EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

When I became the editor of Volume V of the History of the East, I was perhaps even more confused at first than V. V. Naumkin, as he admitted when he opened the discussion on the pages of Vostok magazine. 1 Nevertheless, despite the fact that today scientists understand and interpret the history of the East of modern times in different ways, I came to the conclusion that it is quite possible to create a generalizing work on the history of the countries of the East in the XX century. After all, the disagreements concern not so much its history, but rather a global assessment of the era that came after 1917, the impact of the revolutionary events in Russia at that time on the East, the role of the USSR, the Comintern and the world Communist movement in the East, as well as the interpretation of world history that has developed in Russian historiography, including the answers to were formulated at the beginning of discussion 2 .

The difficulty lies not in the existence of extremely diverse opinions, which in itself should be welcomed, but in the all-too-frequent desire to take extreme, extremist positions. Cave anti-communism can and does provoke a similar wild reaction of cave anti-liberalism. But it seems to me that all this is the cost of excessive politicization of our society, and of our community of orientalists. As the situation in the country normalizes and stabilizes, this politicization will inevitably disappear and is already becoming a thing of the past. But there remains, unfortunately, a craving for ideologization that has been cultivated for many decades and for a whole series of generations, without which it is somehow unusual, uncomfortable, and I would say lonely.

If, for example, those who hold old-Soviet views continue to idealize such concepts as "working class", "dictatorship of the proletariat", "proletarian internationalism", then liberals do not always have the same concepts, but very often they sound like "red-brown", "communo-fascism", "anarchy of lumpens and marginals"(as some now call the anti-globalists). These cliches and cliches should be avoided regardless of any political fashion or ideological fad. I agree with V. V. Naumkin that "with the existing system of organization and financing of science" 3 nowadays it is impossible to completely get rid of the politicization and commercialization of Oriental studies. But we must try. Otherwise, science will simply cease to be a science. However, she always had to fight against attempts to turn her either into a "servant of theology" or a "faithful assistant of the party". And, unfortunately, she did not always fight successfully.

One of the ways to preserve objective scientific knowledge is to deideologize it. This applies to any ideology, not only Marxist, as it is sometimes primitively understood. In particular, I think we should not confuse science with religion and, for example, attribute to the" Judeo-Christian tradition "such postulates of Marxism as" unity of the historical process and the inevitability of progress","objectivity"

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this process and its "independence from the will and consciousness of people" 4 . I haven't found any of these postulates in either the Old or New Testaments. Maybe they are in the Talmud? I confess I didn't look in there. But it seems to me (and obviously not only to me) that the ideas of Marxism were formulated on the basis of a materialist view of the historical process. References to "Judeo-Christian traditions" are particularly piquant when they are accompanied by quite liberal criticism of the "clericalism and religious fundamentalism" of Muslims. It turns out that some people can, and others cannot, be guided by an appeal to their confessional roots? To avoid such misinterpretations, let's better de-ideologize and secularize science!

I have a complicated attitude to L. B. Alaev's article. Complicated to the point where I sometimes agree with the first half of his sentence and disagree with the second. For example, he believes that "two events of recent years" have forced a change of perspective on the twentieth century: "the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001" .5 The first is true, because it is really "the collapse of ideals" and "the disappearance of the previous scale of values". But are the events of September 11 equivalent to the collapse of the USSR? What's new about them? That the "third world" hates the West and its leading power, the United States? This has been known for a long time. In order to overcome this hatred, the United States supported the most militant anti-Westerners in Asia and Africa, represented by Islamic fundamentalists, by supplying, arming, and financing them, starting in 1978, in Afghanistan, Syria (where Hafez al-Assad fought them until 1982), Algeria, and Bosnia Russia , Chechnya, Kosovo, and other regions, including the former Soviet Union. This was playing with fire, especially against the backdrop of the rapid growth of Muslim diasporas in Europe and America, accelerating their cohesion and establishing their own funding for the "Muslim struggle", including in Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Kashmir. So what is new in the events of September 11 is only the amazement of the United States and its supporters, how did Islam-extremists dare to sting the hand that had previously caressed them? And it was not necessary to caress, hoping very short-sightedly that the rage of the extremists would be directed against the Russians, Serbs, moderate nationalists of the countries of Islam, but not against the West.

Of course, September 11 is a tragedy for the United States. Innocent people died there. But this is a war that has been going on in a hidden form for a long time. The United States had a chance to end it after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. But they chose to play their geostrategic card there in order to create a permanent (and controlled, as they thought) threat to the USSR from the south. Now they themselves are forced to eliminate this threat with the help of their allies and with the assistance of Russia. And, unfortunately, very late and, by and large, not very effective.

L. B. Alaev's suggestion to consider Islam-extremism as "something like AIDS" and then classify it as "anti-systemic, potentially destructive forces" is somewhat disconcerting, if I understand it correctly .6 The fatal mistake that many people in the West and in our country make is precisely the unwillingness (or inability) to see Islam-extremism as anything other than terrorism, which has come from nowhere and is unreasonably inspired by mystical "forces of evil".

