For many decades, the key task of modern Afghanistan has been to ensure rapid modernization by overcoming the medieval foundations of the socio-economic organization of society. How to achieve this is a fundamental question, the answer to which is still open.

Keywords: Afghanistan, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Taliban, Mujahideen, Limited Contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV), USA and Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), modernization.

Due to a number of historical circumstances, the awareness of the ruling circles of Afghanistan of the need to overcome its socio-economic backwardness did not meet with an adequate response from local tribal and religious-conservative elites. Attempts to modernize society under various, sometimes diametrically opposed, political and ideological slogans did not lead to the desired results. This was the case during the reign of the eccentric reformist monarch Amanullah in the 1920s, and during the more than four decades of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, a moderate advocate of constitutional evolution in the late post-war years. So it was under the authoritarian General Mohammed Daoud, who in the early seventies, under the slogan of bourgeois transformation, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the country a republic, and under the People's Democratic Party (PDPA). After the 1978 coup, its leaders set out to "socialize" Afghanistan on the Soviet model.

In 1992, the Mujahideen overthrew the PDPA regime, but without reaching an internal compromise in the distribution of spheres of influence, they could not stay in power for long. Their place was easily taken by extremists from the radical religious-nationalist Taliban movement. Having pushed their opponents to the northern provinces bordering Central Asia, they began to enforce a rigid theocratic rule with odious religious foundations. The Taliban were not able to offer any miraculous recipes for economic development. On the contrary, their demonstrative disregard for the elementary foundations of modern economic experience brought the economic and social structure of the country to a final collapse. During their rule, the bases of Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan only strengthened.

The development of the situation after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 largely resembles the scenarios of events in the 1980s of the last century. Washington's decades-long efforts to solve the problems of Afghans by methods that outwardly seem quite logical and reasonable, while against the background of the presence of foreign armed forces in the country, have not yielded any visible results. Ironically, a Limited contingent of Soviet Troops (OKSV) was stationed here for the same period of time.

The parallelism of the actions of the USSR and the United States in Afghanistan can be seen primarily in the very fact of the introduction of foreign armed forces into the country. In both late 1979 and late 2001, his goal was to rid Kabul of the "bad" regime and replace it with a "good" one that was supposed to serve the interests of the Afghan people. True, the main task of the USSR was to significantly "adjust" the power structures, whereas in 2001 it was a question of a radical regime change. Nevertheless, in both cases, it was meant that after the rapid defeat of the stronghold of the "bad guys", foreign military contingents in Afghanistan would not stay long. However, life decided otherwise. Soon it turned out that the Taliban (like the Mujahideen in their time) not only did not disappear, but also began to actively restore their military and political positions. Against this background, the euphoria of the "liberators", who, as they thought, created the prerequisites for the country's transition to radical modernization with massive external assistance (in the first case, it was the USSR, in the second - the United States and other Western countries), soon gave way to bewilderment, and then surprise with a hint of irritation. At the same time, foreigners had no choice but to take on more and more responsibility for everything that happens in the country.

After the introduction of US troops and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into Afghanistan, the population was outwardly more or less tolerant, although without much enthusiasm, of the new reality. Public sentiment was affected by fatigue from a long period of instability and sharp fluctuations in the political and ideological environment. However, after some time, the regrouped Taliban began to actively impose the thesis of "jihad against infidels" and "foreign invaders", while not disdaining the methods of more radical persuasion of their compatriots. Propaganda was increasingly supported, as it was based on win-win theses about the unacceptability of "armed foreigners" staying in the country, as well as an allergy to the imposition of Western stereotypes, as previously-the Soviet foundations of"socialist construction". The growing hostility towards numerous foreign advisers in almost all spheres of the country's life was compounded by the lack of any progress on the economic front, confusion in the distribution of external aid, unfair competition for "tidbits" of budget and donor funds, incompetence of officials, nepotism and corruption at all levels of government, etc. Period of stay in Afghanistan of the OKSV.

The actual task of the USSR, along with conducting joint operations with the Afghan army to " clean up the spirits "(Mujahideen), was to create provincial administrative and managerial "cores". Civil advisers developed the principles of party-state building, reorganized the education and health care system with gratuitous assistance from the USSR, and generally supported the smooth functioning of all major economic facilities. It would seem that everything was done correctly and in the interests of the population. However, the influence of the Mujahideen not only did not weaken, but also constantly grew. Their main thesis has not changed: the unacceptability of the" anti-people regime "of the PDPA, which is supported by the bayonets of" infidel " foreigners. For a long time, the population had bitter memories of mass repressions, as well as of hasty and insufficiently thought-out reforms that literally "raised" the entire Afghan society.

