) "On urgent measures for the restoration of agriculture in the areas liberated from German occupation"adopted on August 21, 1943, attested to the tireless concern of the party and the State for the restoration of agriculture in the areas affected by the war .89 It was implemented in the shortest possible time. This was facilitated by popular participation in the solution of the task. Trains with equipment, materials, tools, industrial and food products were moving in an endless stream to the western regions of the country.

Special patronage committees operated in 12 union and autonomous republics, which carried out a lot of organizational work to provide concrete assistance to the most affected republics and regions of the country. Thus, the workers of the Kazakh SSR patronized 10 cities and 35 districts of the Orel, 12 districts of Leningrad, 3 districts of Stalingrad and the liberated districts of the Kalinin Oblasts90 . This fraternal assistance ensured a high rate of economic recovery in the liberated areas. In 1944, the volume of their industrial output increased by 3 times compared to 1943 (against 15% in the whole country) and amounted to about 20% of all-Union production; they gave more than 50% of the national output.-


86 Kosygin A. N. Uk. op., p. 35; Voznesensky N. Uk. op., p. 61.

87 Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR [History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR].

88 Volodarsky L., Semin S. Uk. soch., pp. 27-28.

89 Ibid.

90 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 12, p. 171

page 32


grain, 1/4 - livestock and poultry, about 1/3-dairy products 91 .

The restoration of the economy of the liberated areas was not limited to reaching the level of 1940. It was a process of reconstruction that made it possible to smooth out the shortcomings in the allocation of productive forces that existed before the war. Large enterprises approached the sources of raw materials, and if possible, these sources were duplicated. During the restoration of cities and towns, their old layout was revised, taking into account the development prospects, geographical and climatic features.

High rates of economic growth and the rapid revival of the economy in the areas liberated from the invaders became an important contribution to the further development of the military economy, the full provision of the needs of the front and the military economy. Thanks to the extensive use of the advantages of planned socialist production, the mobilization of all internal resources, the improvement of technology and organization of labor, the increase in its productivity, and the enormous work on training and training personnel, the Soviet economy during the years of military trials showed high efficiency and viability, meeting the needs of the military economy almost entirely at the expense of its own internal resources.

The supply of weapons, equipment, and various materials under lend-lease was insignificant and accounted for about 4% of our country's industrial output. US supplies totaled up to 13% of aircraft produced in the USSR, 7% for tanks, and 2% for anti - aircraft artillery. Food supplies to the Allies during the war years were also insignificant: the average annual exports of grain, cereals and flour from the United States and Canada (in terms of grain) amounted to 2.8% of the average annual volume of grain procurements in the USSR .92 At the same time, during the war years, the United States received from the USSR in the form of a so-called reverse lend-lease 300 thousand tons of chromium ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as many other valuable products .93

Supplies of military equipment were not always carried out by the Allies at a time when they were particularly needed by the Red Army, and the combat characteristics of the equipment provided by the Allies were often inferior to Soviet models. Here is what an English historian wrote about this: "In numerous articles and books that appeared after the war on the war on the Soviet-German front, it is claimed that the Allied supply of aircraft helped the Russians turn the tide of the war in the air in 1942. But this is a complete lie. The fact is that many of the aircraft supplied to the Soviet Union were significantly inferior to military aircraft, which were produced in large quantities by Soviet factories. " 94

The Soviet people created a powerful rear, made the best tanks in the world, planes, "Katyusha" - everything that the front needed to defeat the enemy. We defeated the aggressor economically as a result of the huge political and organizational activity of the party to create a powerful military economy in the shortest possible time. The Party ensured the utmost mobilization of all resources, from material to moral, the unity of the front and rear, and raised millions for the labor feat. Her appeal is "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" for every Soviet person.-


91 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 581; History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR, vol. V, pp. 356, 402; The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, p. 584.

92 Voznesensky N. Uk. soch., p. 74; Epishev A. At the head of the victorious nation. - Kommunist, 1985, N 4, p. 66; History of the Second World War of 1939-1945. Vol. 12, p. 186-187.

93 Cit. By: Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 12, p. 187.

94 Sovetskiy Soyuz Publ., 1985, No. 2, p. 32.

page 33


In those years, the ka was the law of life, the measure of his responsibility for the fate of the socialist Homeland. The home front workers devoted all their energies to the cause of Victory, convincingly demonstrating to the whole world the correctness of Lenin's words: "The winner in war is the one who has more reserves, more sources of strength, and more self-control in the people's mass." 95

The Great Patriotic War, during which the Soviet Union won an impressive victory, once again demonstrated the creative power of socialism, the advantages of its planned system, and the labor heroism of our people. "The most important and most valuable thing that Victory has given us," Mikhail Gorbachev said at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, " is the opportunity to live and work in peace. The war trial showed: our social system is invincible, its vital forces are inexhaustible. " 96

40 years have passed since the Victory Day. All these years, thanks to the firm and consistent policy of the Communist Party, the Soviet people have been living in peace. The economy, the political system of Soviet society, and socialist democracy are steadily developing, the national state is being strengthened, and the welfare and cultural level of the people are improving. Our science has reached new heights. A concentrated expression of its achievements is that the USSR became a pioneer in space exploration. The Soviet people are now preparing to meet the XXVII Congress of the CPSU with dignity. The persistent, selfless, creative work of our people is the key to further strengthening the economic power and defense capability of the Soviet state, and to fulfilling the Communist Party's plans to accelerate its socio-economic development.


95 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 39. p. 237.

96 Pravda, 9. V. 1985.

page 34


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