If we approach the issue from a scientific and historical point of view, it becomes clear that Muslims, who have been communicating and fighting with European gentiles longer than other people in the East (by now - over 13 centuries!), and therefore have accumulated more grievances against them and claims against them than others, have always been particularly persistent in resisting the colonial power. the expansion of the West in the XV-XVIII centuries, and the last two hundred years, after the triumph of this expansion, took on the function of the most consistent defenders of the identity of the East and the most irreconcilable opponents of everything "Western". Under these conditions, Islamic fundamentalism emerged (including

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the third wave of the historical rise of Islam (after pan-Islamism of the XIX-early XX century and Muslim nationalism of the 20-60s of the last century). This is yet another" return to the roots "that has occurred more than once in the history of Islam, now caused simultaneously by the rather successful offensive of the West in the spheres of economy, politics and technology, and the creeping" Westernization " of everyday life, customs, and social ties between people, which undermines the monopoly of Islam in these areas of Muslim life. The breakdown of social structures in almost all countries of Islam during the difficult adjustment to the requirements of modernizing economic mechanisms and globalizing foreign economic relations is also very painful. A direct consequence of this is the high rate of population ruin, the pauperization of the peasantry, and an unprecedented increase in the number of social lower classes, which turns the cities of the East into a social powder magazine. 7

It can be said a thousand times over that Bin Laden and his men have nothing to do with all this, that they are rich, crazy on the basis of religious fanaticism and xenophobia, irresponsible adventurers and criminals. And it will probably be true, but not all of it. Would these people have done what they did if they had not felt supported by millions of their co-religionists in the East and in the Muslim diasporas in the West, if they had not had an extensive underground of like-minded people both there and there, if they had not been able to conduct (quite skillfully) an information and propaganda war, and if did you not manage a wide-spread network of intelligence, financial, propaganda, military and other services around the world? These are not vulgar bandits. It is a serious international force, historically formed during the second half of the twentieth century, partly due to the short-sightedness and carelessness of the great powers, which allowed the development of the world of Islam to take its course in a dangerous coupling with the world of Europe and America .8

This force is" anti-system "and" destructive " primarily in the eyes of the West in relation to the established order in the East. The Islamic fundamentalists themselves (both "extreme" and "moderate") consider themselves (and are considered by the majority of Easterners) not an attacker at all, but a defensive side, advocating the preservation of their identity and the preservation (and where necessary - the revival) of "truly" Islamic orders, customs, traditions, and compliance with the regulations. The Koran and Sharia, for saving the heritage of their religion and culture from the "destructive" (from their point of view!) the impact of an alien modernization, cultural and ideological "Westernization" and global unification, leading to depersonalization and loss of all distinctiveness (national, religious, social, spiritual).

It is not because "to understand is to forgive"that I have allowed myself to dwell on this problem in such detail. No, it is absolutely necessary to understand any historical phenomenon, even if it is negative and dangerous, because if it is significant, then it will have to co-exist with it (whether in a struggle, in agreement, in hidden hostility) for a long time. Unfortunately, what is happening now - for a long time. And first of all, because nothing is being done not only to eliminate the causes of this phenomenon, but also to adequately (and not ideologically - propagandistically) assess it. Moreover, the selfishness and self-interest of the West, its unwillingness to abandon the model of relations with the East that was formed largely under the influence of colonialism, turned the long - standing West-East confrontation into the main contradiction of our time, that is, at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries.

Even in the post-colonial period, the West managed to break even further away from the East, not only by artificially curbing the latter's industrial and technological development (this development is absolutely unpromising in the context of the huge advantage of technology and production capacities of the West, the monopoly-

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Increasing extortionate interest rates on debts, using enslaving conditions for economic, technical, financial, military and personnel assistance were combined in the policy of the West with the relocation to the East of the most "dirty" and environmentally harmful industries, usually in the form of large-scale production facilities, which were used to create new markets for them in the very East, and Western dictates in the field of raw material prices, determining investment flows, etc.). - more labor-intensive and more unprofitable ones. But this, although often mentioned here, is still a "private" aspect of Western-Eastern relations. The West has gained much more by "exporting" its long-standing social contradictions to the developing world. Previously exploited workers in the most developed countries (yes, almost all of them) the countries of the West have ceased to be the poor proletariat, having actually turned into a "middle class" in terms of their position and standard of living (of course, not all of them, but in the main part). But in the East, the vast majority of the population is poor-paupers and lumpens, poor people and proletarians. Of course, this is not the case everywhere (for example, in Kuwait, Brunei and a number of other small countries), but this is the prevailing trend.

This leads to the conclusion that not only capital, markets, and technology have been internationalized, but also the entire system of social contradictions of capitalism. And Western capitalism would hardly be thriving today if it did not take advantage of the East's inequality and backwardness, its poverty and oppression, which allow the West to dictate its own terms of dialogue. But developing countries tried in Bandung in the 1950s, in Cancun in the 1970s, and through the UN mechanisms to persuade the West to reconsider, change, and mitigate the above conditions. But nothing has changed. The West was quite happy with the current situation, which guaranteed an influx of funds from paying good interest on growing amounts of debt (and what this means, Russians have also felt over the past decade) in the East, exploiting the natural resources of former colonies on preferential terms, manipulating the flow of petrodollars (which are stopped when it is necessary to press, for example, Iran, Iraq, Libya), the use of eastern states as a source of cheap labor for heavy work, a strategic military base, a guaranteed market for their products and a receptor for investment, usually protected from competition.

