- Vadim Alexandrovich, what stages can we divide the counter-terrorism operation conducted by our troops since last summer?

- As such, they were not singled out by us. We were tasked with the complete destruction of the gangs, so we conditionally divide the operation into two phases. The first is the use of main forces. In particular, operations were carried out using aviation, artillery, and missile forces. Large-scale actions were carried out by groups of forces and resources. This is now behind us, and the entire territory is basically liberated and controlled by federal forces. Currently, other special operations are taking center stage. These include targeted зачисток населенных пунктов, identification of militants, destruction of the remnants of gangs in the mountains, and search for bases and ammunition depots, of which, as practice shows, there are still many. Recently, one of these bases was discovered in the mountains as a result of search and reconnaissance operations. I would say that it was one of the largest bases where weapons and ammunition were stored. This indicates that the militants were actively preparing for their actions. To the south of Bachi-Yurt, for example, there was a whole network of such bases belonging to the formations of Maskhadov and Khattab. In particular, buried in the ground 20-ton fuel tanks and mini-power plants were found there. This complex of bases was actively used by the militants. Moreover, everything was prepared long before yesterday. In short, they were preparing in advance. This situation is present in almost all of Chechnya. As a result, the troops are not conducting large-scale operations with significant forces, but rather special, targeted operations.

- What is the current phase of the operation characterized by, and what are the tactics for countering guerrilla groups, so to speak?

- In principle, this tactic is well-known. Of course, our troops are less prepared for such actions. Our units and formations are trained to combat organized armed groups, and our goal is to defeat the enemy's army. However, small militant units undoubtedly employ their own specific tactics. Therefore, our troops are currently learning how to effectively counter these groups. Although the timeline for these activities may be extended, we are not in a rush. Our objective is not immediate. After all, the President of Russia has clearly stated that we are here forever. This is the position we are taking. As a result, the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, which will be permanently stationed in the Chechen Republic, is being formed as a successor to the troops currently stationed there. We are increasingly involving Chechens in our activities. I am not hiding the fact that we are already seeing positive results. The people have turned to us. Compared to a year ago, this is already very noticeable. Most of the local residents don't want to fight right now, so they're showing us the militants. This is how we'll continue to approach our work. This war will be long-lasting. Let's look at historical experience: in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the last gangs were eliminated only by 1956... We are ready for a long process. However, the main goal is to change the psychology of the local residents, so that they perceive a person with a gun or a representative of the government not as a destroyer of their homes and hearths, but as a protector. This should be the focus of all government agencies and our educational institutions.

- You said that the main task of our federal troops is to destroy armed bandits. What was the number of militants during the initial phase of the counter-terrorist operation, and how many active and "conсервированных" bandits are currently opposing the federal troops?

- It's hard to say, because their troops are irregular. This means that there are real civilians walking around the city today who have a legitimate Russian passport. If they have a machine gun buried somewhere, they will act on the first signal. It's almost impossible to see and break through this line. In fact, most of them are "semi-peaceful." As for the number of mercenaries who chose an open form of confrontation and, being organized into certain gangs, are in the mountains, at their bases, we estimated it at twenty thousand at the beginning of the operation. Then there was an influx, and we do not hide the fact that it was not only Chechens. There were mercenaries from Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kazakhstan, and even Slavs. The Arab battalion, the so-called Islamic regiment, was significantly replenished. All of this has taken place, but we have now closed the border, and this flow has been significantly reduced. Nevertheless, they are somehow getting here. So far, their position and global goal are clear to us: there are attempts to seize the Caucasus through Chechnya. But this will not happen.

- Vadim Alexandrovich, you came to the position of Chief of Staff of the Joint Group from the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In your opinion, how can we compare the classical theory and the practical implementation of counter-terrorism operation plans? Is everything planned being carried out here?

- Of course, there are differences and deviations from the classic operation. Although mostly the meaning is the same. No one has changed the canons that we have been trained in all our lives, but, for example, the form of making and communicating a decision is somewhat different from what we worked out in the exercises. Here, decisions are made by a narrow circle, and information is communicated only to a specific performer. But during exercises, in peaceful conditions, a different method is used, maybe from the point of view of the educational process, the correct one: the plan of the commander of the troops is announced to a slightly larger audience, communicated to all participants. However, the methodology used here has been tested. In addition, we have passed through the Joint Headquarters quite a few officers who graduated from military academies and officers from the headquarters of various military districts. They have understood

page 12

The meaning of the mechanism for making and implementing decisions at this level. I think this is a modern methodology. And most importantly, we have worked out the interaction between the different branches of the Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies. We have learned how to manage the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the formations of the Ministry of Justice, and the Border Troops. In general, we work as a unified mechanism. By the way, the generals and officers who have gained experience in inter-branch communication and interaction are the foundation of the future army. For example, today our police officers are already quite proficient in working out solutions on maps. A year ago, they had no idea what it was...

- You mentioned practical training of personnel, in particular, when talking about graduates of military academies who have completed their internships with you. What do you think needs to be changed in the theory of tactics and operational art based on the experience already gained?

- First of all, we need to seriously consider the tactics of a simple soldier. Individual training should be at the forefront of all training, from digging a trench to dealing with extreme situations. Previously, we focused on working with a team as part of a unit, but now individual training has taken center stage: the skills and abilities of the soldier, their training, their resourcefulness, and, ultimately, their equipment and weapons. These are the components of success that contribute to victories.

Today, there are no large-scale operations here. We would quickly destroy any gang if it appeared. The gangsters know this, which is why they are hiding. In this type of militant tactics, it is the individual training and skills of the soldier that play a crucial role. Therefore, it is necessary to work very hard and seriously in this area. Perhaps there is a need to make changes to the regulations and the training of sergeants and cadets in military academies.

- Let's narrow the question: what is being done in terms of mountain training?

- Mountain training is the main component of individual training. And already in Botlikha, it was concluded that this is a serious issue. You can't get away with a Chapaevian assault here. You need systematic special training for units and appropriate equipment.

Today, we are advocating for the establishment of two or three mountain motorized rifle brigades equipped with modern special vehicles and standard pack animals. We also need helicopters with a specific transport capacity to transport wounded soldiers and deliver water. This is one of the significant challenges we face. We need to update our communication systems and make other necessary improvements. The mountains require careful planning and substantial financial investments. If you think about it, we've been fighting almost exclusively in the mountains for the past twenty years... Therefore, mountain experience requires serious reflection, and appropriate training requires improvement.

- Will large mountain training centers be established in this regard, similar to those that existed in the Turkestan and Transcaucasian military districts?

- Of course. We already have the Daryal training center. We created it in the district on an initiative basis. However, we need a few more. Suitable locations have already been identified.

- Does this mean that the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division will have a mountainous terrain?

- Naturally. In particular, the units stationed in Itum-Kale and Borzoye will have, so to speak, a mountainous inclination.

- Vadim Alexandrovich, if we compare the previous and current campaigns in general, what conclusions can we draw?

- I would not like to draw any analogies. Different political goals were pursued there. From a military point of view, the main difference in the ongoing counter-terrorism operation is that it was entrusted to the North Caucasus Military District from the very beginning, rather than to a team led by representatives of the General Staff. The district has all the necessary capabilities and trained officers. It has successfully carried out and continues to carry out all the assigned tasks. In the previous campaign, the operation was managed by everyone without any responsibility. This is one of the factors that has negatively affected the achievement of certain results. Currently, the military districts have established their own directions and assigned special functions to them. This war has confirmed the correctness and timeliness of this approach.

page 13

Постоянный адрес данной публикации: