The article examines the evolution of Soviet-Iranian relations after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Following the transformation of the foreign policy of the USSR and Iran in the framework of bilateral relations, the author comes to the conclusion that the Soviet Union used Iran's desire to gain the status of a regional leader, and Iran was interested in cooperation with the USSR, which could create a counterbalance to the American presence in the strategically important Persian Gulf region.

Key words: Iran, foreign policy of the USSR, Islamic Revolution, Afghan war, Middle East policy.

In the strategically important Persian Gulf, the interests of a number of the world's leading states intersect. The geopolitical situation in the region was largely influenced by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The ideology of the clerics who came to power contributed not only to the internal consolidation of the Iranian people, but also to the emergence of levers of possible Iranian pressure on the USSR and the United States. In response to Tehran's regional ambitions, the United States resorted to a policy of ultimatums and economic dictatorship, which the USSR used to establish Soviet-Iranian relations. When conducting contacts with Iran, the Russian Federation adheres to the basic principles formed by the leadership of the Soviet Union in the period after the Islamic Revolution.

When writing the article, three groups of sources were used. The first category includes documents from the collections of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AWPRF) and the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI), some of which are being put into scientific circulation for the first time. Valuable information about the nature of Soviet-Iranian relations and the evolution of the Iranian foreign policy doctrine is kept in the AVPRF "Embassy of the USSR in Iran" fund.

It is possible to trace the relationship between the Afghan War, in which the Soviet Union took part in 1979-1989, and the formation of a distorted perception of the USSR by Iranians, according to documents containing statements by official representatives of Iran about the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

An idea of the main directions of cooperation between the USSR and Iran can be gleaned from documents relating to negotiations on economic issues, bilateral visits of top government officials and proposals of the Soviet side to provide Iran with various assistance.

The Fund of Declassified Documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU contains resolutions of the Central Committee concerning propaganda work among the Iranian population,

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as well as letters testifying to secret contacts of the Soviet side with the People's Party of Iran (Tudeh) and the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People [On special radio broadcasts to Iran; On the response to the appeal of the leadership of the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian people; Resolution of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On strengthening information and propaganda work in Iran", 1989]. The second group of sources includes published documents that include, for example, decrees of the Soviet government [Long-term Program..., 1989], speeches and other speeches of the leaders of Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini [Khomeini, 1989] and Ayatollah Khamenei [Khamenei, 2000]. Memoirs and interviews of employees of the USSR Embassy in Iran constitute the third group of sources (Vinogradov, 1998; Shebarshin, 1999).

The Islamic Revolution is a subject of intense interest on the part of domestic and foreign researchers. Thus, D. Anarkulova and E. A. Doroshenko considered the role of the Shiite clergy as the main component of the revolutionary processes that developed in Iran in the 1970s, which was heterogeneous in its essence and was distinguished by a variety of views on the future of post-revolutionary Iran [Anarkulova, 1993; Doroshenko, 1998]. In turn, V. V. Mashin, R. Wright, and A. M. Bininashvili consider the influence of the West and the significant presence of the United States in the Middle East region to be the main reasons for the radicalization of the country's foreign policy doctrine [Bininashvili, 1989; Mashin and Yakovlev, 1985; Wright, 2000]. We should mention the analytical works of S. N. Sarukhanyan, S. I. Verevkin, and A. K. Lukoyanov [Sarukhanyan, 2007; Verevkin, 2012; Lukoyanov, 2009], which study the entire spectrum of events related to the Islamic Revolution.

There are several approaches to the periodization of Soviet-Iranian relations after the Islamic Revolution. Thus, V. A. Ushakov, having chosen the level of political cooperation and the frequency of bilateral consultations as the main criteria, identified four stages of development of bilateral contacts: "normalization" (1979-1983); "tangible alertness" (1984-1989); and "rapprochement" (1989-1991), which occurred after the collapse of the USSR (1992-1996) [Ushakov, 1997]. Unlike V. A. Ushakov, who focused on the dynamics of Soviet-Iranian relations, S. N. Sarukhanyan considers the entire post-revolutionary period before the signing of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1989 as a stage of their deterioration [Sarukhanyan, 2007, p. 74].