Thus, we can agree with L. B. Alaev that " the world is moving towards the one... to society". Only, obviously, it is not "post-industrial" or "post-capitalist" (simply because no one knows what it is), but the most capitalist in its essence. Of course, it is changing and some things are serious, but for the countries of the East this is little consolation. To them, the West turns only its "old-capitalist", almost traditionally colonial face. And it is clear why. Yes, because in this movement towards a "unified society" a new global structure of world capitalism is emerging, which includes the "center" and "periphery" on the one hand, and puts under its control, "drawing" into itself socially alien to it pre-capitalist traditional societies-on the other 9 . Naturally, within the framework of this hyperstructure, the West got the role of the dominant upper classes, and the East-the subordinate lower classes. And in this connection, the West-East confrontation, which has always been determined by historical, political, socio-cultural, and religious factors, has acquired another quality - a social confrontation between coalitions of social and class forces. Hence the new content and aggravation of this historical confrontation, which is quite natural after the introduction of the class principle into it. It is in this peculiar and somewhat unexpected form that the internationalization of the class struggle is now taking place.

In this connection, I would like to argue with L. B. Alaev about the essence of his understanding of Marxism. I agree with him that there was an "erosion" in Soviet social science.

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Marxist theory". Moreover, it ceased to be a theory in practice and became simply a means of agitation and propaganda support for the political course of the ruling circles of the USSR, with all its opportunistic zigzags and purely pragmatic approaches that did not fit in with the actual provisions of Marxism or did not coincide at all. Why this happened-more on that later. Here I will also point out that L. B. Alaev, defending himself "against the accusation of wholesale denial of everything that has been done by Marxist historical science", in fact, if not indiscriminately, then basically denies the very significance of Marxism as a theory of knowledge of the life of society and its development, including in the East. Having identified only six postulates in Marxism, he argues that three of them are not Marxist at all (unity, objectivity, and stadiality of the historical process), and the other three (economocentrism, class approach, and violence as a method of solving social problems) are "morally and historiographically outdated and require revision."

First, any theory, including Marxism, does not arise from scratch and takes a lot from its predecessors, which, by the way, neither Marx nor his followers denied. At the same time, they have so reworked, enriched and updated what they borrowed from others that it is unlikely that anyone will think of comparing their formulas with any of the theses of the Church fathers or, say, with Giambattista Vico's theory of cyclical development.

Secondly, is economocentrism so "obsolete"? As far as I understand, in our society, which has now chosen the market path of development, enthusiastically praising capital and all its "moral values", calling capitalism nothing but the only possible "world civilization", it is simply ridiculous to deny economocentrism! And what, then, is in the center of everyone's attention now, both in our country and "over the hill", as they used to say?

Third, the class approach is absolutely not outdated. It is simply that the class struggle is now taking on new and more complex forms, as we have already noted. A. I. Levkovsky, as well as many other domestic and foreign researchers, wrote about this at one time10 . Of course, there was a lot of discussion with Levkovsky, but what new idea was easily accepted and when? And especially in Soviet times. But it was precisely then that Levkovsky managed to make a significant contribution to the development of Marxist political economy and to prove that in most Eastern countries, at the junction of various formations, a multi-layered society emerges during a long transition period, characterized by exceptional social diversity, extreme confusion of antagonistic and non-antagonistic conflicts, the formation of heterogeneous class coalitions, as well as a " complex interaction inter-and intra-structural contradictions " 11 .

In developing his theory, he referred to V. I. Lenin, but only for the purpose of defense against critics, since Lenin only mentions five ways of life in post-revolutionary Russia, without dealing with their theoretical development. Levkovsky, on the other hand, was criticized, but in practice he was not alone, because the idea of multiplicity was taken up and developed (though in many ways differently and often from a completely different point of view) by G. G. Kotovsky, V. V. Krylov, V. I. Pavlov, N. A. Simonia, G. K. Shirokov. There were even new theories ("duality", "synthesis", "dependent development") that claimed to "overcome" the idea of multiformity or at least move away from it, but, in general, were based on it and proceeded from it12 . The most widespread concept was that of the main-formative-way of life in the entire multi-layered system. According to it, "the general direction of interaction between different ways of life is determined by the development of the formation way, i.e. the system-forming way" 13 .

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I anticipate the objections of many, especially younger Orientalists: is it really necessary today to be guided by what was written 20-30 years ago, or have nothing new been invented during this time? Unfortunately, they didn't come up with it! As an exception, we can only point to the attempt of N. A. Simonia to formulate the idea of splitting patterns and dividing them into "homogeneous" and "synthesized" 14. And then, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, there followed a brief period of complete domination, fortunately for our Oriental studies, by " civilizationists "who simply replaced economic and social factors with spiritual ones and, rejecting the theory of formations, even tried to" stop " the course of history, and time itself. Let us recall what was stated in this regard quite recently: "Instead of the past being permanently abolished in favor of the present in accordance with the so-called historical approach, it reveals the ability to preserve and accumulate, ensuring the continuity of evolution, and if necessary, it is suspended or reverted back" 15 . It seems that this romantic, quite Chateaubriand-like, but still untenable attempt to abolish history can hardly compete with the theory that explains the evolution of Eastern society and its class structure by the complex development of a heterogeneous system of multiculturalism, the internal transformation of ways of life and the change in the relationship between them.

Moreover, it is precisely the theory of multiculturalism that can explain such nonsense, from the point of view of orthodox Marxism, as antagonistic contradictions between the numerous social groups of the bourgeoisie in the East: 1) foreign; 2) non-national; 3) large national; 4) bureaucratic; 5) comprador; 6) middle and lower strata of eastern entrepreneurship. In addition to the differences that are obvious and usually recorded in the literature (by ethnic and religious affiliation, degree of wealth, foreign policy orientation, etc.), the most important thing is the difference in their fundamental interests associated with diversity.