Coalition forces under the military umbrella of NATO have also actively taken up the idea of so-called provincial reconstruction teams. The goal was essentially the same: to create capable and closely connected local governments in Kabul to ensure security and conditions for the economic and social development of various regions of the country. But just as the same scheme didn't work before, it doesn't actually work now.

The most important task of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan, both during the PDPA's rule and after the overthrow of the Taliban, was to form a national armed force with the assistance of foreign advisers. The Americans started this work almost immediately after the formation of the first government of H. Karzai. The Soviet representatives were no less energetic on this front earlier. However, despite all their efforts, neither of them managed to create a combat-ready Afghan army.

At the same time, this situation led to the fact that the OKSV was increasingly forced to take the brunt of combat operations against the Mujahideen. The same thing happened with the troops of the international coalition. By 2011, the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan reached almost 150 thousand people. Whether ironically, or by ill fate, however, the same was the size of the OKSV before its withdrawal to the USSR.

The real situation was clearly demonstrated by the highly publicized joint US-Afghan operation Moshtarak in 2010. It was aimed at squeezing the Taliban out of a strategically important area of the south-east of the country and striking a blow to drug production, but, most importantly, at restoring or establishing a strong central government here, it gave serious failures. The situation developed according to the scenario that the Soviet troops faced in the 1980s: after the implementation of the "sweep" and the withdrawal of troops on the ground, the central government disappeared again.

In 1986, Moscow and Kabul came to the conclusion that it was necessary to develop a new political line in relation to the Mujahideen. This was especially true at a time when the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was almost a foregone conclusion. To give these tasks full legitimacy, the PDPA resorted to the convocation of the traditional national council of tribal elders-the Loya Jirga, which approved the policy of national reconciliation. Some representatives of the old elite, clergy, and intellectuals were attracted to the power structures. The personal reputation of many of them was quite high, but the ability to influence the real alignment of military and political forces is very limited. The strategy didn't reach its goal. The Mujahideen leaders, despite bitter infighting among themselves, unanimously rejected any dealings with the Government.

Kabul and Washington also began to think about the idea of political reconciliation soon after the overthrow of the Taliban and the entry of foreign troops into the country. It became increasingly visible after Washington began to reflect on the feasibility of reducing its military presence in the country. By the time the decision to withdraw US troops was made in 2010, such a line was already taking on quite distinct contours. The task was to split off the least odious elements or "random fellow travelers" from the Taliban, and then involve them in certain power structures in a dosed manner. Just as in the mid-1980s, the traditional Loya Jirga gave legitimacy to this political project. In the summer of 2010, the so-called Kabul process was launched, which assumed the gradual transfer of responsibility for key areas of the country's life, including ensuring its internal security, to national authorities. The task is ambitious, but time will tell whether it will be completed, in what form and scope. So far, only one thing is clear - it is extremely difficult to implement the project, especially since the possibility of a negotiation process with Kabul is conditioned by the Taliban on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

This approach of the Taliban also predetermined their reaction to the decision of the United States and NATO to begin a gradual withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. It was similar to the one that the Mujahideen once showed in relation to Moscow's decision to end the OKSV mission. In both cases, the logic and hopes of Kabul's internal opponents were similar - after the withdrawal of foreign troops, the "anti-people" rule was adopted.-

The government will certainly fall, or at least become extremely weak, which will open up new "windows of opportunity"for the opposition. This is exactly what happened to the Najibullah regime. In 1992, Kabul completely lost the military, political and economic support of its only ally, Moscow, and was left in complete international isolation and alone with the Mujahideen and their patrons. For their part, despite the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan of 1988 (which formally provided for the cessation of external interference in the country's affairs after the withdrawal of the JCPOA), they continued to receive significant material and moral and political assistance from outside. Today, the Taliban, despite all their mutual differences, are counting on a similar option. At the same time, the elimination of bin Laden by the Americans in the spring of 2011 did not affect their position.

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At the same time, it would not be entirely correct to limit ourselves to parallels in the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s of the last century and the United States-in the "zero". There were also significant differences. The world's perception of the current American and earlier Soviet arguments about sending troops to Afghanistan was fundamentally different. The 1979 overthrow of the Khamenei Amin dictatorship in Afghanistan further strengthened the pro-Soviet component of the PDPA regime, but it was met with caution in the international arena, including among Moscow's direct allies. The picture was different at the beginning of this century. The overthrow of the Taliban and the entry of foreign troops into Afghanistan received support from most of the world community. These actions took place in completely different and radically changed conditions of international relations after the collapse of the USSR. We quickly received general support and theses on the international terrorist threat from the territory of Afghanistan. Against the background of growing global fears of the spread of terrorism as a means of achieving political goals, the Afghan mission of international forces led to the formation of a fairly broad external coalition. The US-Western military operation was given a positive international context, and ISAF was given a UN mandate. The Soviet Union had neither a coalition nor such a mandate.

