In connection with the formation of Mongolia's independence in the XX century. Based on primary sources from Russian and Mongolian archives, the article attempts to clarify the question of Stalin's relations with Mongolian leaders and his personal ideas about Mongolia.

Keywords: Mongolia, USSR, Japan, Manchukuo, archives, Stalin, negotiations, independence.

Stalin's attention to the Mongolian question was clearly revealed in 1932. In the spring of 1932, due to popular discontent with the leftist policy of the Mongolian authorities, an armed insurrection1 broke out, involving wide circles of the population, including the clergy. This issue was considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) at a meeting of May 16, 1932 [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 133]. The extremely complicated international situation in the Far East at that time, the intensification of Japanese policy, the creation of the state of Manchukuo, and other problems affecting Mongolia drew Stalin's attention to the situation in the Mongolian state. As a result, in 1933 he first showed interest in meeting with Mongolian leaders. From December 1933 to September 5, 1952, according to the materials found by the author, there were a total of 21 official and unofficial meetings between Stalin and the Mongolian leadership.

The AWPRF and RGASPI have preserved the minutes and records of these meetings. In connection with the intensification of the policy of the Soviet government and the CPSU(b) towards Mongolia since 1932, since the establishment of the Mongolian Commission under the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), issues related to Mongolia were discussed monthly, sometimes weekly, and as a result of which decisions were adopted. An analysis of the level of Stalin's participation in all the above-mentioned meetings reveals and characterizes his ideas about Mongolia (Batsaikhan, 2007).

During the period from 1933 to the end of Stalin's life, excluding the first two years of the Great Patriotic War, i.e. 1941 and 1942, as well as 1950 and 1951, annual meetings took place between Stalin and the leaders of the Mongolian state, sometimes twice a year. The first meeting was held in December 1933. On December 25, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MNR and the Minister of Finance S. V. Yushchenko met. Dovchin 2, Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee

1 In the history of the MPRP, it is written that these were "counter-revolutionary armed uprisings inspired by reactionary secular and spiritual feudal lords" [Essays on the history of the MPRP. 1971, p. 139]. In reality, it was a popular movement against government policies, confiscation of property, persecution of relitia, etc.

2 A delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister of the MNR Government and Finance Minister S. Dovchin expressed a desire to meet with Stalin. An official document sent to Stalin from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR states: "Dated December 15, 1933, to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), Comrade Stalin: Dear Comrade! Deputy Prime Minister of the MNR and Finance Minister Dovchin arrived in Moscow with a delegation. Dovchin is authorized by the Mongol ruler-

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B. Eldevochir, MNR Ambassador to the Soviet Union G. Sambuu arrived for a meeting with I. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov 3. This was Stalin's first personal meeting with representatives of the Mongolian authorities. There is no evidence of earlier encounters. During this meeting, speaking about the new turn of politics in Mongolia, Stalin referred to the growing number of lamas and asked about their lives, saying: "This is a state within a state. Genghis Khan would never have agreed to this. He would certainly have dealt cruelly with them " 4 and advised, following the example of the struggle against Orthodox churches, to launch a struggle against Christianity. Apparently, at the end of this meeting, Stalin found it necessary to meet with the Mongolian Prime Minister.

About a month before this meeting, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of November 1, 1933, having approved the proposal of the Mongolian Commission (T. Voroshilov) and issued a corresponding resolution, decided to send a commission headed by Eliava to Mongolia to clarify the general situation [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 125-127]. The Soviet government's policy towards Mongolia at that time was connected with the complication of Soviet-Japanese relations. Apparently, this was the reason for Stalin's attention to the Mongolian question.

Eliava had to explain to the Mongolian authorities that "in the light of recent complications in Soviet-Japanese relations and political events in Japan, a direct threat of Japanese aggression has arisen; there are many reports made by responsible Japanese military leaders calling for a declaration of war on the USSR, and some reports contain direct instructions that in the event of entering the Soviet Union, the The Japanese military authorities will seize the territory of the MNR for a war against the USSR." His task was "to inform the Mongol comrades that all the Japanese are now making comprehensive preparations for the capture of the MNR" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 127].