The first group, usually represented by TNCs, embodies the monopolistic capitalism of metropolitan countries or their blocs. The second group occupies an intermediate position between the first and third, embodying the inter-layered connection of economic elites. The third group, if it has not grown to the level of international monopolies (as in India, South Korea, and Indonesia), is usually weak, as is all developed national entrepreneurship. The fourth group is closely related to the public sector, and the fifth group reflects the specifics of long - established channels of communication between local businesses and the global market. The sixth, as a rule, embodies the activity of the growing "democratic capital" of small and medium-sized businessmen from well - off peasants, rich officials or intellectuals, as well as former workers, especially migrant workers, who managed to accumulate initial capital and start their own business. In the political and economic sense, all these groups differ not only in their origin, income and position in society, but also in the different qualifications of the labor force used, the different level of technology and production culture used, the orientation to different consumers and even different markets (external, internal urban, internal rural, etc.). And the difference in their social positions and social opponents in different ways, the difference in conjunctures in the respective markets and the state of various industries controlled by these groups, also separates the theoretically unified bourgeoisie.

All these groups can form coalitions to protect their interests, but almost never do these coalitions cover all the listed groups. The emerging bourgeois coalitions are socially diverse (with ethnic, confessional, caste, factional, and personal interests mixed in), which gives rise to their ideological, political, and sometimes ideological orientation.-

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economic heterogeneity. This property explains the frequent instability and fragility of such coalitions. However, they cannot be dispensed with, because in the East, multi-structure leads to such fragmentation of society that not only the bourgeoisie, but also any other social class of the old Marxist scheme (the proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia, middle and intermediate strata) is also split and divided, and taken in the "original" (according to the same scheme) integral state of society. It is nothing more than an unstable and motley coalition of heterogeneous class forces. Thus, among the peasantry, which in most cases has already ceased to be a class-estate of the medieval type, we can distinguish pre-capitalist producers associated with subsistence farming (patriarchal community members), feudally enslaved sharecroppers, rural farmhands (proletarians) and farmers who conduct small-scale farming. There is also an increase in capitalist-type farms employing wage labor, but this is usually combined with bonded forms of semi-feudal rent and payment (such as hammasat in Arab countries). In addition to these groups, landless peasants are especially numerous in the Eastern countryside.

This analysis can be continued (by identifying workers, for example, employed in the public and private sectors, in national and foreign enterprises, skilled and unskilled, associated with large or small - scale production, and finally unemployed). But even so, it is clear: multiculturalism determines (and reflects) the diversity of Eastern society and is the reason for the emergence of new peculiar forms of class struggle, previously quite rare or absent altogether.

The last postulate of Marxism, which is disputed by L. B. Alaev, is the role of violence in history, especially Marx's expression about violence as the "midwife of history".: "The midwife doesn't kill the mother to free the baby." First, and the midwife sometimes kills (especially if the father is an eastern father! - demands to keep the child at all costs). And secondly, history is not the peaceful serenity of philanthropists, but a drama, often a tragedy with a bloody ending. And not only Genghis Khan or Tamerlane come to mind, but also Cromwell and Robespierre. How could Marx have treated violence differently if he saw that history has never been without it? Julius Caesar tried, however, to spare his opponents. So how did it all end? The logic of history is extremely cruel: either you or you. And Marx foresaw that the bourgeoisie would not yield to the proletariat and would not give up power. Therefore, he advocated revolutionary violence, and the events that took place thousands of years before him, and for a century after, confirmed and confirm, unfortunately, his point of view.

"Only slow changes," writes L. B. Alaev, " are lasting." But how long do you have to wait? In society, for some reason, there is always such a situation that the majority is dissatisfied with the existing situation. But there are those who can wait (for example, the bourgeoisie dissatisfied with the king or high-paid employees dissatisfied with the government), and those who cannot wait - the social lower classes, the urban and rural poor, etc. It is the latter who have become marginalized and do not want to be them, who start all revolutions, gradually drawing the rest of the discontented into them. And the blame for this, as a rule, falls on the ruling circles who overslept the danger, underestimated the unfavorable course of events, and failed to cope with pressing problems. But they usually respond with reprisals, which lead to a series of subsequent violence. It was only in the twentieth century and in a very limited circle of the most civilized countries that events of a revolutionary nature took place (de Gaulle's coming to power in France in 1958, the gradual dismantling of Francoism in Spain in the following years).

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The 1970s, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, and the unification of Germany in 1989-1990) were relatively peaceful.

The 20th century is one of the most terrible in the history of mankind: wars, seizures, mass genocides, social and national revolutions, ethnic "purges", religious fanaticism, etc. It is filled with violence. Some historians even believe that the whole world is filled with an incessant war, which is only conditionally divided into two world wars, seven Middle Eastern wars, three Indo-Pakistani wars, two Afghan wars, two Algerian wars, and countless wars in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And perhaps this circumstance now affects our common desire to prevent violence in any form. So I can understand L. B. Alaev. But I can't agree with him. Historical science, if it is really a science, cannot be defined by emotions and good wishes. It only needs to accurately (which is not always possible) record how it was, and, to the best of its level, explain what happened after all. Actually, this is what historians argue about.

The attitude of Marxism to violence was also not born immediately and was established in the course of a struggle of opinions. As is well known, socialism as a current of social thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was by no means limited to Marxism. Many socialists, from the followers of Proudhon to the modern Labourists, rejected Marxism altogether. And there were different directions in Marxism itself (Marx said about some of them that "if this is Marxism, then I am not a Marxist"). In our country, Eduard Bernstein, a figure of German social democracy who, like other "Bernsteinists" in Western Europe, was fiercely criticized by Lenin, is best known for his rejection of revolutionary Marxism and his preaching of evolutionary reformism. But Bernstein was still a political theorist who never openly opposed Marx.