The emphasis was also placed differently in the propaganda support for the entry of foreign troops into Afghanistan. Washington's operation focused primarily on ensuring the national security of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and only then on the interests of the international community and the Afghans themselves (after all, at one time Washington was even inclined to recognize the Taliban regime). The Soviet leadership declared the military-political task in reverse order: first it was about the interests of the Afghan people and the "national democratic revolution", and only then-about the threat to the security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

As a direct consequence of foreign military intervention in the early twenty-first century, power in Kabul passed to a pro-Western government. The overthrow of the Taliban was positively received by the international community, while the PDPA's rise to power in the late 1970s aroused its wariness and rejection. Today, despite agreements on the division of power in the country between representatives of various ethnic and political groups, Washington, as well as the West as a whole, is playing a solo role in Kabul, and "American Afghans"are in the power structures. During the PDPA period, the external" first fiddle " in Afghanistan was the Soviet Union, and those in power were either ideologically closely related to the USSR, or received civilian and military education and professional training there.

However, in essence, neither of these two Kabul regimes, despite the fundamental differences in their political and economic doctrines, as well as in the scale of external support provided to them, was able to secure the support of the majority of the population.

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What is the "dry residue" of ten years of both the former Soviet and current American presence in Afghanistan? Practically none. None of the tasks designed to strategically solve the country's socio-political and economic problems were completed. These parallels in the" Afghan " strategy and tactics of Moscow and Washington confirm only the thesis that the resource base of external influence on the situation in Afghanistan and the internal logic of its development are fundamentally limited. External prescriptions-from radical socialists to liberal capitalists-have failed to ensure a national consensus and a strong central government in the country, regardless of its political, ideological, economic, or military orientation. "Stable instability" in the country against the background of the inability and unwillingness of local elites to reach real, rather than imaginary, agreements and compromises invariably blocked any attempts on this path. At the same time, external forces that offered their own recipes sooner or later became hostages of the current situation. As a result, additional conditions were created for military and political activity and opponents of any regime.

The most pressing question today is: how will the situation develop in and around Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops? It is clear that the overall external framework for such a conclusion will be more favorable for present-day Kabul than for the Kabul of the late 1980s. The situation of the current central government of the country is very different from that of the last PDPA government. Today, the Afghan leadership is not only not isolated on the world stage, but, on the contrary, enjoys international recognition and stable external support. All this creates a fundamentally different geopolitical situation in the world and around Afghanistan than that which was typical of the last decades of bipolar confrontation.

A significant advantage for today's Kabul is the more significant place of Afghanistan in the structure of regional international relations than it was at the end of the last century. Serious attention to the country from external forces is predetermined by the specific impact of the situation in Afghanistan not only on neighboring regions, but also on a broader scale. At the same time, internal instability in this country continues to create a breeding ground for regional military and political activity of the Taliban and for international terrorism. The difficult situation in Central Asia is influenced not only by the activities of the Taliban, but also by such opposition groups that cooperate with them and Al-Qaeda, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir, etc. The situation in Afghanistan is increasingly having a destabilizing effect on Pakistan. The situation is compounded by the fact that today Afghanistan has become the main world center of heroin production (which was not the case in the 1980s). In recent UN documents, this fact is recognized as a threat to international stability. With the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, all these negative components of the overall situation may increase.

It is fundamentally important for the prospects of not only Afghanistan, but also the entire region, that if earlier the main external outline of the Afghan issue was essentially determined by Soviet-American bipolarity, today the influence of multipolar trends is increasingly increasing, which predetermine the expansion of the geography of regional players in the Afghan field with their own interests and influence. In the near future, the West may try to ease the burden of its own spending by trying to partially involve others, including neighboring states, in solving Afghan problems. New bursts of turbulence in the neighboring Middle East region may also push Washington and Brussels to do this, which is fraught with diverting the material resources of the United States and other countries.

The West refuses to solve purely Afghan problems. However, it will be very difficult for Washington to shift some of the responsibility in Afghanistan to other countries, primarily because of the differences in the approaches of Afghanistan's neighbors to the problems of this country, and the ambiguity of their relations with the United States. When building a further line in the Afghan direction, the US administration will have to seriously take into account the wariness of the prospects for a long-term US military presence here, not least on the part of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. They themselves are likely to seek to avoid strategic commitments to Kabul in the long run, while maintaining their influence over specific aspects of its political and economic life. Against this background, the Afghan authorities themselves will have new opportunities to pursue the traditional policy of balancing and taking advantage of the contradictions of external forces already in a new, multipolar scenario in international relations.