Stalin's second meeting with the highest representatives of Mongolia took place during the visit of the MNR Prime Minister P. Genden on November 15, 1934 [MUUTA, f. 445, d.2, kh. n. 31, kh. 1-24]. The meeting began with a discussion about llamas. Stalin inquired about their situation in great detail. He also asked many questions about other issues in Mongolia.

An important issue on which Stalin and Genden exchanged views was the question of the independence of the MNR. Referring to this problem, Stalin said: "Now about independence. On the practical side, your country is an independent state. But as far as I know, only the USSR recognized your independence. Isn't it? Your country has not formally separated from China, and such an independent status has not been proclaimed. Isn't that right?" Then he asked Genden, " Do you want other countries to recognize your country? Do you want to establish an official relationship with them?". He added: "Once you gain strength, you will declare your independence from China, and then the Chinese will not dare to invade you. Then it will be necessary to build a strong state inside the country. All lamas should be firmly taken in hand. Having smashed weakness to dust, we must not forget that only the strong are recognized. This is the essence of the question of your independence" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 24].

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic is pleased to present you with a fully furnished Mongolian yurt and a horse with harness and saddle. Dovchin expresses his interest in a personal meeting with you, at which he intends to present you with a certificate from the Mongolian government and, if possible, install a Mongolian yurt in any place. Can I notify Dovchin that you will accept him? If you agree to the appointment, please provide instructions and instructions on how to do it. Sincerely, welcome to G. Sokolnikov" [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 745-804, l. 55].

3 The minutes of this meeting in Mongolian are kept in the MPRP archive. A brief description of the meeting with Stalin is found in the same place [MAKHN-un archive, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 173, kh. 125-130]. In addition, an arbitrary (from memory) record of the brief content of this meeting was found on sheets 2-9 of case No. 351 of the RGANI foundation 558.

4 Summary of the conversation between T. T. S. and V. with Dobchin and Eldevochir in the presence of translator B-in on December 25, 1933, from 21 to 23 hours (an arbitrary record from memory) [RGANI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 351, l. 3-4].

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The words "breaking down weakness, we must not forget that only the strong are recognized" seemed to Genden words with deep meaning that can be taken for guidance. Although this was the first time Stalin had met with the head of the Mongolian government, he expressed very specifically his understanding of Mongolia's independence.

Following this meeting, on November 24, 1934, a delegation of the Soviet government headed by Stalin attended a dinner in the building of the MPR's plenipotentiary representation in the USSR. A recording of the conversation between the leaders of the two countries has been preserved [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 351, l. 66-73]. The main confirmation that Stalin attached great importance to the Mongolian question is not only that he personally attended the dinner, but also that he said the following:: "In short, let's raise a toast to the independent Mongolian state. It's easy to lift the glasses... Drinking and eating is easy, but maintaining independence is difficult. Let us raise our glasses to the Mongols who can resist, who can fight! (Genden: "Hooray") "Hooray" is easy to shout, but it's better to do it. Mongolia's independence must be preserved. Although this is much more difficult than saying and raising the glasses. And so let us raise our glasses to a free and independent Mongolia! "[RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 351, l. 66].

During the dinner, Genden approved the idea of concluding a mutual assistance agreement between the USSR and the MNR, after which they agreed to hold a meeting on November 27 and discuss the issue of "a mutual assistance agreement". This was one of Stalin's first steps to ensure the protection of the Soviet Far East from Japan.

Back in late 1933, during Stalin's meeting with Dovchin and Eldevochir, Stalin wanted to meet with Genden in order to agree that after the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement between Mongolia and the USSR, the latter's troops would be stationed on the territory of the MNR and its territory would become a military base in the Far East. It follows from archival documents that at that time, in case of a conflict on the Manchurian-Mongolian border, the Japanese put forward the idea of concluding an agreement between the MNR and Manchukuo, but the Soviet government did not give the Japanese such an opportunity, putting Mongolian-Manchurian relations under its control [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 17, l. 132-133].