The real opponent of Marx in the field of philosophy and sociology was Emil Durkheim, who most sharply disagreed with Marxism on the issue of violence. As a liberal (or, as it is now commonly called, democratic) socialist, Durkheim, who later became a classic of world sociology, rejected the doctrine of class struggle (which for him was an "anomaly") and violence as a means of this struggle. He believed that as society develops, it will move towards socialism not through class struggle, but through their "organic solidarity" .16 He advocated the gradual overcoming of social contradictions, the reconciliation of classes. In politics, his ideas were expressed by Jean Jaures, who became a socialist under the influence of Durkheim. By the way, socialism, according to the latter, should arise as a result of the development of economic activity, when the state "is forced by the very course of things, by the very urgent needs of life, to look after it and more and more organize its manifestations" 17 .

Isn't it true that we are now closer to Durkheim than to Marx? For we need comfort, even if only illusory, after all that we have experienced in the past century (and at the beginning of this one). But good wishes do not abolish historical laws. Unfortunately for all of us, and indeed for the whole tormented humanity, Marx was right, based on the concrete reality of the nineteenth century, familiar to him, and what happened in the twentieth century, too, mostly went according to Marx. The only thing that happened in spite of him, as many now believe, was the collapse of the USSR. And this should be said separately, since L. B. Alaev's article even pays too much attention to this issue.

I agree with him on what he calls " Soviet Marxism." This is not Marxism, but an evil parody, a caricature of it, born largely of Russian backwardness, poverty, lack of culture, as well as the excesses of Stalinism, which by 1938 had practically destroyed the very possibility of creative, non-dogmatic thinking in the country.-

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perception of Marxism. Our differences begin with the interpretation of what the USSR was and what its role in the world was. Of course, it is not necessary to repeat phrases about the "vanguard of humanity", as well as other official rhetoric of the Soviet era. But in the same way, one should not create new dogmas: the U.S.S.R. was "not" so-and-so; the struggle for socialism "was not the main road of history", etc. Who in Europe of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries considered the struggle for capitalism so expensive? They had no idea about it, although it already existed, developed, and in some places won (in England, Holland). And the bourgeoisie, before the French encyclopedists, was not at all imbued with the consciousness of its historical mission; on the contrary, it clung to the aristocracy, appreciated the favors of monarchs, and in Spain, for example, it dreamed of giving up all business, buying a noble title and living as a parasite.

"It is not given to us to predict "(according to Tyutchev) not only" how our word will respond", but also what the consequences of our actions will be, especially in the sphere of politics and economics. If I were L. B. Alaev, I would draw attention not only to the experience of, say, Syria and China, where they found the model of the optimal combination of the public sector and private entrepreneurship, which Russia has been painfully searching for over the past 11 years, with the subordination of the second to the first. It is also worth taking an open-minded look at the results of many years of activity of the Labor Party of Great Britain, the Social Democrats of Scandinavia and Germany, the Socialists of France and Spain. No, of course, these countries are not building socialism. But the corresponding tendencies are gradually growing in them, leading to the restriction of the omnipotence of private capital, its economic and political interests, to the emergence and expansion of social guarantees (disappearing under the pressure of the non-bourgeoisie in eastern Europe), to the increasing participation of workers and trade unions in the management of production and even in profits, to an increasingly noticeable increase in the state's share for example, in its planning, modeling, and orientation. I almost agree with L. B. Alaev said that these countries are "closer" to socialism "than the society of the USSR once was." And who can tell you where the line is that separates this very "popular" capitalism from socialism? And if something prevents you from crossing this line ,then (God forbid!) clash with the "third world"!

As for the collapse of the USSR, it is really a tragedy. The point is not that "October did not open a new era in world history." Just opened it! But he discovered it in a backward country, destroyed by the world, and then-and civil, wars, the efforts of 14" civilized " interventionist states turned into a besieged fortress, subjected to blockade. What did Churchill's call to "stifle Bolshevism in its cradle" mean? From the point of view of liberal democracy, this is an open interference in the internal affairs of another state, imposing someone else's ideological choice on its people. And what did Lord Curzon's "cordon sanitaire" mean? It was later, after 1945, that it was called the "iron curtain", supposedly invented in Moscow. And it worked! Because in the "information society", the offensive of which L. B. Alaev is so happy, it is not the historical truth that is important, but the gain in the information war. It is precisely because of this "win" that English schoolchildren, for example, in Birmingham, do not know that Russia participated in the Second World War at all and was an ally of England.

The trouble with the U.S.S.R. was not that Lenin, not listening to the Mensheviks, began to build socialism in a country where there were no conditions for this according to orthodox Marxism. And it is not that Stalin ruined Lenin's cause. You can still argue about all this. But it is indisputable that the U.S.S.R. has become not so much a country building socialism as an armed camp for defending the very idea of socialism. And the responsibility for this is borne not so much by the Bolsheviks, but by those who imposed this situation on them, this retreat into a blind defense and the psychology of the defenders of the besieged fortress. This situation and psychology dictated their own logic of behavior-an iron discipline.-

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well, suspicion, militarization, espionage mania. What else was there to do? In such conditions, any leader and any party would restrict all democratic freedoms, escalate combat readiness and military psychosis, and consider any deviation from the" general line " a crime.