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Despite all the weaknesses and shortcomings of the current government of Afghanistan, unlike the "late Najibullah" regime, it will not be left alone with its most odious opponents. Most states, including the country's neighbors, are not interested in this in any way. They will be united by a common interest in stability in the country and the desire to prevent its sharp radicalization. This is the scenario that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are essentially proposing today. To avoid this, the international community will continue to be forced to provide all possible assistance to Kabul at all financial and other costs. However, the question of whether he will be able to gain the upper hand over his internal opponents remains open.

Reconfiguring the current foreign military presence in Afghanistan will open another chapter in the" Big Game " in the Middle East, which is now in its third century. Schematically, it can be divided into six stages. The first chapter dealt with the rivalry between the British and Russian empires in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The second coincided with the First World War, when Germany was involved in the "game", and from 1917, Soviet Russia, which replaced the Russian Empire. The third chapter was turned around in the pre-war years and during the Second World War. The fourth - during the Cold War and the formation of a bipolar world with the key roles of the USSR and the United States. The fifth stage of the" Big Game " in relation to Afghanistan covered the period of PDPA rule, short-term rule of the Mujahideen, as well as the Taliban. The sixth chapter was opened by the Bonn Agreements of 2001, which marked the beginning of the formation of a pro-Western government and mainly Western influence in Afghanistan in the context of a fundamentally new structure of international and regional relations.

Time will tell when and how the seventh chapter of The Big Game will be written. The political game around Afghanistan is waiting to continue, while becoming more and more multifaceted and contradictory. So far, only one thing is clear: it will not be the last. 2014 is unlikely to be the final year for the full transfer of power to the Kabul Government in its current configuration. In fact, the developers of the new US strategy themselves recognize this. Deeply mired in Afghanistan, Washington is unlikely to risk leaving it without its "security umbrella"after 2014. It has already announced its intention to keep 25 thousand military personnel in the country and equip several military bases. Having started withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan, the Americans strongly emphasize their intention to fully counteract the scenario of "plunging the country into chaos", as it once happened after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This juxtaposition is not entirely correct. After all, it is Washington, along with Islamabad

At that time, I opposed as much as possible the Najibullah government, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, to complete the policy of national reconciliation. If the United States and Pakistan had put pressure on the Mujahideen and they had started negotiations with Kabul, and the Geneva Agreements developed earlier could have contributed to this, then subsequent events in Afghanistan might not have led to the emergence of the Taliban movement by the mid-1990s. Interested in a stable Afghanistan, regional players will have to put up with this situation, if possible extracting some dividends from it for themselves.

Troops of the third coalition in the last decade - the United States and NATO - in the Greater Middle East region are increasingly being drawn into the situation. The further the current new phase of the Middle East crisis continues, the more additional problems may arise for Western settlement schemes in Afghanistan. If the new instability in the Middle East leads to new relapses of territorial and national divisions, it may cause similar processes in the northern and north-western regions of Afghanistan, especially since such schemes were developed earlier. At the same time, attempts to implement such a scenario, including against the background of the simplified schemes put forward today in Washington for a certain regionalization of the north and south of this country, as well as its division along territorial, national and ethnic lines, could only lead to a sharp destabilization not only in Afghanistan, but also outside it. First of all, this applies to Central Asia, as well as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. Not only Uzbeks, Tajiks and other ethnic groups live in the territory of northern Afghanistan in a mixed way, but also the descendants of those resettled here at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. pashtuns. The question is how will these lands be divided, and how will new borders or delineations be drawn?! In addition to the inevitable sharp escalation in the north of the country, the situation will immediately lead to unrest among the Afghan Pashtuns. On the one hand, they are unlikely to agree to the division of the country, and on the other hand, they may once again start actively exploiting the slogan of "Great Pashtunistan" and the return of the original Pashtun lands that currently make up a significant part of the territory of Pakistan. Further escalation of instability in this country, which is still a key ally of Washington in South Asia, is unlikely to be in line with US interests in the region.

It would be most reasonable for both Kabul and external players in the Afghan field to ensure greater autonomy within the country, while maintaining its central authorities such key prerogatives as control over finances, foreign economic assistance and trade, domestic and foreign policy, security structures, etc. a radical change in the internal political and ideological orientation of the government is sufficient. It was in this vein that President Najibullah acted in order to survive in the early 1990s. It didn't work out. Will the current Kabul succeed, and will there finally be a national consensus on its future?

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