In connection with the religious situation (the strong power of the clergy), Molotov and Kaganovich suggested: "Given the tense international situation, without denying the MNR's open struggle against lamas, it is necessary to apply harsh punishments to Japanese agents exposed among the lamas." Following this suggestion, on November 26, 1935, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted Decision No. 34, signed by Stalin, which stated: "As the international situation of Mongolia worsens, the counter-revolutionary organization of the Lamas not only becomes stronger, but also incites traitors from their own people to go over to the side of the Japanese invaders. As a result, the Mongolian leadership is advised not to weaken the struggle waged with the Lamas" [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d.18, l. 170]. As a result of this decision and subsequent instructions, there were a lot of "counter-revolutionaries" and "Japanese spies" in Mongolia, which led to their total arrests among the clergy.

On November 27, 1934, as mentioned above, Stalin, Voroshilov, and Molotov met with a Mongolian delegation headed by Prime Minister Genden. It discussed issues of economics and finance, increasing the number of defense troops, issuing the Soviet Union a gratuitous annual loan for the army's expenses in the amount of six million tugriks for five years, etc. [RGANI, f. 89, list 63, d. 13]. The main topic of the meeting was the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on mutual assistance. About this Stalin said: "I think it is right to conclude a mutual non-aggression treaty between the MNR and the USSR." To which Genden replied: "I understand that this mutual assistance agreement has defensive purposes." But Stalin said, " No, it's not like that. We want to conclude two agreements, one on mutual assistance and the other on mutual assistance.

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about non-aggression. These two agreements must be signed in Ulaanbaatar." It should be noted that one of the steps of the Soviet policy pursued in the eastern direction, related to the situation created in the Far East in the early 1930s, was the beginning of the legal formation of its own military-strategic positions in Mongolia. Based on the problems discussed at this meeting, an oral agreement on mutual assistance was concluded between the USSR and the MNR in 1934.

On December 30, 1935, at a meeting of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Litvinov, and Stomonyakov with Genden, Damid, and Namsray, 5 this issue was discussed in more detail [MUUTA, f. 445, d. 2, ch. 41, kh. 1-8]. At the next meeting, on January 7, 1936, they negotiated for three hours [MUUTA, f. 445, d. 2, xn. 43, kh. 1-8]. The main point of the meeting was that the Mongolian delegation needed to hear: "In order to strengthen Mongolian independence, the Soviet Union's assistance is required," and as a result, it is absolutely necessary to conclude a mutual assistance agreement. Those words weren't spoken by Genden, but by Damid. Genden's failure to take the initiative was one of the reasons for Stalin's loss of confidence in him. After Damid's words, Genden stated: "If given the opportunity, the mutual assistance agreement is ready to be signed even now."

At Genden's words: "Due to the confrontation and negotiations on our eastern border, the work being done among the peasantry and the fight against it has been weakened," Stalin retorted accusingly.: "This is your right-wing bias, Gendena. To tell you the truth, it's unpleasant. However, there is no other way out. Mongolia's interests are higher" [MUUTA, f. 445, d. 2, khn. 43, kh. 3]. These words of Stalin were tantamount to the fact that he was more concerned about the interests of Mongolia than the Mongolian Prime Minister.

It seems that all this was a preparation for repelling a possible Japanese attack on the MNR. In particular, Stalin said: "Our help should come only from good will. You voluntarily want help. And we volunteer to help. This is not a joke. If your government decides to request military assistance, these troops should be sent not at the time of the war, but now. Our troops should be in two directions of your north - Tamsag and Haalgan. It is advantageous to send our troops right now, because, firstly, our military will get stronger, and your military will help them in training, and, secondly, they will be guided by the territory" [MUUTA, f. 445, d. 2, xn. 43, xh. 4].