The emergence of the idea of the similarity of revolutionary situations in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century and in Iran in the 1970s was partly due to the high level of polarization of the population and the level of income observed in these states during the corresponding periods. According to V. M. Vinogradov's calculations, by the mid-1970s, 54% of families in Iran continued to live below the poverty line with huge incomes from oil exports [Vinogradov, 1998, p. 366]. This circumstance prompted the Iranian authorities to draw parallels with pre-revolutionary Russia and consider the Soviet experience of state-building as a reference point for the development of post-revolutionary Iran.

Recognizing the Iranian Revolution, the USSR sent 500 liters of canned blood, 4 tons of medicines and dressings to Tehran as medical aid to Iranian citizens who suffered during the armed uprising [AVPRF, f. 174, on. 63, p. 265, d. 1, l. 6, 1979]. In response, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, D. Sanjabi, pointed out the possibility of political rapprochement between the two countries [Vinogradov, 1998, p. 426]. On November 19, 1979, the Soviet Government issued a special statement protesting against Western interference in Iran's internal affairs.

As part of the establishment of Soviet-Iranian relations in 1979, a group of Iranian students and teachers was sent for an internship at the Pushkin Institute of the Russian Language; negotiations began on expanding bilateral economic and technical cooperation [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 63, p. 265, d. 1, l. 22, 50, 1979].

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However, the contradictions between the spiritual leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini and other clerics and the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan negatively affected contacts between the USSR and Iran. The formation of the views of the "grand Ayatollah" on the future of Iran and relations between the two countries took place against the background of a fierce factional struggle. It should be noted that at the first stage of his leadership, Khomeini supported the establishment of equal relations with both the United States and the USSR [Anarkulova, 1992, p.137] and tried to smooth out the impact on the masses of attacks directed against the Soviet Union in the press and anti-Soviet slogans that were increasingly heard during prayers.

The struggle for power between certain groups of Shiite clergy contributed to the emergence of a more advanced concept of the development of a new Islamic state among the followers of the Ayatollah ("Khomeinists"). A. Lukoyanov notes its "extra-class nature, designed to unite the masses on the basis of unity of religious interests" under the slogan "revival of Islam" [Lukoyanov, 2009, p.108]. The danger of this concept was that the idea of Islamic revival meant the spread of the Islamic revolution to other Muslim countries and their unification under anti-imperialist and anti-communist slogans. To this end, Ayatollah Khamenei said, " Khomeini should not have allowed any foreign interference in the affairs of the Islamic people. That is why he so resolutely resisted the United States and the then Soviet Union" [Khamenei, 2000, p. 225].

The emergence of anti-Soviet slogans was partly due to the fact that the Soviet Union did not see the victory of the Islamic Revolution as the result of unification based on a common religious idea. L. V. Shebarshin, a KGB resident in Tehran in 1979-1982, wrote in particular:: "It's not very nice to admit it now, but... Adherence to dogma (Marxism-Leninism. - approx. V. P.) distorted perception. And the Iranian revolution was popular, Imam Khomeini was the people's leader, and Shiite Islam was the only ideology acceptable to the Iranian people " [Shebarshin, 1999].

THE CONCEPT OF "DEVIL" STATES

The Afghan war contributed to the formation of Iranians ' perception of the United States and the USSR as two "diabolical" states. In the appendix to the statement (dated December 30, 1979) of the Revolutionary Council of Iran in connection with the events in Afghanistan, the entry of Soviet troops into this country was considered as an indication that "the superpowers used every opportunity to reach an agreement on the redistribution of the world": "The occupation of a neighboring state by the Soviet army weakens our struggle against the American imperialism and therefore is considered as a hostile act towards the Iranian people " [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 63, p. 265, d. 2, l. 197, 1979].