Unfortunately, all this extravagance has very organically merged with the semi-Byzantine and semi-Horde traditions of Russia's political culture, which has always placed the sovereign (and other superiors) above the law. This was taken advantage of by Stalin, who, most likely, would not have been able to do this if there had been no emergency born of external danger. Of course, the lack of traditions of democracy, self-government, and self-organization to protect our interests also affected our society. I recall in this connection the words of an English professor at the University of Manchester: "If Churchill had been born among you, he would have become Stalin. But we didn't let him turn around." That's the whole problem. Unfortunately, we did.

Nevertheless, despite all the negative aspects of the Soviet experience (about which too much has been written over the past 15 years and often without knowledge of the case, according to rather primitive Western stereotypes), it is worth remembering the positive aspects that were in this experience, and which, unfortunately, are hushed up or distorted. It cannot be excluded from history that after 1917, backward Russia became the second industrial and military power in the world, a country of mass literacy and advanced technologies, a rapidly modernizing society and growing production, with a gradually (though too slowly) expanding sphere of education and social guarantees. And, of course, the moral factor was of great importance: for the first time, working people felt like full-fledged members of society, to a certain extent even "salt of the earth". And in the union and autonomous republics, all these positive developments, as well as the flourishing of national culture and the actual solution of the national question, were even more impressive. Of course, we can now say that all these successes were temporary and relative. But in what other country has such a giant leap been made from one state to another? And in which country did the solution of the national question even come close to the level that was achieved in the USSR?

All this is necessary to keep in mind not in order to try to understand the reasons for the "nostalgia for the USSR" that exists in our society. First of all, this is necessary for a correct, balanced, de-ideologized and objective assessment of the path we have traveled. Of course, our country has ceased to be a superpower and lost its former power. It is not our task here and now to decide why this happened. If only because it is still a question of acute ideological and political struggle, which has not yet become a topic of serious historical research. Our task is to determine more or less correctly the role of the USSR in the world during the 70 years of its existence, and especially to determine its role and place in the history of the East of the XX century.

I do not agree with L. B. Alaev that the struggle between capitalism and socialism is "a comparatively insignificant contradiction of the epoch" after 1917. And what was more significant? After all, not only the "developed countries", in his words, spent "huge amounts of money on weapons", but also the USSR, and this was a much heavier burden on the USSR and, moreover, the arms race was specifically imposed on it in order to achieve its economic collapse. And in this confrontation on the part of the West, ideological intolerance, political intransigence, and geostrategic cunning were shown no less, and perhaps even more, than on the part of the USSR. Moreover, this policy, which provided for "creating a solid geostrategic front against Russia", is based on the almost 400-year-old tradition of distrust of the West, its fear of our country and its identification with Russia.

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to a certain extent (not from an excess of erudition, of course) Russia and the East, which the West has opposed for 1400 years. And that is why all Anglo-Saxon geopolitics of the twentieth century, from John Mackinder to Zbigniew Brzezinski, recommended that Western governments, especially the United States and Great Britain, push, crush and dismember Russia .18

And no one listened during the Cold War to the opinion of the great scientist and humanist, the Russian "father of American sociology" Pitirim Sorokin: "Western leaders assure us that the future belongs to the capitalist ("free enterprise") type of society and culture. On the contrary, the leaders of communist nations confidently expect a Communist victory in the coming decades. While I disagree with both of these predictions, I am inclined to believe that if humanity avoids new world wars and is able to overcome the dark critical moments of our time, then the dominant type of emerging society and culture will probably not be capitalist or communist, but a specific type, which we can designate as integral. It will be intermediate between the capitalist and communist system and way of life. It will unite the majority of positive values and free itself from serious defects of each type. " 19 Expressed for the first time in 1960 in the article "Mutual convergence of the USA and the USSR in the direction of a mixed socio-cultural type" 20, this idea of Sorokin seems to have attracted the attention of only A.V. Sorokin. D. Sakharov. But if you look at what is happening in the world after 1991, it should be recognized that Sorokin was right in many ways, and in his prediction was not only the hope of a utopian dreamer, but also the foresight of a real "wind of change in modern Russia and China," as one of his students wrote in 1988. 21 .

If we take into account all the above, then it will be clear that it is completely useless to search for the right and those responsible for the "cold war", especially if one of the parties is classified as"non - systemic, destructive forces". There was a struggle between two ideologies, two alternative development options. One of the parties won this fight. But for how long? The rapid development of the latest technologies leaves less and less space and opportunities for the private initiative of small and medium-sized owners, who, if they remain, are mainly satellites, assistants, agents, and servants of large corporations, including state or semi - state ones. The increasing complexity of management and the increasing knowledge intensity of the economy are accompanied by an increase in its statisticization. And this is a global phenomenon, only accelerated by the processes of globalization.

All this leads to a calmer, depoliticized assessment of what was happening in the twentieth century, including in the East, including with the participation of the USSR. It is hardly necessary to attribute the "humanization of capitalist relations" to the countries of capital themselves. Yes, if it were not for October 1917 in Russia, Churchill and Clemenceau would have suppressed and shot strikes just as they did in the 1900s. From what "laws of development" of capitalism does its "humanization" follow? Nowhere did the bourgeoisie make concessions to the workers unless it was forced to do so. The experience of domestic capitalism (not to mention Asian or Latin American) suggests criminalization rather than" humanization", rampant low instincts rather than high spirituality.