It should be noted that at the end of 1931, Moscow offered Japan to conclude a non-aggression treaty, but the Japanese government did not accept this proposal. As a result, the Soviet government began to increase defensive measures in case of aggression from Japan (Terayama, 1997). Stalin's repeated meetings with Mongolian leaders are consistent with this. As a result, these meetings became the direct basis for the conclusion of a protocol of mutual assistance between the USSR and the MNR in Ulaanbaatar on March 12, 1936. Under this protocol, large Soviet military forces entered Mongolia in the summer of 1936.

On December 23, 1936, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Stomonyakov, and Tairov met with the Prime Minister of the MNR A. Amar, as well as with R. Mandom and J. Kropotkin. Dende-vom 6 [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 352, l. 17-26]. Amar didn't repeat Genden's mistake. He said: "Our main desire is to depend on assistance from the Soviet Union for the defense of our country... We want even more help than last year." Referring to Inner Mongolia, Amar added: "I think the time has come when the inner Mongols themselves... they will join us. There under China-

5 P. Genden-Prime Minister of Mongolia in 1932-1936 G. Damid - Minister of War of Mongolia. D. Namsray-Chairman of the Department of Internal Affairs of Mongolia in 1932-1936.

6 R. Mend - member of the Presidium of the MPRP Central Committee, Minister of Transport and Communications, J. Dendev - Minister of Justice of Mongolia.

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our brothers, three million of the same nationality, are under its administration. We assure you that we will show them care and attention" [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 352, l. 22]. To which Stalin immediately replied, almost in a whisper: "Yes... I don't know what time the Mongols defeated the Chinese. They built the Great Wall to protect themselves from you" [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 352, l. 23]. Then Amar added: "Up to the Great Wall of China, all the territory belongs to us, the Mongols." In response, Molotov smiled and remarked:: "Yes, you have imperialist goals." On January 4, 1937, at 9: 30 a.m., Molotov received Amar, Manda, and Dendav in his office in the Kremlin. This meeting was also attended by Stalin, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, Litvinov, Mezhlauk, Mikayan, Rosengolts, Ginka, Stomonyakov and Tairov [MUUTA, f. 445, d. 2., kh. n. 52, 1-12 dakh tal].

Sending Soviet troops to Mongolia in August 1937, Stalin gave Smirnov and Frinovsky a particularly secret task: "The commissars of our units that entered the territory of the MNR, and the leadership of the Red Army, should conduct explanatory work among the soldiers about the political and military significance and goals of concluding a mutual assistance treaty and introducing troops to the territory of the MNR. Defending the border of the MNR, our troops protect our entire Far East and border territories from Japanese invaders " [RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 532, l. 73-77]. This was a step towards the implementation of Stalin's military strategy in the Far East. The introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Mongolia should be taken not only as a measure to protect the interests of the USSR in the Far East from Japanese-Manchurian aggression, but also as a measure to prevent the breakout of retreating Chinese troops into Mongolian territory, since the Japanese could also invade the MNR after them.

Up to this time, in all Stalin's negotiations with the Mongolian leaders, one of the main topics was to protect the independence of the MNR with the help of Soviet troops on Mongolian territory. But at all subsequent meetings, after the Soviet invasion of Mongolia in 1936 and 1937, Stalin rarely returned to this question.

list of literature

Батсайхан О. Монгол ундэстэн бурэн эрхт болох замд (1911 - 1946) [Монголия по пути нации-государства (1911 - 1946)]. Улан-Батор: Монгол Улсын Шинжлэх Ухааны Академи, 2007.

Монгол Ардын Хувьсгалт Намын Архив [Архив МНРП] (МАХН-ын архив).

Mongol Ulsyn Undesny Tvv Archive [Mongolian State National Central Archive] (MUUTA).

Ocherki istorii MPRP [Essays on the history of the MPRP]. Moscow, 1971.

Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI).

Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI).

Terayama K. Sovetskiy Dalniy Vostok v nachale 1930-kh gg. [The Soviet Far East in the early 1930s].

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