The Afghan events predetermined the appearance of the phrase "little Satan" in the application to the USSR, which was used by Iranian political and public figures. In turn, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict gave the idea of" exporting the Islamic revolution " a sacred meaning. As Ayatollah Behetshi stated in a speech to the faithful in Kazerun on June 9, 1980, "if the Americans, Russians, British, or Chinese want to enter this land ,we will start a war and knock out their teeth." Behetshi argued that for him there is no difference between American capitalism and the USSR, which "occupied" Afghanistan [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 64, p. 267, d. 6, l. 6, 1980].

The rationale for the changes in the Iranian government's attitude towards the Soviet Union is contained in a letter from the then Foreign Minister of Iran, Sergey Lavrov. Rotbzade A. A. Gromyko, dated August 11, 1980 S. Rotbzade tried to persuade the USSR to further cooperation on terms favorable to Iran. The nature of Soviet-Iranian relations before the 1979 revolution was considered "unfair" in the message.-

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livy and anti-Iranian " [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 64, p. 267, g. 2, d. 4, l. 25, 1980]. Among the reasons that the USSR is "no less devilish than in America" are the discovery in Kurdistan of "large volumes of Soviet-made weapons in untouched packages"; the implementation by Soviet satellites of "flights over the territory of Iran" and photo shoots of "our military positions in Kurdistan"; the publication of propaganda materials by the banned Tudeh party at the expense of funds, provided by the USSR; ignoring the Islamic nature of the revolution in Iran ("While American imperialism and its minions... you ridiculed the Islamic revolution, you never even called it Islamic in your media, calling it the democratic revolution of the Iranian people " [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 64, p. 267, vol. 2, d. 4, l. 26, 1980].

The main reason for strained relations with the Soviet Union, according to the message, was "the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, contrary to the principles of establishing mutually beneficial Soviet-Iranian relations" [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 64, p.267, vol. 2, d. 4, l. 28, 1980]. The letter ends with the Iranian government's proposals to normalize Soviet-Iranian relations, subject to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and a reduction in the number of Soviet missions in Iran.

The letter indicated that there were a number of unresolved problems concerning Soviet-Iranian relations, and that there were differences in the goals pursued by the two countries. As for the intensification of Soviet propaganda work in Iran, it was aimed at preventing large-scale American information penetration into this country and preserving anti-American sentiments there. The Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat " On strengthening information and propaganda work on Iran "drew attention to the strengthening of"reactionary Iranian circles hostile to the Soviet Union, in which some ruling circles and clergy take part." It was supposed to "develop general democratic tendencies in Iran and consolidate the country on anti-imperialist positions simultaneously with the broad awareness of the Iranian public about the policy of the Soviet Union" [RGANI, f. 89, op. 46, d. 89, l. 1-2, 1980].

The extent of the USSR's propaganda activities in Iran is evidenced by the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the implementation of the above-mentioned Decree, which indicates a noticeable increase in the time of radio broadcasting, the commissioning of two relay television stations, etc. [RGANI, f. 89, op. 46, d. 89, l. 22, 1980].

On December 27, 1980, the Soviet mission building in Tehran was attacked. The USSR declared a strong protest against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. First of all, the fact that the Iranian authorities were informed about the planned attack and received repeated requests for help from embassy staff caused outrage. However, as stated in the note of the Soviet leadership ," no immediate and effective measures were taken to prevent the attack. The extraterritoriality of the Soviet embassy was grossly violated, and a large group of violent elements armed with batons, stones and knives broke into its territory. The national flag was insulted, and the embassy building was damaged" [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 64, I. 267, d. 2, l. 67, 1980]. The Soviet government demanded compensation for the damage caused and the creation of conditions that excluded the possibility of a repeat of such an incident.