There are different ways of judging whether or not there was a "general crisis of capitalism." But it is impossible not to take into account the series of economic crises that broke out immediately after the First World War, especially the crisis of 1929-1933 that shocked the whole world. And what about both world wars, the collapse of the colonial system in the 1950s and 1960s? Moreover, the collapse of capitalism on 1/6 of the entire landmass is already a manifestation of the crisis, and the political and socio-economic instability of the 1920s and 1930s also had the character of a permanent crisis, from which capitalism in the United States found a way out in Keynesian state regulation, which was implemented by Roosevelt, and European capitalism - in fascism. We have some subtabs-

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It is clear that fascism, in addition to unleashing the hysteria of racism, chauvinism, hooliganism and violence, also fulfilled its main function - to save reeling capitalism from communism. His task was to wrest the workers out of the influence of communists and socialists with the help of pseudo-popular demagogy and symbolism, to unite them under the banner of nationalism and false " anti-bourgeoisism "(mainly directed against the foreign competitors of "their" capital) with angry lumpen and pauperized small owners, throwing them all into the pool of external adventures in order to force forget about the class and ideological opponents among our compatriots.

Today, many liberal publicists, both here and abroad, equate fascism and communism, looking for something in common between them. But this position is historically completely untenable, because it proceeds from forgetting the fierce mutual destruction of communists and fascists in the 1920s and 1930s, from the fact that communists were everywhere in the vanguard of the anti - fascist struggle. And allusions to the alleged "similarity" of both are nothing more than political speculation. Fascism was like an antidote to communism and, as such, had to include something resembling communism (the epithets "socialist" and" workers " in the name of Hitler's party, the red color of banners, denouncing "plutocracy" and "exploitation", preaching violence in social and other struggles, state regulation in the economy centralism, militarization, strict party discipline, organizational principles borrowed largely from the labor movement). It is worth paying attention to the fact that fascism did not succeed in the colonies. The weakness of the communist movement in the colonial countries also determined the uselessness of an "antidote" to it.

Western countries took all this into account. It is customary in our country to condemn the USSR and Stalin personally for the Soviet-German pact of 1939, which many rightly consider an unprincipled conspiracy and a stab in the back to the world Communist Movement, especially in Europe. But the" democracies " of the West also agreed to a similar arrangement with Hitler in Munich a year earlier! And with all the negative attitude to the 1939 pact, we must not forget that it was, among other things, an attempt by the USSR to neutralize the consequences of Munich, the purpose of which was to direct the aggression of the fascist powers against the USSR. After all, this is why Britain and France forced Czechoslovakia not to resist Hitler (which it could do with the support of the USSR, but only with the approval of its Western allies). That is why they allowed fascism to triumph in 1939 in Spain, which was supported by the USSR.

Of course, it is possible to consider the Comintern's activities as "subversive". But why does L. B. Alaev not point out the same activity of the West, which formed various "legions", "associations" and simply gangs (for example, Basmachis) along the entire perimeter of the borders of the USSR until 1934-1936? After all, in relation to the Soviet government in the USSR, all of them and the agents they sent across the border played the role of "destructive non-system forces". In general, L. B. Alaev's conviction in the organic "humanism" inherent in capitalism prevents him, in my opinion, from taking a more objective view of this social system. Yes, humanism was an instrument of the bourgeoisie's struggle against feudalism, stagnation, and clericalism in Modern times. But what a radical anti-humanism is observed in the course of all the famous bourgeois revolutions of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in Holland, England, and France! And then the bourgeoisie, asserting its rule, dealt with its own workers and residents of the colonies, without thinking about humanism. He was again needed only for the information and propaganda war against the" atrocities of the Bolsheviks " (with the omission of his own).

In short, we should not just change our old ideas to the exact opposite, but try to proceed from the facts and an unbiased, comprehensive approach. I agree with L. B. Alaev that this is the way to review our previous agreements.

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concepts of colonialism. At the same time, I would not be in a hurry to announce the absence of "colonial tribute" in the XVI - XVIII centuries. Perhaps the economic exploitation of the colonies had not yet been established. But it was successfully replaced by direct robbery, destruction or enslavement of their population. It is also very doubtful that at the last stage the colonialists, in fact, voluntarily left the colonies. Why, then, did England fight so long in Malaya, and France in Vietnam and Algeria? The "economic disparity" is also not entirely clear. Where did it come from, at the expense of what? In the West, they say that due to the" laziness and bad work " of the East. But even Franz Fanon proved 40 years ago that the "laziness of the colonized" (as well as the slave, serf) is his "protection from exploitation by the colonizer". Such "lazy people" have learned very well that no matter how much you fight, you can't break out of bondage: they won't let you in, they won't let you in, if necessary - by force. And no "differentiation" of Afro-Asian countries, the allocation of "tigers" loyal to the West and NIS among them, does not change the situation in principle yet.

Of course, some of them are "catching up" with the West. And Kuwait and Brunei have even surpassed it in terms of living standards. But these are just exceptions that emphasize the rule. It is the impoverished East that the West needs, just as advanced capitalism cannot do without a reserve army of unemployed people. This fact is socially determined and there is no need to build illusions about it.

I would not support L. B. Alaev in his desire to divide anti-colonial movements into "democratic", respecting liberal values, and traditionalist, which he considers "reactionary anti-imperialism". But in real life, it's so mixed up! The National Liberation Front (FLN), which launched the 1954-1962 revolution in Algeria, advocated in its 1956 program a "democratic and social" republic, pluralism of opinion, and "genuine equality among all citizens of a single homeland without discrimination." The religious nature of the FLN struggle was denied and the rights of citizens of European origin were guaranteed. At the same time, FLN newspapers and leaflets in Arabic declared "adherence to the principles of Islam", promised "the victory of Allah" and assured: "Allah is with us!" Subsequent programs of the FLN were openly socialist in nature and denounced reactionary clericalism. At the same time, there was also a constant emphasis on "Arab - Islamic values" in mass propaganda and education systems .22 This ambivalence persists even now, and not only in Algeria. In part, it reflects the duality of Afro-Asian societies, reflecting both traditionalism and modernization in their spiritual life.