However, despite the measures taken by the Iranian authorities, attempts to attack the Soviet mission were carried out in the future. In addition, the documents prepared by the Soviet Embassy in the 1980s were full of reports of offensive actions against the Soviet flag and institutions under the jurisdiction of the representative bodies of the USSR. For example, a note from the Soviet embassy dated June 2, 1981, stating that a group of unknown persons broke the windows of the Iranian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, while insulting statements were made against Moscow [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 65, p. 270, d. 1, l. 103, 1981].

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Such actions prompted the Soviet government to reconsider its policy towards Iran, especially in the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Moscow, on the one hand, sought to prevent the penetration of Islamic ideology of the Iranian type into the Soviet Muslim republics, on the other, tried to expand economic ties with Iran and create an atmosphere of trust by formally curtailing support for forces opposed to the Islamic leadership.

During the negotiations between the USSR and Iran on economic cooperation, the issue of Soviet arms supplies to Iraq was repeatedly raised. Thus, in early 1984, a note was published-an appeal of the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Union, indicating Iran's desire to develop mutually beneficial cooperation, but the main condition was to stop supporting Iraq as a country with an "ever-increasing tilt towards the United States" [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 68, p. 277, d. 3, l. 14, 1984].

A real breakthrough in Soviet-Iranian relations was the visit of the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Department for European and American Affairs, Mohammed Sadr, to the USSR and his meeting with Alexander Gromyko. The talks were held behind closed doors, but according to some reports, the issue of reducing the supply of Soviet weapons to Iraq was discussed.

In September 1985, an agreement was signed that provided for the Soviet Union's assistance to Iran in the construction of energy facilities [Ushakov, 1997, p. 388]. Interest in economic cooperation with Iran forced the Soviet government to withdraw its open support for the Tudeh Communist Party and other opposition groups. The Central Committee of the CPSU decided to liquidate the illegal Soviet radio station "National Voice of Iran", which had been operating since 1959 [RGANI, f. 89, op. 13, d. 2, l. 5, 1986].

The rapprochement of Soviet-Iranian political and economic interests against the background of the USSR's gradual refusal to support Iraq had a positive effect on the formation of the Iranian foreign policy doctrine, which assumed recognition of the large role that the United States and the USSR play in the international arena, and significantly less opportunities that other countries have [Embassy of Iran..., 1993, p.7].

By the end of the 1980s, the number of visits of Soviet representatives to Iran for consultations increased markedly. Only in January-February 1989, delegations of the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry and VO Mashinoexport visited Iran (to negotiate the modernization and expansion of the Arak Machine-building Plant) [AVPRF, f. 174, op. 73, p.293, d. 1, l. 1, 36, 85, 1989]. On February 25, 1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze was received by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Frequent consultations on economic and political cooperation, joint work on the implementation of the UNESCO Silk Road - Path of Dialogue project (1989-1993) testified to the emergence of new trends in the development of Soviet-Iranian relations. Iran began to consider the Soviet Union as a political partner, cooperation with which, in particular, weakened the negative impact of economic sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran in the 1970s and 1980s, and promised to receive political and economic dividends. The USSR was ready to provide Iran with qualified specialists and new technologies.

As a result of the liberalization of the internal political situation in the USSR, it became possible for Iran to cooperate more closely with the Soviet Union republics in the religious sphere. Here is what Ayatollah Khomeini wrote about this to Mikhail Gorbachev:

"I ask you to pay attention and approach the study of Islam with all seriousness, and not only because Islam and Muslims need you, but for the sake of the high values that the Islamic world has and which can bring peace and salvation to all peoples and unravel the tangle of problems that concern humanity. In conclusion, I would like to firmly state that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the most powerful stronghold of the Islamic world, can easily fill the vacuum that has formed in the ideological system of your society. Be that as it may, our country still adheres to the principles of good neighborliness and development of bilateral relations and respects these principles" [Khomeini, 1989, p.9-10].