It is not necessary to assess the "progressiveness" of certain movements from the point of view of the geopolitical interests of various powers. But I would not be in a hurry to say that Russia is "no longer a competitor" to the West. Let's say we think so. And the West? You can't tell by his behavior. And the more we get back on our feet, the more the West will listen to Brzezinski and his ilk.

Some other provisions of L. B. Alaev's article are also controversial, in particular, his denial of the right of nations to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of states, his desire to ignore the leaders of the Eastern countries, since "they are not our allies", etc. for a discussion. In particular, it is unlikely that he himself seriously believes that " the protection of identity means in fact only the use of conservative sentiments... to legitimize the regime." And the reduction of the main contradiction within the countries of the East to the dilemma "Westernism-soil science" also seems superficial. And, of course, I completely disagree that in the" struggle of the blind giants", i.e., the USSR and the USA, after World War II, the leaders of the USSR were the "attacking side", and the leaders of the West "only defended themselves". If we recall the intervention and the civil war of 1917-1922, countless con --

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If there were conflicts, ultimatums and threats, subversive actions and sabotage against the USSR, then the situation was most likely different. Although, of course, it is also impossible to deny the aggressiveness of a number of actions of the USSR. But "in war-as in war!" In addition, the leaders of the West defended not so much the "ideals of democracy and human rights", but rather their economic, political and military-strategic positions, their class interests and domination. Nor should the East (even if not all of it) be considered an "enemy" of Western civilization. It is hostile to the West's economic, military, and spiritual domination of itself, not to its civilization.

To sum up, we can only welcome the beginning of a discussion on all the above issues on the pages of the journal. We have been silent for too long, not daring to express our opinion, which is inevitably controversial in the discord that has become common in our country since Perestroika. And an exchange of views is necessary. Even in Soviet times, orientalists were at the forefront of theoretical research in the fields of political economy, sociological and cultural analysis. This good tradition of a long time is worth continuing.

notes

Naumkin V. V. 1 Scientific and theoretical Forum: post-war history of the East // East (Oriens). 2002. N 4. P. 50.

2 Ibid., p. 51.

3 Ibid., p. 50.

4 See: Alaev L. B. According to the latest intelligence data, we fought with ourselves. (To the question of the basic contradiction of our epoch) / / Orient (Oriens). 2002. N 4. P. 52.

5 Ibid., p. 51.

6 Ibid., pp. 53, 54.

7 Social image of the East, Moscow, 1999, pp. 56-57; The Middle East Viewed from the North, Bergen, 1992, pp. 73-84.

Babkin S. E. 8 Movements of Political Islam in North Africa, Moscow, 2000, pp. 241-263; Islamism and Extremism in the Middle East, Moscow, 2001.

9 S. Amin, I. Wallerstein, A. Gunder Frank, P. Emmanuel, and other "neo-Marxists" in the West have written extensively about this. For more information, see: Capitalism in the East in the second half of the XX century, Moscow, 1995, pp. 3-249, 265-303 (chapters by V. G. Rastiannikov and A. N. Fursov).

Levkovsky A. I. 10 The Third World in the modern world (some problems of socio-economic development of multi-layered states). Moscow, 1970; on. The Petty Bourgeoisie: the Image and Fate of the Class, Moscow, 1978; Aron R. Le developpement de la societe industrielle et la stratification sociale. P., 1956.

Levkovsky A. 11 The Developing Countries Social Structure. M., 1987. P. 18, 20 - 22.

12 For more information, see: Landa R. G. Sotsial'naya struktura i politicheskaya borba: mnogokladnaya model ' [Social structure and Political Struggle: a multi-layered model]. Politicheskie otnosheniya na Vostoke, Moscow, 1990, pp. 36-37.

Rastyannikov V. G. 13 Agrarian evolution in a multi-layered society. Experience of Independent India, Moscow, 1973, p. 6.

Simoniya N. A. 14 Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya [Countries of the East: Ways of Development], Moscow, 1975, p. 207; Evolyutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo, Moscow, 1984, p. 38.

Alaev L. B.-Erasov B. S. 15 Formation or civilization // East (Oriens). 1990. N 3. P. 49.

Aron R. 16 Etapy razvitiya sotsialisticheskoi mysli [Stages of development of socialist thought], Moscow, 1993, pp. 371-374.

Durkheim E. 17 Le socialisme. Sa definition, ses debuts, la doctrine saintsimonienne. P., 1928. P. 34.

18 For more information, see the series of articles: V. I. Maksimenko. Russia and Asia, or Anti-Brzezinski (essay on geopolitics 2000) / / Vostok (Oriens). 2000. NN 1, 2, 4, 5.

Sorokin P. A. 19 The Basic Trends of Our Time. New Haven, 1964. P. 78. International Journal of Comparative Sociology. 1960. N 1. P. 143 - 176.

21 Destinies and prophecies of Pitirim Sorokin / / Pitirim Sorokin. Human. Civilization. Society, Moscow, 1992, p. 17.

22 For more information, see: Landa R. G. History of Algeria. XX vek [XX century], Moscow, 1999, pp. 115-117.

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