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The peak of Soviet-Iranian rapprochement and the beginning of a new stage in the development of bilateral relations was the adoption on June 22, 1989 of a long-term program of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and Iran for the period up to 2000 with its further automatic extension [Long-term Program..., 1989].

In general, the Islamic Revolution, as R. Wright correctly noted, offered the world a new ideology and predetermined the emergence of a new political spectrum in international relations [Wright, 2000, p. 8]. The characteristic features of this ideology were its dynamism and flexibility, necessary for the development of a new theocratic state.

Thus, Soviet-Iranian relations were transformed under the influence of the Islamic Revolution and the resulting innovations in the economy, politics and ideology of Iran. If the Soviet Union, given Tehran's desire to take a leading position in the Middle East region, provided it with its own markets for the sale and transit of Iranian goods and access to new energy technologies, then Iran considered the USSR not only as a counterweight to American influence, but also as a force capable of pushing the United States in the Persian Gulf.

list of literature

Anarkulova D. Shiite clergy in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. Dushanbe, 1993.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRI). F. 174.

Bininashvili A.M. Vliyanie vneshnego faktora na razvitie situatsii v Irane [The influence of the external factor on the development of the situation in Iran]. Reasons and Lessons, Moscow, 1989.
Vsrsvkin S. I. Aroma of the martyr. The Islamic Republic of Iran: unknown, amazing, frank, Moscow, 2012.
Vinogradov V. M. Diplomacy: People and Events (from the Ambassador's notes). Moscow, 1998.

Long-term program of trade, Economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Islamic Republic of Iran for the period up to 2000 (Moscow, June 22, 1989). http://lawscctor.ru/.

Doroshenko E. A. Shiite clergy in two revolutions: 1905-1911. 1978-1979. Moscow, 1998.

Lukoyanov A. K. The Islamic Revolution. Iran-Experience One, 1979-2009. Moscow, 2009.

Mashin V. V., Yakovlev A. I. The Persian Gulf in the plans and policies of the West. Moscow, 1985.

Notes, memorials, memoranda of the USSR Embassy in Iran / / AVPRF. F. 174. Op. 67. II. 274. D. 2, 1983.

Notes, memorials, memoranda of the USSR Embassy in Iran in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran/ / AVPRF. F. 174. Op. 73. 11.293. D. 1. 1989.

On special radio broadcasts to Iran / / RGANI. F. 89. On. 13. D. 2. JI. 5. 1986.

On the progress in implementing the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On strengthening information and propaganda work in Iran" / / RGANI. F. 89. Op. 46. D. 89. L. 22-23. 1980.

On the response to the appeal of the leadership of the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian people / / RGANI. F. 89. Op. 15. D. 24. L. 2-9. 1986.

The Iranian Embassy. Third look: news, reports and comments from the Iranian press. B/M., 1993.

Resolution of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On strengthening information and propaganda work in Iran" / / RGANI. F. 89. Op. 46. D. 89. L. I 2. 1980.

Raku M. V. "The Islamic Factor" in Soviet-Iranian relations (1979-first half of the 1980s). http://www.hist.msu.ru/Dcpartmcnts/ModernEuUS/INTREL/ASPIRANTS/Raku.htm.

Sarukhanyan S. N. The Nuclear Factor in Russian-Iranian Relations, Moscow, 2007.
Ushakov V. A. Foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the revolution of 1978-1979: diss. ... Doctor of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1997.

Hamsnsi, Ayatollah. The light of the Islamic Revolution. Speeches and speeches of the Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Moscow, 2000.
Khomsini P. M. The Path leading to Truth: a message from the great leader of the Islamic Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the head of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev. B/M., 1989.

Shsbarshin L. V. Russia is not at war with Islam. http://kuchaknig.ru/show_book.php?book=115527 (1999).

ВР Statistical review of World Energy, June 2013 // bp.com/statisticalrcvicw.

Wright R. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. N.Y., 2000.

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